October 2006 Archives

I had been cautious of posting here, as I self-promote enough on other blogs, but now that Aherring and Curtis have asked me to share my thoughts, I thought I will.

Attempts to establish what is meant by 5GW runs into two main problems.

  1. William Lind's dialectical definition of "generation" as a "dialectically qualitative shift" from the preceding generation. To the extent he means "something very different," I agree with him. But his phrase has shades of Hegelian-Marxist-Dialectic b.s. about it. The generation model of warfare is too important to let it be ghettoized by worthless academic philosophy.
  2. The use my some commentators (I won't name names) who see 5GW as just another useful buzzword, and so try to hijack it for their own quixotic theories. These writers seek to use deception to push their own agenda, by hijacking a more respected and developed theory's terminology to push their own.

We need to safeguard 5GW Theory against these twin evils of academic theossophy and marketing buzzwordspeak. This can be accomplished by defining "generation," or even better its symbol "G," as a scale. It seems to be that "G" measures the kinetic intensity of conflict, which every new G being approximately 20 times less intense than the one below it.

This holds up under a first analysis. Pre-Modern Warfare (the Zeroth Generation of Modern Warfare, "0GW," about 0Gs) is unremittingly genocidal. If the AD 1900s had the same fatality-from-war rate as the 6000s BC, we should have seen something like two billion war deaths. We might say that form the dawn of man to the dawn of agriculture war meant from measuring around 0.1 Gs on the kinetic intensity scale to .9 Gs.

Or think of it another way: 0G Warfare focuses on ending an enemy's ability to fight by killing their men. By the time we get to 4G Warfare almost none of the battle is in the field, but in the mind's of men who will live regardless. This 5GW we talk of seems to be even more mental and less physical, seeking to leave the men, material, and even will of the enemy essentially unchanged. If kinetic intensity is seen as morally bad, then every new G is a moral improvement. 5GW may truly be "moral war," compared to everything that has come before.

My thinking has evolved through recent posts and discussions on tdaxp. As I am a self-promoter (see above),l the links to these are below:

Sysadmin U.

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The other day a friend of mine and I were talking politics and the conversation moved into a discussion about the U.S. military’s growing pains as it has shifted from the offensive force that brought down Saddam’s Iraq to the force that has had to fight the peace, what Tom Barnett calls the Sysadmin. We both agreed that this would take much more than different sets of equipment and that combinations of skills would be needed for the job. Then my buddy said,

"Yeah, but they don’t teach that way so nobody goes to school for that."

I was thinking about that statement all day long.

One of my main goals here at Dreaming 5GW is to establish a definition of Fifth Generation Warfare. My hope is to be able to explain the general concept of 5GW in a short paragraph. With that in mind I have started with a ‘working definition’. This ‘working definition’ is by no means carved in stone. It is an acorn that has a very long way to go before it can be called a tree.

My ‘working definition’ currently reads:

Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW): an emergent theory of warfare premised upon strategically influencing change in systemic rule-sets through manipulation of multiple horizontal systems. (Arherring 10/21/06)

This ‘working definition’ reflects my current thinking that the progression of rule-set, system perturbation, new rule-set is the process 5GW will employ in its operations. I realize this progression is nothing new and often is a result of military operations, but unlike previous generational warfare where new rule-sets following system perturbations are a side effect, it is the directed focus on this process as method of action that I feel makes it a new generation concept.

To go along with this ‘working definition’ I have a list of topics that I wish to explore in more detail. Some I feel will have a direct effect on the shape of 5GW to come and some are merely topics that I think will be interesting to consider in light of 5GW.

This list currently contains (in no particular order):

Command push and recon pull in 5GW operations.
The roles and types of system perturbations.
The roles and types of rule-sets.
5GW as stage magic, Illusion or sleight-of-hand.
5GW as con game, flim-flam or grift.
The inherent (?) secrecy of 5GW.
The distinction between kinetic and non-kinetic actions.
The consideration of creative destruction.
The consideration of shaping a battle space.
The practice of warfare by proxy.
Open and Closed Source organizations applied to 5GW.
The ideal size of a 5GW organization.
The ability (requirement?) of operating on all sides of a conflict.
Increasing and decreasing resiliency as a 5GW manipulation.
The ability (requirement?) to operate as horizontally as possible.
The role of networks and new technology.

My intent is to revise the ‘working definition’ as I consider each of these topics to reflect my increased understanding of the material. Indeed, the real purpose of the ‘working definition’ is to generate more questions.

Some interesting commentary on that post.  I wanted to highlight the commentary and my reactions, but this, it turns out, requires a lengthy post; so follow below the fold .........

Future Starlight

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An intriguing post from Kent's Imperative that may have major implications for conducting fifth generation warfare:

"Searching Starlight"

One of the other very key Insights from the Proteus study was the concept of Starlight – the complex and variable effects of time and distance on perceptions of information about events; and the impact of those effects on intelligence problems.
The metaphor is meant to remind us that the pattern of stars we see in our night sky is in fact not the reality; it is the past reality.  (Given how much time has passed since the light first left those stars.)  When we witness events in the world, the same sort of delay may happen: we are only seeing a past emergence, but whatever confluence of forces caused that emergence has since passed on (although those individual forces may still exist).  It might even be supposed that those forces have been altered by the newly emerged situation to which they helped give birth  I'm sure many other thoughts might spring from thinking of Starlight -- for instance, the way people respond to order vs the way they respond to chaos; what they are seeing is a past order or, really, multiple past orders.  They may be acting upon that perception even before they are aware that new orders have since emerged from new 'confluences.'

The post links to another considering Google, 'the level 50 magician' , particularly how Google is amassing information and not only enabling better ways of compiling that information but also probably ahead of the curve, itself, on compiling it.  In closing, Kent's Imperative links this, the future of the Intelligence Community, and Starlight:
Foresight and uncertainty management become the objects of the intelligence cycle in the future; the task for the Intelligence Community, therefore, is not merely the cataloging of events, but more the recognition of patterns. As a result, given finite resources, sensors may be less important than new ways to analyze complex data...
Ah yes, pattern recognition... Acting without that ability, or with a very limited ability for pattern recognition, may be a hallmark of the inept ones.

However, I'm not certain that recognizing past patterns, even if we recognize that they are past patterns, will always enable a prediction of future starlight, on this our global scale: not all stars are visible to the naked eye.

I am leaping ahead in this post to a summarizing look at John Robb's Global Guerrillas, fueled by my own thoughts concerning the recent Barnett-Robb 5GW debate as well as a bit by Mark Safranski's thoughts on the matter.  Mostly though, I see that some of my most recent characterizations had latent within them a possible answer to the debate, something I find intriguing enough to justify this leap.  Anyone who has not followed the debate is encouraged to read my last Barnett-Robb post and follow the links from there to the pertinent entries on either man's blog.

Perhaps it is the Zen in the ZenPundit that has led Mark Safranski to ask, "5GW Emergent -- But What is It?" while maintaining neutrality between the opposing views.  Neutrality is of course the wrong word, since he views both approaches with interest and not a little agreement either way.  However, it is Mark's addendum on system perturbations -- and addendum #2, linking to Arherring's consideration of system perturbations here on Dreaming 5GW -- that holds the first key for linking the opposing points of view under the heading "5GW"......

Barnett and Robb

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Short on time today and tomorrow.  Too bad, because 5GW discussion has been ratcheted up in our little neighborhood on the AllSpace.  Here are some links and a few remarks; but I will definitely be returning to these shortly, when I have the time to properly address them!

Thomas Barnett has posted his Own Personal 5GW Dream, in which he heavily references Dreaming 5GW!  So much is given in this build-it-as-you-go post, I feel almost ashamed offering only minor observations while I wait for the time (a day or two) I need to really dig into the post.  But that would be point #1:

  1. So much is given in this build-it-as-you-go post.  Not very secret, is it?  Reading the post, I felt those intransigent but highly active fingertip feelings squirming within me.  This post is like Barnett throwing down the gauntlet, and it might have been too early.  The dream he gives will terrify enough people, if it were given in Congress (just imagine!  But I don't know his readership; it might already be!), the opposition to his dream would be mobilized.  (As it has been; but that's another blogger, whose recent activity I'll address in a moment.)
  2. I do like Barnett's thinking, however, and he's far more right than wrong (something I've been saying a lot lately, about not only Barnett.)  The biggest problem with his dream may be seen in how various commenters around the web are responding to it:  Ok, so America assumes a false 'failing' in order to motivate China to become more active; that sounds 5GW, but Barnett's a little too blasé about this.  In order for America to emerge "fat, rich, and safe for the long haul," a country named 'America' needs to still exist by the end of things.  We were fortunate that we had time to readjust to our disillusionment after Vietnam; I doubt we have that luxury now.  So when he says,
    all this talk of winning-while-appearing-to-lose simply won't wash. You simply can't manipulate people and countries like that.
    I wish he would stop thinking about other countries for a bit and think about the American psyche.  This is not to say that it cannot be done, but only that it would need to be managed a little better than that.  America must be occupied in feeling quite successful, even as other nations -- China, in particular -- gain motivation from America's seeming failure in areas like the Middle East.  (Heh, side-thought that's been bouncing around in my head:  If we were to annex Mexico, or at least some Mexican states, the introspection required to turn eyes away from 'failure' in the Middle East, as well as a reinvigoration and a feeling of American worth -- i.e., expansion -- could both be achieved.  Hmmm.)

Speaking of naturally motivating opposition... This talk of 5GW has motivated John Robb to rechristen his Global Guerrillas as 5GWarriors: "THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW)".  He let slip the 'GG as 5GW' meme in the post before that post, which I addressed here in my last D5GW entry.  His method is disingenuous, to say the least, since he has previously:
  1. Argued that GG is 4GW; because 'Lind said so'.
  2. Argued that it's just too, too early to call 5GW.  (And this less than a week ago!)  Even worse, he usually says such things while saying, in effect, I agree with Lind: too early to call 'er!
  3. And now, he pulls a Lind, steals a title, and his destruction-oriented mythical creatures have become 5GW Warriors -- because, I think, the idea of 5GW must be coopted since much 5GW discussion concerns building order, and Robb sees that such a framework will shut his forthcoming book out.  Any theory of perpetual, unstoppable chaos & violence must necessary disregard any notion of emergent order.
On that second point and link:  If you follow the comments, you can see how clearly Robb has been motivated to do #3.  After a consideration of 'prematurity', given by Mark Safranski of ZenPundit, Robb comments,
Zen, then we are likely seeing it in some of the evolutionary behavior I have documented on GGs.

You see the wheels turning, there.

But, as I've said I've said a lot lately, Robb may be more right than wrong, at least on some particulars; and I can see how his wheels have been greased.  I've addressed the GG debate before -- "Lind, Robb, Dan, PurpleSlog, CGW" -- and come now to the same conclusions.  Robb appears to have a fairly good grasp on a phenomenon we may face in the future, but he is describing an environment more than a generation of warfare or any coherent operational dynamic (i.e., if you take the GG in toto; however, some methods of GG are clear and coherent, if taken piecemeal.)  He may not be seeing the entire dynamic; but clearly seeing some aspects of it, he's taking those aspects and drawing logical conclusions.

Robb actually responds directly to Barnett's dream -- by calling it "Totally unreal" -- and Barnett has responded with a field of flowers and weeds.  I wrote a comment on Barnett's response, which has not posted yet (it's in moderation; for some reason, my Typekey login did not click from the preview page), which I'll repost here.  After another commenter questions Barnett's statement, that he "[doesn't] see nonstate actors, nor their networks, becoming stronger over time," I wrote this:

I don't know what Barnett sees, but perhaps 'stronger' for these specific non-state actors is relative to the forces of stability. In GG and similar theories, there appears to be an assumption that approx. 99.9% of the world population (or more!) will just sit back and let the forces of chaos reign, that even the kind of devastation possible by a superempowered individual will outweigh any kind of potential response to such devastation. Chaos is assumed to emerge, but order is not.

The biggest problem with such a theory (of many) is this assumption of passivity for the vast majority of the human population. Whereas, every single bit of technology, from the low-tech to the futuristic high-tech, will also be available to those 99.9%. Methods of social organization (e.g., open source) will also be available to those 99.9%. In fact, many of those 99.9% will also be 'superempowered,' just like Robb's mythical GG's. So a better vision of the future would take these factors into account: From a Wild West perspective, the chaos will not only be about 'bestial strangers' (demons) appearing from nowhere to destroy all the hard-built homesteads, leading to perpetual wilderness, but also about the efforts of those building their livelihood amidst the chaos.

And that metaphor, btw, makes no difference whether you take a nativist or a homesteader p.o.v., since either group worked hard to establish their own particular sense of order. Despite all the chaos that came from conflict, an order emerged. So when Robb will argue on the one hand that these demons popping up all over the place will have no common motivation but destruction, and on the other hand that they will somehow manage to work together in a stable 'bazaar of violence' funded by a stable 'black globalization' and developing into 'virtual states' -- first they are disconnected 4GWarriors he says, then when 5GW discussion kicks in, his GG are somehow suddenly 5GWarriors rather than 4GW -- I think he is only trying to work around the fact that even these pseudo-demons will have tendencies toward order: i.e., establishing their own sort of order. They are not endless chaos generators.

Barnett's far too easy on John Robb. GG, in order for it to actually become a reality, has been twisted into a self-sustaining prophesy powered by selective but obstinate ignorance -- i.e., by ignoring large realities. If you believe real demons exist, and moreover that they are entirely unstoppable because no real angels exist, you'll buy into the prophecy being given by Robb.

On the other hand: and this is important: as I've argued before, Robb's outlining a phenomenon rather than a generation of warfare or any type of coherent operational methodology. When I read GG, I pay close attention to what Robb is saying, because he is in large part describing a significant aspect of the environment that will face us (who are the 99.9% he generally disregards.) There is of course the possibility, I think, that some one GG faction or handful of superempowered individuals will succeed in a major strike at order, fueled by destructive high technology, causing everything to collapse globally; a particularly vicious virus might do it. So there is that to keep in mind. Organizations like Lifeboat (and many others) are keeping that in mind, however.

---------------

More will come, when I have more time!




UPDATE: Corrected link to John Robb's CHANGING FACE OF WAR post.

Also, TDAXP takes a look at GG with "5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is Incoherent)"

System Perturbation: A situation that causes a break down in, or invalidation of, a system level rule-set

Rule-Set: The underlying principles (groups of rules) that define and govern norms of behavior and conduct.

Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW): The strategic mindset premised upon creating or manipulating a system perturbation in order to change an existing rule-set or replace an obsolete rule-set. (10/14/06 Arherring)


As 5GW is an emerging and developing theory, trying to carve it in stone at this point would be foolish. For the purposes of this discussion, however, I am going to stick the above definition as my working definition. The definitions of system perturbation and rule-set are taken from Tom Barnett among others but reflect my personal understanding of the concepts.

As I wrote previously in Welcome to the World of 5GW, there are multitudes of ways people are approaching the theory of 5GW. These approaches are mostly focusing on the execution of 5GW rather than its underlying principles, what it will look like more than why it looks like that. I can understand the reasoning for this approach though I notice that what people see in 5GW execution seems to reflect a great deal of their previous theories. The three example scenarios I used in Welcome to the World of 5GW were; memetic engineering, the super-empowered individual, and Sysadmin. I will confess that in the interests of appealing to as many readers as possible I was attempting to make them sound as different as possible.

They are not. In reality they are virtually identical...

Or is that, 'the Arc of 5GW'?

On Coming Anarchy:

On ZenPundit:
On Global Guerrillas / John Robb's Weblog:

Some interesting 5GW-related discussion ......

A commenter at John Robb's Weblog asks the question,

If 5GW is getting others to do what you want them to do of their own free will (though maybe that is not the best definition?), where is the "war" part? [Ryan Luke]
The question is in two parts and inspires a third.

On Free Will

First, the question of free will seems to assume that merely because a target acts according to the dictates of his own free will, he must have perfect freedom.  Without going into a long philosophical treatise on the subject of free will, I'll just point out that whatever will is exercised will be exercised in relation to the environment surrounding -- and having surrounded, in the past -- the target.  To the degree that his capability for observation is and has been limited, his reasoning will also be limited, and the will to act flowing from that reasoning will be limited.

This is accordance with the operation of the Revised OODA, and why I repeat that reasoning operates outside the strict lines of cause & effect.  For instance, Americans and Iraqis may interpret the destruction of a mosque in different ways and come to different conclusions and ultimately decide on different acts responding to such an attack.  Or, think of a church being destroyed in America and a mosque being destroyed in Iraq, or a cartoon attacking Christianity being published in America and a cartoon attacking Islam being published in Europe:  While true that the actual act is slightly different in each case -- one is a church, one a mosque; one attacks Christianity, one attack Islam; one is in America, the other is in Iraq or Europe -- the actual acts are quite similar but the reasoning utilized to come to an understanding of such events will be informed by past observations including upbringing, tradition, past experiences, etc. which are not as similar.

You might argue that cause & effect is ubiquitous and can be used to understand the differences in conclusions reached by different people -- and, many network theorists put their faith in such an argument -- but even though the universe operates by cause & effect, increased complexity and human cognition result in lines of cause & effect between observation and act which span multiple time frames and multiple environments outside the strict lines of present time and present environments.  Moreover, for any individual the chances for observation have been limited by his mortality and his ever-real limitations in perceptual observation, regardless of the time he has lived and the environments he has witnessed.  His will to act will also be bounded by these limitations.

So much for 'free' will.

For a philosophical treatise, read Plato, who thought that the leaders of the Republic should often lie to its citizens simply because those citizens would create lies of their own quite naturally anyway, and that the Republic would be better served insuring that the lies believed by the citizens were productive and beneficial for the Republic (and thus, for the citizenry).  There are those who hate the thought -- but their faith in 'free will' requires faith in human omniscience and human omnipresence.  (One might make a utilitarian argument for such unbounded faith in 'free will', or even a 5GW argument, however....)

5GW effectors will recognize the bounds of human observation and thus the bounds of free will.

On "the 'war' part"?

This manipulation of observation would appear to be non-war by traditional definitions.  The glory of dismembering bodies and destroying infrastructure in the pursuit of 'showing the enemy what's what!' would seem to be sidelined.  In fact, the question seems almost to come from a 1GW perspective, and I have occasionally witnessed the greatest disdain for 5GW theory coming from soldiers and their officers in the field.  They have after all been trained to dismember enemies and destroy battle placements, or to wipe out an enemy's operational capability through a quite limited EBO which seems less limited simply because the devastation can be directed over large areas through targeted aerial  bombings and missile strikes.

We are witnessing the effectiveness of these strategies in Iraq and on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are we not?

The ability to motivate an enemy to surrender or to take that reaction out of the equation by utterly destroying the enemy will prove less and less effective as that enemy host disperses over a larger battlefield and hides its fluid-- dynamic -- placement.  You may destroy Zarqawi utterly, but his death is not the death of Muhammad or bin Laden or any of any number of other enemies lurking elsewhere who may in fact be motivated to continue fighting by their personal salvation from the fate that came to Zarqawi.  Showing that enemy 'what's what!' is exactly what you are doing:  "I can kill this person quite easily, see! (but you, alas, have been able to escape me.)"

Or: "See how easily I destroy weapons depots, bridges, and roads! (and how easily you can maneuver around these losses)."

What's what is the question in 5GW, really.

Giving your enemy the 'free will' to act is not giving your enemy an unbounded freedom to act, although because 5GW does not rely on being able to utterly destroy the enemy or infrastructure or at least dismember that enemy, it would seem to be something other than war to those whose concept of war is not in the context of anything else.

Fifth Generation War

It may be that those who understand war through a limited context of concrete destruction will prove by their belief to be the very best methods by which a 5GW effector can accomplish his goals.  In response to that comment on John Robb's weblog, I referenced an old post on a purported al-Qaida document discovered in Iraq after Zarqawi's death: "Al-Qaida Goes 5GW -- or not."

In the document, al-Qaida operatives consider the possibility of embroiling America in another war -- against the Shi'ites in general, or against Iran in particular -- in order to weaken America.  I.e., if America's concept of showing the enemy 'what's what!" remains what it appears to be, then an organization such as al-Qaida (who operates similarly) might well depend on America's faith in concrete destruction of perceived enemies.  Help America to perceive new enemies, and you motivate America to dedicate the type of resources America believes will be necessary for destroying that enemy.  Changing that enemy may be less of a concern for America than destroying that enemy; or, rather, the only methods for change understood by the American Administration are methods of direct physical change via a limited EBO, etc. --

So, then, how could a hidden 5GW force defeat a fuzzy 4GW force?  Influence it to fight another force, one it already despises  — and, preferably, one it cannot defeat.  Or, introduce dispute within it, of the sort that would paralyze its activities, create massive amounts of in-fighting.  Or, befriend it; give it real accomplishments (perhaps by surreptitiously influencing other parties who can give them these) which, nonetheless, lead to final outcomes quite different than it originally intended. Because a 4GW force tends to be decentralized, dependent on local actors and local activities, focus on influencing them. Do not try to destroy the 4GW force; focus on changing it. [Initiating 5GW]

-- of course, such methods may be quite effective if the target of EBO -- the perceived enemy -- has a quite similar concept of warfare.  However, the 5GW effectors who have motivated America to utilize EBO in such a manner can sit back and watch the devastation caused by that EBO, to both parties.

So while I hypothesize an ultimately non-violent low-grade-fever type of 5GW sometime in the future, the fact remains that any 5GW organization will need to work with and within the belief systems currently in place.  You motivate by triggering faith or else by creating a new faith; and as long as faith in 'the war part' remains what it is, plenty of dismembering and devastation may play a role in any 5GW plan.

My reason for hypothesizing a development toward 5GW planning now lies in the growing general understanding that 3GW and even 4GW will prove less and less effective because the devastation possible in either type grows exponentially as technology advances and because global society is becoming interdependent (what some call 'networked'.)  So for instance China might be modernizing its military, preparing a kind of MAD stalemate for third generation warfare between great powers, and any sort of move China would like to make for advancing its influence in the world would be informed by the understanding that 3GW between great powers would be counterproductive.  As the technology increases destructive capability, more and more actors on the world stage may see this as a signal for both:  1) avoid open confrontation yourself, 2) but embroil your enemy in such confrontation with a third party, if possible.

Welcome to the World of 5GW

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First off I would like to give a big thanks to Tom Barnett, Zenpundit, TDAXP, Purpleslog, John Robb and many others (especially Curtis Weeks!) for setting the perfect stage to introduce Dreaming 5GW. We couldn’t have arranged it better ourselves . . . or did we?

Yes friends, welcome to the world of 5GW, land of conspiracy theory, confidence game, warfare by proxy and all good things that keep the royalty checks rolling in for Action / Adventure / Spy / Thriller novelists the world over. Come! Come out of the bright light and into the shadows, the realm of misdirection and sleight of hand. I am Keyser Soze, your guide, your friend. I have 31 flavors of 5GW for your pleasure. Take all that you wish but beware, sometimes that which seems most bitter is sometimes merely the least sweet . . .

Lots of interesting commentary on 5GW over the last day.  It is this type of chatter, more than anything, that led me to question Dan's assessment that "The American System of Government is as brilliant at defending itself from 5GWs as from 4GWs." -- as well as the idealized version of Thomas Barnett's paradigm-shifting strategies for preempting opposition within the Gap, questioned in yesterday's post.  How much 'democratization' of the OODA 'observe' will be allowed by grand strategists and grand paradigm builders?  As social systems move away from concrete totalitarian structures and the decision-making process becomes more democratized, more complex, the field for 5GW ripens; the board becomes set by becoming perpetually unsettled.  The OODA is not merely the O; no, it involves other levels of cognition and reasoning, reasoning is always from a limited observational capability which removes it from the strict lines of cause & effect, and although the World may be the same for everyone, individual assessments of it will differ.  Complexity introduces perplexity.

Thomas Barnett considered this in another recent post, "Fifth Generation (political) warfare," in which he considered the plight of Conrad Burns from Montana:

Constant observation of the foe. Unrelenting surveillance. Every gaffe exposed and then run ad nauseum on the web. His ability to orient himself as desired in the race is disrupted.

Conrad Burns, the incumbent, is trailed everywhere on the campaign by a young operative for the Dems who videotapes him non-stop every chance he gets, waiting for the screw-up.
Why does this sort of preemption of the OODA work?  Because one set of possible observations -- Conrad Burns' legislative history, his political epistemology in action; and his family interactions, etc. -- is usurped by the constant introduction of new data sliced quite separate from that history.  I've discussed this sort of thing before, in my posts on the Revised OODA; in a way, it is a 3GW cognition attack on the undecided voters, who, being offered a constant stream of new data, are being forced to make snap judgments impulsively.  Or else, for the Democratic party faithful, it is the 4GW reinforcement of an old assessment of Burns, leading to yet more habitual assessments.  (And actually, what starts as a 3GWish attack on orientation may over time become a 4GW reinforcement of assessments, if the data is sliced along the same parameters regularly enough.)

Ad agencies do it, and the process is none too new for political parties.  Ministers and weblog pundits do it as well.  (Can anyone say, "Ms. Malkin"?)  It is so old, we have the example of Cato: "Delenda est Carthago!"

One might attempt the same in a totalitarian system; but the populace, lacking power to do much to change the status quo, are not as apt to act on their assessments, and the head of the totalitarian state is not as apt to follow whatever popular assessment is being whispered on the streets.  In a democracy, things work differently.

Notice how Mark Safranski picks up on the importance of surveillance for a state wishing to defend itself from 5GW:
The state in turn, is vulnerable to a proliferation of such superempowered individuals and will have to defend itself with a combination of surveillance and active cultivation of primary loyalties ( reducing the motivation for such individuals to act out in antisocial ways).
This may actually be true of any state, if we are to think of state-citizen interactions in terms of social contracts.  In any case, the totalitarian state certainly wishes to defend itself from 'superempowered individuals' -- i.e., from individuals empowered by rights to privacy, the right to vote and demonstrate and meet, the right to carry arms, and so forth.  So this too is nothing new.  The 5GW trick has been to give the populace the belief that it is the state, although Mark appears to separate the two in offering his prescription for 'the state's' consideration.  (In a perhaps not-too-well considered post on Christianity and 5GW, I once suggested that the founders of America had pulled off a 5GW coup.  I also suggested that 'dispensational premillennialism' was introduced into Christianity in order to combat the socialist tendencies of amillenialist Christianity:  Give people the power to assess the level of their own personal salvation, the power to achieve it on their own while disregarding the spiritual welfare of others, and you have 'superempowered' people who will believe they act entirely of their own free will, and that they may act powerfully.  I.e., you set the 5GW chessboard.)

These things are why I say that Thomas Barnett's system for change in the Gap and the world is more likely to lead to 5GW opposition than squelch it.  John Robb's more right than wrong when he contemplates perpetual chaos for the future, which he usually does.  However, as I contemplated yesterday, some shadow lies over the exact shape that the future will take, and this constant lack of settling -- this chaos -- may not be perpetual violence.  I.e., Barnett would introduce the sort of political chaos he has described for America into the Gap: remove totalitarianism and insert 'democratized' OODA loops, and you therefore remove totalitarian methods (concerted violence) while introducing democratic conflict (mass and constant chatter.)  If 3GW and 4GW always threaten world destruction, particularly as technology advances, then even 5GWarriors may be more inclined to find non-violent methods for domination.

Shloky has in fact postulated post-5GW conflict that results from the 'technological singularity' predicted by Kurzweil et al.  My first impression is that all the bets of current 5GW theory are off once such a major change occurs; this includes the advent of advanced nanotechnology.  I.e., if I'm alive when these things occur, I'm quite certain I'll revise my assessment of the fifth generation of warfare.  However, until humans stop being humans, the process of observe - orient -decide - act will continue to shape human activity, and I expect 5GW to adapt & grow with these changes.


UPDATE: Speaking of democracy, it would appear (and has appeared for some time) that advocates of democracy work into their designs 5GW methods as a matter of course; check out "Developing a Strategy for Fifth Generation Warfare" on Democracy Project. (HT: ZenPundit.) I.e., using commercial advertising and focused messages to insert members of one's own party into key positions...is fundamental to the operation of democracy as currently practiced.

First, I would like to welcome visitors to Dreaming 5GW, a new cooperative blog focusing on various theories of fifth generation warfare.

Over the course of the last year and a half, I've been both, intrigued by various blogospheric discussions concerning 5GW and often inspired to address the subject myself on my blog Phatic Communion: inspired by bloggers Dan of tdaxp, Mark Safranski of ZenPundit, and Younghusband of Coming Anarchy.  Discussions of 5GW have ranged between these excellent blogs and have led to conversations on Phatic Communion as well, through which I have had the good fortune to engage in related discussion with others who have also discovered the subject -- in much the same way I did -- and found it fascinating.

Lately, however, I have felt the need to consolidate the conversations in whatever way I could.  Perhaps this was a result of seeing so many searches for "5GW" in my blog's stats which never developed beyond the quick hit on my weblog by strangers who may -- or may not? -- have found what they were looking for; but I think the desire to find a home for 5GW theory has come from my own wish to explore the topic in more detail without having to constantly travel the Blogospheric Highway piecing together the conversations.  (Or, indeed, without needing to search Phatic Communion for the 5GW-related posts and conversations every time I wanted to revisit the topic!)

At the same time, the conversations on 5GW which had inspired me...inspired me greatly because they approached the topic from angles I had not considered.

Trying to suss out what the next generation of warfare will be is like trying to predict exactly what some future language will be after who knows how many cultures, geopolitical and geologic events, and technological innovations have first occurred:  it will probably have some relation to modern English but is unlikely to be exactly like the English I am now using.  (Indeed, who knows how much of a typical conversation from the year 2340 would be intelligible to a 21st century American?)

Thus, I recognized the need to maintain the diversity represented by cross-blog conversations on the topic, and I decided that a similar approach would be valuable for Dreaming 5GW.  It is my hope that the different angles provided by the contributors to Dreaming 5GW -- each with his own eye training on the wide-ranging WWW, on the world, and indeed on what Thomas Barnett has recently called the 'AllSpace' -- that each individual contributor OODA, will provide a better composite angle on 5GW than I could possibly accomplish on my own.




"The sandwich generations-of-war strategy" -- Thomas P.M. Barnett

"5GW and Ruleset Automation" -- Dan, of tdaxp.

"A Strategic Dagwood" -- Mark Safranski, ZenPundit.

Speaking of Thomas Barnett... I had planned to take a day or two off after completing the designs and setup for Dreaming 5GW (a somewhat tedious affair) but from the blue comes an intriguing correlation with something I had only tangentially suggested previously:  That Thomas Barnett may actually be a 5GWarrior.

A 5GW operation will create conditions and contingencies to avoid detection by hiding among the crazies. I can see where parts of an operation might purposely be exposed and then linked with false information and crazy theories to discourage real investigation. All of this is aimed at the observation part of the OODA loop of the opponent.

[PurpleSlog, "5GW Will Hide in the Sea of Conspiracy Theories to Avoid Discovery"]
So, then, how could a hidden 5GW force defeat a fuzzy 4GW force? Influence it to fight another force, one it already despises — and, preferably, one it cannot defeat. Or, introduce dispute within it, of the sort that would paralyze its activities, create massive amounts of in-fighting. Or, befriend it; give it real accomplishments (perhaps by surreptitiously influencing other parties who can give them these) which, nonetheless, lead to final outcomes quite different than it originally intended. Because a 4GW force tends to be decentralized, dependent on local actors and local activities, focus on influencing them. Do not try to destroy the 4GW force; focus on changing it.

[Phatic Communion, "Initiating 5GW"]
Let’s interrupt the theorizing and consider some specifics. Insofar as I can follow 5GW theory, the 9/11 attack could be called a 5GW operation....

[Alan Sullivan, commenting at Phatic Communion]
Hello Alan. I’ve been trying to put my finger on the 5GW aspects of al-Qaeda activity.

The present insurgency in Iraq, the followup bombings in Madrid and London, the bombings in Egypt (and the abduction of foreign diplomats in Iraq) have the hallmark of a 4GW war: the effort to sap the will of the targeted enemy. In Madrid, al-Qaeda succeeded.

9/11 was something else, since it really initiated so many present countermoves by America, rather than sap America’s will. Most of America didn’t realize we were fighting jihadists until 9/11.

[CGW, responding]





Are we on the cusp of a revolution in warfare...?
Humans have been organizing themselves into complex social networks simce they emerged from the stage of tiny hunter-gatherer bands. They did so "naturally" and unconsciously without understanding how this pattern mirrored that of other complex systems....

There are already attempts to understand networks in terms of terrorism and military strategy and these efforts to exploit this information in order to reap a comparative advantage will only proliferate, perhaps exponentially. In other words, as complex network theory meets cultural evolution, humans will attempt to consciously "steer" the evolutionary devlopment of social and, eventually, biologically engineered networks.

[Mark Safranski, ZenPundit, in "What happens when networks meet 'The Logic of Human Destiny' ?"]
All of these elements already exist. They are not the product of ‘futurism,’ of gazing into a crystal ball.

[William Lind,  “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”]
Lind has already pointed at an area that may have significant refinement in the future, whenever he has written of psychological warfare, the power of media, and attacking a society’s culture.  But in 1989 he believed these things would be supplemental. Others since have focused on a limited use of these, since 4GWarriors in theory would influence societies in only a small handful of ways via media and culture warfare.  They have seen these things, because media has always been extraordinarily important to human societies, whether merely in the form of language, or of poetry, or of edicts, or of scientific texts, or of Theses nailed to Church doors, or of holy words and texts preserved for millennia.

[Phatic Communion, "Lind, Robb, Dan, PurpleSlog, CGW"]

Today I discovered a visitor referred from the Norwegian version of Wikipedia to my post "5GW and Christianity."  The article is on fifth-generation warfare and includes links to tdaxp, ZenPundit, Global Guerrillas, PurpleSlog, and Coming Anarchy.  (All of which can be found in my blogroll on the main page of PC.)  So naturally, I searched for the English language version, and found one.  The article appears to be only the bare outline for a new article, and the English version does not include a complete list of the many "external links" included on the Norwegian page --  although the numbers for those external links do link to articles on the blogs already mentioned.

The English article may also be subject to deletion for violating the Wikipedia "No original research" policy. A discussion has in fact begun today concerning deletion. That discussion is also quite bare, as yet.

The article needs some work to make it Wikipedia-compliant.  I wonder how much sourced material is necessary, and of exactly what variety, quality?  The idea behind 5GW is quite new, after all, and may be only theoretical, bouncing as yet between only a handful of interested bloggers. The "no original research policy" clearly states the following:

However, it also includes new interpretation, analysis, or synthesis of published data, statements, or concepts --including that which would amount to, in the words of Wikipedia's co-founder Jimbo Wales, a "novel narrative or historical interpretation."
On the other hand, the line between "reputable sources" and other sources is growing thin, as the Blogosphere and the Internet in general grow.  For instance, the Wikipedia policy also states:
Wikipedia articles include material on the basis of verifiability, not truth. That is, we report what other reliable sources have published, whether or not we regard the material as accurate. In order to avoid doing original research, and in order to help improve the quality of Wikipedia articles, it is essential that any primary-source material, as well as any generalization, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, or evaluation of information or data, has been published by a reputable third-party publication (that is, not self-published) that is available to readers either from a website (other than Wikipedia) or through a public library. It is very important to cite sources appropriately, so that readers can find your source and can satisfy themselves that Wikipedia has used the source correctly. [ed. -- my emphasis]
Most of the blogs cited in the article are self-published, but in the Blogosphere, certain sections of each blog article may be republished in other blogs.  The "third-party publication " may not be "reputable" (as it often is not) if that third party is a blog; but deciding a definition for "reputable" may become more of a problem in the future, and one wonders if blog rankings might eventually be the scale used to determine reputability.

The Wikipedia policy also makes clear that "source-based research" is perfectly fine:
Original research that creates primary sources is not allowed. However, research that consists of collecting and organizing information from existing primary and/or secondary sources is, of course, strongly encouraged. All articles on Wikipedia should be based on information collected from published primary and secondary sources. This is not "original research"; it is "source-based research", and it is fundamental to writing an encyclopedia.
But one may wonder, as I have, if every topic on the Blogosphere must have its own article in Wikipedia...In any case, the article as currently written does not objectively present the different concepts of 5GW being bandied about the 'Net. I think that a healthier discussion of 5GW, including pros and cons of many particulars from many more sources, ought to precede a Wikipedia article, in order for that article to have true objectivity in selecting sources and presenting the idea of 5GW to those new to the concept. It may be too early.


UPDATE 6-17-06: The article has now been deleted by Wikipedia. We might view this as an example of network resilience. Or not.

Preface

As regular readers probably already know, debate over the characterization of John Robb's "Global Guerrillas" has been spotlighted in various places around this tiny section of the web.

PurpleSlog initiated the recent debate in "Am I Understanding the Gist of the Global Guerilla Concept?" and remains truly objective throughout the debate.  With Dan tdaxp, PurpleSlog arrived at the consideration that the GG movement might be a type of 3GW -- which seemed a good characterization from my perspective:
Is there a reason a Light Infantry variant of 3GW could not appear? [PurpleSlog]
As even Lind said in "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,"
Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a contest of [material] because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack. [William S. Lind]
The blitzkrieg characterizes the change toward greater maneuverability; but could greater maneuverability be achieved at the infantry level, in response to the superior material force of an opponent...?

...after getting a little hot air from Michelle Malkin: "Michelle Malkin uses 5GW to strike back" --

Michelle Malkin has a new weapon in her arsenal. It is called Hot Air, yeah right, like a hydrogen bomb emits hot air! Her latest vlog post is called Freedom is not free. Amen, sister.

Today, I was introduced to a concept (5GW) that should have been self-evident.
The link to Phatic Communion's "Initiating 5GW" is on the word flailing.  Heh. Well, the Thunder Pig finally found something by Lind to make a vertical line through the chaos -- essentially, Lind suggests that any consideration of a fifth-generation of war is pointless because we are still in the very early stages of 4GW, and,
Attempting to visualize a Fifth Generation from where we are now is like trying to see the outlines of the Middle Ages from the vantage point of the late Roman Empire.

[Lind: "Fifth Generation Warfare?"]
-- because, y'know, now is then as every vertical thinker knows.  Oh, wait!  Lind was making a metaphor!  So it wasn't vertical...

Reading the short commentary by Lind -- which, it should be noted, was written in early 2004 -- I realized that most of his points have been addressed already.  In fact, this very commentary has already been included elsewhere in consideration of 5GW.  That consideration, at tdaxp, inspired most of my own.  I even posed the possibility, as others have, that nanotechnology might bring in the truly next-generational warfare.

One thing troubles me about Lind's 2004 commentary:
One reason for the confusion may be a misapprehension of what “generation” means. In the context of the Four Generations of Modern War, “generation” is shorthand for a dialectically qualitative shift. As the originator of the framework, I adopted the word “generation” because I was speaking to and writing for Marines, and “dialectically qualitative shift” has more syllables than the Marine mind can readily grasp...
When he speaks of generation this way, he seems to be suggesting a singularity, or the point at which a phase shift occurs.  I.e., it is almost as if he imagines a single point in time at which the "dialectically qualitative shift" occurs.  Before that shift is one generation; after, the next.  Plenty of commentary since has focused on the possibility (I say, the certainty) that tactics associated with each of Lind's generations have probably always been around -- indeed, that is the main criticism of Lind's Four Generations of Warfare.

I have attempted to also consider a type of shift, but one not so easily chopped into segments of time, by thinking of the generations of warfare as periods when warfare can be described in terms of refinement of tactics, inspired by shifting ground realities (including technology), when those tactics most come into prominence.  (One visualization already linked above, of a continuum, is an attempt at describing such phase shifting.)  Lately, I have also been contemplating what most 5GW theorists, and even Lind,  have already been saying but perhaps without realizing the significance of what we are saying:  that these generations of warfare come into conflict. I.e., when Lind said,
One simple test for whether or not something constitutes a
generational shift is that, absent a vast disparity in size, an army from a
previous generation cannot beat a force from the new generation....
what he meant was, both styles of fighting, both generations of warfare, are contemporaneous.  There is no clean break between them in a practical time/space sense -- they must both exist, in order to be in conflict -- but rather a broad period occurs when one generation and the following generation, responding to ground realities, might coexist at a relatively equal strength.  The ground realities "favor" neither one.  During such a period, there may be stalemates.  But the same ground realities that have inspired the next generation to form in response to them -- both are relatively new -- may continue to develop, and at some point, the ground realities will favor the new generation over the prior generation, and we will see that "qualitative shift" Lind mentions.  Even so, the old generation style of warfare continues as long as some ground realities justify it; thus, we might even consider the advent of a next-generation of warfare that is a mutation of the prior, during which tactics of previous forms of warfare are still utilized even as new tactics are born.  When critics of the concept of "generations of warfare" say that these styles of warfare have always been around, they are not far wrong:  similarly, the genes which make me have been around for a long time, but I am no pre-sapiens.  It's just that new arrangements of genes, and mutations in genes, have given rise to a qualitatively different being.

If we think of the generations of warfare in this manner rather than believing that they occur on separate sides of singularities in time, we will be able to see how next-generation warfare might already be forming now.  The tactics and strategies of 5GW are already occurring as shifts in ground realities occur.  Heck, I've also already contemplated the role of pundits in 5GW.  Thunder Pig and I may be having the same dream, but it's a response to ground realities we have both witnessed from different perspectives, across different domains:   It is consilient thinking in action -- or metaphorizing the objective world, looking for the thing behind the things.


UPDATE: It seems that Purpleslog has already met the Thunder Pig, in much the same way: by being linked by him. Amazing how quickly a meme can spread...

An interesting cross-view of China's increasing global influence can be found at The Council on Foreign Relations:  "China's Soft Seduction."  Much of the information is not new, although perhaps more focus on individual perspectives may be occurring.  Interestingly, the article's author, Esther Pan, had this to say about China's role in Latin America:

And this Congressional Research Service report (PDF) details China's growing investments in Latin America, where many governments have been receptive to the Chinese message that bringing millions out of poverty is the best example of respecting human rights.
I have addressed the Chinese involvement in Latin America a few times.  Most recently, a thought experiment inaugurated by Purpleslog, concerning a possible 5GW-style effort by Hugo Chavez and others in the immigration protests, led me to offer an actor-behind-the-actor hypothesis to the thought experiment: China.  So of course, the next question in the thought experiment would be, How has China's message in Latin America been filtered into action by Chavez and Morales and Castro?

I read the article only a few hours after reading the Pentagon's recent news release on China's modernization of its military, with its suggestion that within China, debate may be occurring concerning China's previous "no first use" rule on using nuclear weapons.  (One wonders if recent rumors of the U.S.'s policy on nuclear weapons, vis-a-vis a potential strike on Iran, have influenced the debate in China.)  The Pentagon story also makes much of another Chinese maxim first put forth by Deng Xiaoping and still being repeated (apparently) by senior Chinese analysts: "Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership."

Naturally, all of those dicta would support a 5GW mentality...

Displaying the Pentagon's tendency to fight the last war, Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, has only focused on one phrase in the maxim for this news report:
"The phrase that strikes me, of course, is 'hide our capacities and bide our time.' I think this encapsulates what's China's strategy is. They are very patient," Rodman said.
Of course, China's modernization of its forces should not be ignored -- what bits the Pentagon is able to determine, that is, like anti-satellite and long-range ballistic missile capabilities -- but I think that the entire maxim should be taken together.  Plus, the news report also stresses the fact that the Pentagon is not going to "overestimate" China's capabilities (while also not underestimating capabilities.)  This alone should be a pointer that China's progress might promote, at present, greater efforts within China to understand asymmetric warfare.

While bouncing the ball between 4GW and 5GW theory has proven more than interesting for me -- and may prove quite useful in "negotiatiing" the future -- it's important to remember that force warfare has a long history for a reason.  If you kill a man, or cut off his supply of food, or physically destroy an enemy's infrastructure, while preventing the same being done to you, you automatically gain an extraordinary advantage.  Man may not live by bread alone, but without it or some substitute, he dies.  I have approached a theory of 5GW that recognizes these factors at a distance, since human actors quite often must think before they act -- as often, have long trains of thought leading to actions -- and influence over their patterns of thought can lead to acts of a beneficial nature; but, still, at the end of the day, those acts and particularly the physical world they create are the primary goal.  I do believe we are moving toward a world design that will severely limit the direct use of force warfare -- but a world entirely without such warfare may be a long, long time away.

Often, I worry more about surprise asteroids, viruses, global warming, and other BIG THINGS which are far less manageable than even human motivations, certainly less manageable than bullets and missiles.

In our exploration of generations of warfare, it will be important to remember the true nature of force warfare.  Whatever else we might like to think of open source guerrilla movements or 4GW movements popping up all over the place -- and their homemade bombs and black market machine guns and RPG's -- a single state or organization with the right force advantage may exert extraordinary influence on the physical world, thus influencing world affairs and even these guerrilla movements.  Similarly, anything short of an adept 5GW entity may find that states with extreme force advantages and force structures change the world in ways the 5GW entity cannot counter or significantly influence:  though they spin paradigms however they like, the state with the right advantages may force paradigms quite contrary to the designs of the 5GW entity.

These thoughts have been percolating in my mind but are brought to you now after reading "Nanotechnology in Global Security and Economics" on Genetic Engineering News (GEN), written by Patrick Lin, Ph.D. and Brian Wang.  The opinion piece is not comprehensive, and the few things mentioned may seem like science fiction -- "Bionic suits for superhuman strength and capabilities; more effective battlefield medicine; more powerful and lighter energy sources; faster production of military assets, i.e., force multiplier; and enhanced weapons of mass destruction, e.g., bio-weapons that can target specific DNA." -- but it should intrigue anyone interested in security and warfare.

Globalist theorists might begin to wonder if all the theories about globalization now being bandied about are non sequiturs.  The authors of the piece offer an estimate of the near-term growth spurt of nanotechnology, $1-trillion within five to 10 years, and also a vision of a (perhaps) more distant non-globalized world:

Additionally, like other revolutions before it, we can expect nanotechnology to radically change many elements of society in the distant future, if not earlier. Particularly, if the predictions are right and nanotechnology, in its advanced form of molecular manufacturing, can enable us to create objects from the bottom up, i.e., one molecule at a time, then whats our incentive to trade if we can create nearly anything we want? Would that make entire industries obsolete overnight and lead to massive displacement of workers? Further, would that encourage an isolationist economic and political policy, and what problems might come from that?
I.e., if the simple molecules found in dirt can be made into anything we want, why trade with other dirt-producers, given our own supply?

I found the link to this opinion piece at Responsible Nanotechnology, an extremely interesting blog written by Mike Treder, co-founder and Executive Director of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology.  He has also written an intriguing analysis of the future repercussions of nanotechnology for Future Brief, titled, "War, Interdependence, and Nanotechnology" --

From the dawn of the nuclear age until the present day, we have relied on two mechanisms to protect us from World War III: the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and the growing interdependence of nations.

However, in the very near future we may not be able to count on these controls. The tenuous balance of MAD and the worldwide network of commercial trade are both threatened by the rise of advanced nanotechnology.


Mike Treder's thoughts touch on many things, including: the end of interdependence and trade as we know it; the rise of super-powered, competing special interest groups within nations, which means civil wars, coups, and great devastation; extreme unemployment rates, as hyper-production capabilities become even more automated.  But without the tensions created by competition over natural resources, and with the ability to reconstruct the world more efficiently, great peace and prosperity are possible, too.

4GW networks and 5GW networks may utilize nanotechnology in the truly next-generation warfare, in ways we can hardly envision; or, nanotechnology may one day eliminate the very networking which gives birth and force to 4GW and 5GW: imagine, self-sufficient and forceful entities not requiring all the benefits we associate with human networks.

Introduction

In the second installment of this series on Rethinking the OODA -- "EBO is Everything in War -- Almost" -- I made some claims which will further bear on the subject of the generations of warfare as conceived by William Lind:
  1. "I would assert [that] all warfare beyond absolutely destructive warfare is EBO or ought to be considered such."
  2. "[A]lthough I have not drawn a direct line from Act to World [in the Concrete OODA of the Revised OODA],  the line is implied, since our physical acts alter the concrete world.  Also note the most obvious and most important implication: that our ability to affect an enemy always stems from manipulation of the physical world....such a consideration ultimately confounds many theories of 4GW and 5GW or at least limits them — and ... severely limits what may be accomplished via EBO."
  3. "[T]he link between cause and effect in the concrete world is omnipresent and difficult to refute...How, pray tell, can we conduct a war without creating changed concrete environments through physicial acts...?"
  4. "EBO as a theory is a theory of how to cause a living enemy to do what we want, whether it is to make a horrible move or to surrender, and the desire to understand EBO well enough to employ it comes from an understanding that we cannot completely and utterly destroy our enemy physically, at least not at the moment. If we could destroy him utterly through a physical act of our own, we would not need to have an EBO theory."
  5. "It’s just that cause and effect are omnipresent, the World is complex, and Observations — whether concrete or abstract — are going to be limited, stretching from the past through the present and into the future.  Thus, reason is limited."
These points suggest both, the significance and the limitations of Effects-Based Warfare.

The significance of EBO is simply this:  that, despite superstitious belief in metaphysical acts that can directly change the physical world, all our actions upon the world are physical in nature, and any effort toward a concrete goal vis-a-vis warfare must therefore be conducted by physical means.  That goal is the effect we wish, upon which we base our operations as we strive toward it.  In other words, "An effects-based approach is a common-sense and intuitive way to conduct operations," as explained by Sonny at FX-Based.

The limitations of EBO are of two natures, both of which are concrete although one also takes into account the objective reality of subjectivity:

  • Points #1 and #4 above imply that complete destruction of an enemy is really beyond the realm of our modern EBO theory.  True, we might consider the utter destruction of an enemy to be an effect which we wish to create via applied physics -- thus, it would be an effect-based approach to warfare of the purest sort -- but to do so would confuse two very different approaches to warfare.  As already stated, all warfare directed against a real enemy, because it must be conducted through physical means, could be considered EBO; but this would make the very concept of EBO worthless as a theory of warfare, since it broadens the scope of EBO theory to encompass everything in warfare.  Furthermore, if we are going to discuss EBO theory, we should not forget that most current warfare strategies already rule out the purest sort of effects-based approach -- absolute destruction of our enemy -- except as a very last resort, and only then if we are capable of utterly destroying every single enemy in the enemy host.  Thus, to give EBO meaning and utility in our present theory and present world, we must consider limitations on the physical effects encompassed by that theory.
  • Points #2, #3, and #5 above reflect the influence of subjectivity in warfare operations, whether our own or our enemies' subjectivities.  We may act physically upon the physical world, and so must put our faith in the reality of cause and effect, but reasons motivate humans and reason operates not only in relation to present actions, present effects, and the present world but also in relation to past acts, past effects, and past physical realities.  In effect, our actions upon the world may alter the shape of the present and the future concrete world but may never alter the shape of the past concrete world which has already had its role in shaping subjectivities and reason.  And, more to the point, human acts -- which operate on the present physical world -- are motivated by reasoning -- which is informed by the past.  While an EBO approach may take into consideration the past world and the subjectivities resulting from it, abstractly and at a distance from the past, the operations in an EBO approach are focused on altering the present environment in order to create future results.  Thus, as an approach, EBO is limited in what it can accomplish via the influencing of a living enemy, by the past upon which it cannot directly act but which nevertheless continues to motivate human activity and thus, ultimately, future concrete realities.
Point #5 above, in particular, may be applied to both of these limitations on EBO and may suggest how specific effects-based approaches have differed or developed in the history of warfare.  Our ability to reason, although it has always been limited by our correspondingly limited Observation of the concrete World, has nonetheless been altered as our World has matured......

We Observe, We Orient, We Decide/Act

It’s just that cause and effect are omnipresent, the World is complex, and Observations — whether concrete or abstract — are going to be limited, stretching from the past through the present and into the future.  Thus, reason is limited.

[CGW, Dreaming 5GW, "EBO is Everything in War -- Almost"]


Thus, our conscious Acts are shaped by our reasoning, which in turn has been limited by our Observation of the World -- or, more to the point, by our concrete ability to observe the world.  Our acts and decisions will always be limited by what we observe and may observe, and thus are shaped by the concrete reality of the world, of which our own physical reality -- our genetic heritage -- is only part.

Dan of tdaxp has previously utilized John Boyd's OODA Loop to gain a better understanding of William Lind's framework for the generations of warfare, in a post called "Go Deep (OODA and the Rainbow of Generational Warfare)."  In that post, Dan considered primarily the part of the abstract, or subjective, cognitive process most targeted by each generation of warfare, shown here in an image modeled on his but using a closer approximation to Boyd's Loop:

tdaxpBoydLind.gif
Dan's theory is that each succeeding generation of warfare represents a focus "deeper" into the enemy's OODA decision-making process:
1GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy's ability to decide and act....

2GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy's ability to orient and decide....

3GW is defined by conflict centered around an enemy's ability to orient....

4GW is defined by conflict centered around Observe and Orient....

[Dan, tdaxp, "Go Deep"]


Technological and observational capabilities predetermined what could be accomplished on the battlefield. William Lind addressed the technological factors in "The Changing Face of War:  Into the Fourth Generation":

First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc....

Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear....Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed manpower....Technological factors included von Moltke's realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph....

Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower....Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics.... the addition of a new technological element--tanks--brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to time....

[Lind, "The Changing Face of War" emphasis added.]


In that 1989 essay, Lind also postulated technology-driven 4th Generation War.  4GW might operate through increased "direct energy" to directly destroy small targets behind enemy lines or within societies, through robotics and remote-piloted vehicles giving warriors greater access to the enemy, and through the increased reach of media -- which Lind uses to postulate an idea-driven 4GW.

Dan of tdaxp, in explaining his determination of where on the simple OODA each generation of warfare sought to "attack" an enemy's decision-making process, also included brief considerations  of the observational capabilities of both attacker and target:

[1GW]  Information was relatively symmetrical -- precise locations of either army were unavailable to any commander, while general knowledge of the land was known to all commanders....

[2GW] You know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly where you are going to die (in the razorwire and minefield, hit by enemy crossfire). Thanks to telegraphs and modern communications, commanders are flooded with a tsunami of almost meaningless facts. Thinking now centers around where and when it makes sense to try to break through, as well as the how to move to advance evenly....

[3GW] Victory in 3rd Generation Wars required the ability to instill madness -- to mess with the enemy's minds....  [ed. -- i.e., not only knowing roughly where you and the enemy are, but knowing the enemy's orientation beyond the simple bi-polar trench-line or strict front warfare, or knowing nodes and connections between individual units and battle placements, and being able to insert oneself quickly amidst that orientation via "blitzkrieg" maneuvers.]

[4GW] If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads [ed. -- observes, among other things] everywhere  yet regular armies have a hard time even finding battles....

[5GW] A 5th Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever was a war.

[Dan, tdaxp, ibid.]

Unfortunately, Dan's consideration of these factors is rather brief in that linked post, as are Lind's considerations (in his linked essay) of the effect of technology on the generations of warfare.  As mentioned at the beginning of this section, our conscious Acts are shaped by our reasoning, which in turn has been limited by our Observation of the World, and I would like a closer look at the way observational capabilities have altered effects-based approaches over time.

While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability -- reconnaissance capability -- than Dan's brief assessment allows, one's own scouts or the spies in an enemy's encampment would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report.  In the first place, their reports would have been old news by the time they were received by one's generals -- perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity; perhaps days old if movement from the enemy forces to one's own force (to report) required days.  Individual movements on the battlefield once battle had commenced would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-man, making the scout relatively useless.  Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still be targeted, and targeting elements behind the enemy lines -- or beyond the range of those weapons -- would have been relatively useless.  In the case of limited long-range capabilities, the targeting mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough if the cannonball or shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line.

2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range communications, and rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach. Primitive air forces also increased, and sped up, observational capabilities.  Greater fire power in artillery and aerial bombings meant that one could more accurately target more enemies whenever one used these things (unlike, say, a cannonball in the previous generation that might have hit nothing when it fell or only one or a handful of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually helped limit the need to know an exact enemy placement.)

3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities -- a necessary improvement if one is to know where one's enemy is, exactly, and how that enemy's forces and strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most effectively to disrupt and overcome that enemy's defenses.  Again, improved air forces, communications technologies, transportation, and firepower improved one's observational range and speed.  Keeping one's own forces in contact, and operating efficiently and not at cross-purposes, also required quicker communications and observational capabilities.

4GW continues the trend.  The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors even as I type this.  Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and the net of media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data, increasing observational capability.  Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists are often quite separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society, but they have yet to infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies' forces; i.e., be among those forces without being detected.  (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi defense forces has somewhat occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi government has also occurred at some level.  But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces or government?  Unlikely, although the theft of databases -- such as the recently-stolen armed forces personnel database -- and intercept communications might give 4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S. operations.  Or else, the New York Times will boldly publish details of those operations.)

5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as I've theorized, might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently available to 4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a society's armed forces, and a society's institutions and government, or else open communication of intentions from proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that they are being so used.

Furthermore, a consideration of these generations of warfare should not forget to look at the way other aspects of society beyond technology have developed across the years.  For instance, at a time when many societies were organized on the basis of land-ownership rather than interstate commerce and trade, they tended to be insular (as well as self-sufficient), and an individual stranger was more quickly identified by differences in physical appearance and language, while an enemy state's operations were occluded by distance and their own insularity. As interconnectivity has increased, flows of information have increased in number; but while these increased flows of information have improved observational capabilities vis-a-vis enemy state activity, they have also multiplied factors to be considered, creating a complexity that may blind us, particularly when trying to distinguish individual enemy operatives.  (That last may be applied particularly to the theory of 5GW, but these considerations may also touch significantly upon 4GW and even 3GW tactics.)

In each of these cases, a force's ability to observe its opponent enables or disables types of action available to that force, by allowing or disallowing a more complete and accurate orientation in relationship to that enemy and, thus, better decision-making ability. 

Because greater observational capability may lead to successful "deeper" actions against an enemy, that enemy may be forced to adjust his decision-making process in reaction to those "deeper" acts.  Essentially:

  • The nearer one strikes at one's enemy, particularly with successive acts during war -- via a physical alteration of the concrete world -- the more immediate, numerous, various, and defined the observations that enemy has of one's actions.
  • The deeper into enemy territory we go, the less that enemy has to observe more deeply into our territory to see what we are doing; in fact, a focus on the present near activity may limit that enemy's ability to observe further into our territory if he is preoccupied with reacting to what we are doing.
Both of these factors shape an enemy's decision-making process.  By broadening the field of battle, including deeper into enemy territory -- as a result of broader observational capabilities -- each succeeding generation of warriors forced their enemies to broaden their own observational activity and thus affected their decision-making processes by the multiplication of factors to be considered.  This, I think, is the reasoning behind Dan's diagram of these generations and the OODA loop.

Going Deeper into OODA

tdaxpBoydLind.gif
I.e.,
  • 1GW could only operate on the basis of a shared, symmetrical concrete plane, including roughly symmetrical technology but also including the lay-of-land.  Maneuvering on the basis of an enemy's organization would have been severely limited simply because the ability to observe that enemy's organization was severely limited as a battle occurred -- so keeping a formation together and moving together became very important for ruling out whatever moves were available to the enemy.  The enemy had to attack that formation while ruling out the same thing by doing the same things. Geography was utilized as much as possible, in advance, to improve whatever observational advantage one could devise; but when battle occurred, it was man-to-man, and changing the physical environment -- particularly, the physical beings of the enemy host; i.e., killing as many as possible -- was the primary strategy.  Because either side of two 1GW forces would operate mostly on the basis of the unfolding physical environment, either only had to judge that physical environment when making a decision.  Thus, one attempted to affect most directly the enemy's process of deciding actions by altering that physical environment -- especially, by taking initiative to change it first and, if possible, most.
  • 2GW operated similarly, but increased communications ability via the telegraph and railroads, etc., allowed one to know better at any given time the direction of an enemy's approach, an enemy's location, and so forth.  Improved observational ability gave one the option of where to attack:  a 2GW force need not hit the enemy all at once on the same plane of activity, nor defend all at once, like 1GW forces,  but could focus defenses where needed and assault the enemy where it would be most beneficial.  Two 2GW forces, then, would tend to form stable fronts of concentrated force while trying to exploit weakness where they were observed.  Because greater firepower could quickly decimate forces where they were weakest in their defenses, movement became more limited than 1GW, more cautious, and this led to developments like trench warfare.  Initiative was gained by observing a weakness first and exploiting it before the enemy could strengthen his defenses; by doing so, a 2GW force would turn his enemy's observation to that point on the line.  Or else, the 2GW force sought initiative by overburdening the foe's resources through successive strikes along the line of defense.  In effect, successive strikes were direct strikes against an enemy's ability to decide.  By altering the number of factors to be considered for any decision -- by changing the concrete environment in multiple places, in multiple ways -- the 2GW force produced many different potential decisions, and a foe could be forced to weaken other areas as he strengthened some in reaction. On the diagram above, this effect is shown between Orient and Decide.
  • 3GW utilized this process of multiplication of factors to be considered, because the 3GW force itself was able to consider multiple factors in order to strike in the most beneficial way.  Improved observational ability (and thus, planning ability) suggested ways of striking where the foe was weakest and in a way the foe had not fully anticipated, and improved technology made such strikes possible.  The 3GW force knew its moves were not fully anticipated.  Thus, when the foe was hit, the foe would be forced into an attempt to orient to the sudden new information.  3GW was much quicker than 2GW, less cautious with defense and more audacious in attack; it had to be, or else the enemy might observe a 3GW force's actions toward it and orient to defend (Act) against those actions.  The foe would see it happen as it happened, but because it happened more quickly than his previous experience of warfare could allow him to anticipate, he would have difficulty settling into a corresponding understanding of what was needed to defend against it.  Whatever decision he made would be too late.  By driving deeper into enemy territory, in force, the 3GW attacker also forced the enemy to observe sudden new information in rapid, near, and various quantities, and thus attacked the enemy's decision-making ability primarily on Orient.
  • 4GW forces are typically already among their foes.  Wars against occupation which are fought by 4GW forces are a good example.  But as interconnectivity between societies increases, the ability to be among foes also increases; the process of globalization means an increasing single plane of activity.  "Being among" represents not only physical proximity, but also observational ability and, thus, the ability to act, for the 4GW force, on many levels. And because these forces are typically among their foes, they can confuse their enemies' ability to separate cause and effect, foe and friend, actions committed by the 4GW forces and those committed by the target of 4GW.  If a 4GW force kills lots of civilians and then quickly hides among other civilians, the demarcation between 4GW force and the populace of a nation becomes blurred for the ultimate target of 4GW -- i.e., the observer outside that force -- who may commit acts which may be inseparable from those of the 4GW force, in the minds of other observers and even of themselves.  As Dan of tdaxp explained it, "Like 3rd Generation Wars, 4th Generation Wars focus on the picture inside the enemy's head. But while 3GW tries to destroy the picture, 4GW builds a new one."  By attacking a target's ability to Orient, a 3GW force impedes decision and action in its target, but a 4GW force wants to force an orientation of its liking and wants its target to decide and act -- but in the manner of the 4GW force's choosing.  This is accomplished by feeding information into its target while limiting the influence or significance of other information:  the 4GW force kills or destroys, but then hides again or in fact becomes "just another part of the populace."   This role affecting what moves between Observation and Orient is shown in the above diagram.  Since 4GW forces are seen but as apparitions, and yet their actions are known to be 4GW actions, their influence may seem unstoppable for the observer, and they may ultimately weaken the desire to wrest control of the OODA back from them (i.e., morale.) through the impossibility of finding them and destroying them.
  • 5GW, as implied in the diagram, is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know that the 5GW force exists.  When the target makes any decision, the target believes it is in full command of its decision-making ability.  The 5GW force merely creates information in relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes all information available and continues on his way toward making a decision and acting.  Selective information creation will be the 5GW force's modus operandi, and the 5GW force's goal is to have the target act on that information.  The 5GW force will have an action or set of actions in mind before it decides what information will be created for the target of its efforts.  Thus, the 5GW force acts primarily on its enemy's ability to Observe.
Alas, going deeper into the enemy's OODA must be achieved via physical acts, because psychic abilities do not exist.  I.e., we cannot really act directly upon an enemy's abstract processes, but are confined to the creation of new information by altering the concrete world being observed by the enemy -- and must contend with the information that enemy possessed before we act.  We must also contend with multiple sources of information within the concrete world over which we have little ability to shape -- in fact, may have little ability to observe directly -- whenever we attempt to affect an enemy's decision-making process.  But as outlined at the top of this post and in Part Two of this series, that's exactly what we must do if complete and utter destruction of our enemies is out of the question or beyond our ability: EBO.   But different effects will require different operational styles.  And, even the same effects in a changing World may ultimately require new limits or new directions for operational choices; by altering what -- and how -- we observe in that World, that changing World may give birth to new operational approaches.

And Deeper......

I began this series of posts because I was not comfortable with the OODA loop as presented by John Boyd.  Primarily, I did not like the fact that the Orient phase was written mystically, or as a magic cloud:


BoydsOrient.jpg

-- as if genetic heritage, cultural traditions, and new information originated in the Orient phase of the decision-making process, a phase that seemed to represent entirely an abstract process.  This, combined with fuzzy feedback loops and "implicit guidance and control loops" (as in the images above this image of Orient), blurred the distinction between concrete reality and what we make of that concrete reality when we witness it.  So I revised the loop to account for the influences of both, the concrete and the abstract, by separating them and yet joining them as two concurrent processes.

I've looked deeper into the subject of EBO -- in "EBO is Everything in War -- Almost" -- to better come to grips with how, indeed, we may act in warfare to create beneficial effects.  And, I've found limits to EBO, which I've outlined in more detail at the beginning of this post.

Essentially, causes and reasons are two separate things, although colloquially we tend to equate them.  But though different, they bear a relation to one another.  To say that any action we may commit in warfare can cause a person to decide and act a certain way may miss the distinction between cause and reason -- some other subjective thought, or more likely many thoughts, about the present concrete environment or even a past concrete environment, could well be the primary foundation upon which an enemy chooses to act -- but nonetheless, we reason from the concrete.  If we change the concrete world, our enemy may well be forced to reason from it, if only partly from it.

We can view an enemy's Acts to get a better, perhaps more objective, understanding of that enemy's abstract processes. Human acts are the physical manifestations of these abstract processes. To the degree that we can form a true understanding of an enemy's abstract processes, we may present him with information likely to run the course of his abstract processing in ways that will lead to beneficial acts -- beneficial to us.

But even given the possibility that we can somewhat objectively come to understand an enemy's thought processes, the World is complex, with much information feeding into our own and our enemy's Abstract OODA beyond our direct control.  The World has always been complex, but we are only now, in modern times, beginning to appreciate the level of complexity.  In my second post in this series, I commented on a contemporary superstitious belief in metaphysical acts by referencing

the superstitious theory that we are all somehow “connected” via a “network” and able to act upon each other metaphysically or outside the realm of physics... [CGW]
and although I stand by the description, I recognize the difficulty inherent in assessing the current shape of human affairs in toto.  We speak of such complexity in the shorthand when we refer to "networks" -- but it is a shorthand with some basis in concrete fact, I am sure.   If cause and effect are indeed omnipresent in the concrete world -- another claim from that post -- then everything might truly be connected, perhaps in multiple ways and through mulitple chains of relation but affecting everything else in a very concrete manner.  I'm just not able to suggest with sincerity that human beings are able to consciously affect everything or even anything through the same all-connecting tissue.  (Except, we tend to connect everything we observe abstractly by finding a place for each thing in our general world-view.)  Plus, the omnipresence of cause and effect, in combination with the complexity of the concrete World, may well mean that our physical acts, though minutely directed or focused on only part of the world, change parts of the concrete world we are as yet incapable of seeing in any present situation:  that is the Butterfly Effect so commonly touted.

Given these considerations, and notwithstanding the perhaps futile process of simplifying the complexity to gain a better understanding of complex human interactions, I've attempted to overlay the "generations of warfare" onto the Revised OODA presented in Part One of this series:


EnemyTargetOODA.gif

Some notes on this diagram:

  • First to be considered:  Each generation, 1 through 5, actually affects the enemy through physical acts.  These acts change the concrete world, but perhaps in different ways, thus offering different types of information, or different types of sets of information, for the enemy's consideration.
  • "Enemy OODA Target," then, merely means the intended portion of the enemy's OODA to be most affected by our methods of concrete manipulation of the World.  Because everything in the OODA feeds from information of the concrete world, every part of the OODA will be influenced by our every action in manipulating, or changing, that world; but certain portions of the enemy's decision-making process will be where we plan the greatest influence.
  • "Desired Information Flow" merely points at the subprocesses we intend to utilize -- or, more accurately,  to be utilized -- once we have created new information for the enemy.
  • Although I have not made the point before:  The Conditional Constructs and Mental Constructs can occur simultaneously, but either one or both together represent the state of orientation at any given moment.  To say that actions flow from either is merely to say that actions flow from the state of orientation. And, each of the three loosely-name types of action is drawn from the type of construct most dominant at the time of action.
  • Each of the generational Enemy OODA Targets [EOT] is placed roughly where they were placed by Dan of tdaxp in his model, and for roughly the same reasons given in my contemplation of that model, above.
  • The biggest exception in EOT placement is that for 1GW. I took my cue from Lind's essay,
    Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon.   ["The Changing Face of War"]
    and from the consideration, outlined above, that 1GW attempted to affect the enemy's decision-making process primarily by destroying that enemy, or by altering the physical environment, without as much consideration for the abstract processes of that enemy.  To change the World was the attempt at forcing a decision and an action -- surrender or retreat, etc. -- but this is still not the type of utter destruction of all enemy units that would be beyond the scope of EBO.
  • The other slight exception in EOT placement would be for the next generation, 2GW.  John Boyd's OODA, as stated multiple times, blurred lines between the abstract and the concrete; but I've attempted to separate them.  While very concerned with altering the physical environment, 2GW specifically sought initiative by trying to overburden an enemy's Abstract Decision.  Ideally, the Abstract Act that would follow would be, "I must surrender!" but it could also be the weakening of one point in the front as the target attempted to strengthen another.  Multiple choices were not so various and immediate as offered by the later 3GW, so the 2GW could orient -- relatively static fronts helped -- but upon analysis of the situation the target of 2GW would have to decide between options, and the 2GW force would hope the decision led directly to the Abstract Act of an understanding.  (Greater hypotheses and reviewing of decisions might lead to an undesirable understanding, or an understanding beneficial to the target, not the 2GW force.)
  • 3GW is really the oddball of the five, from one perspective.  A quick succession of acts deeper into enemy territory produces too much new data (relative to past experiences) for any Abstract Decision-Abstract Act to occur.  As Dan said, a 3GW tries to destroy the "image" in his foe's mind.  The result is either a constant looping from Abstract Decision(Hypothesis) - Conditional Construct - Abstract Observation -- i.e., paralysis -- or into an impulsive act based on Conditional Constructs (or images produced primarily by that new data, chaotic and a bit incoherent, unsettled).  Incidentally, anyone who has read John Robb's theories about Global Guerrillas ought to recognize how this consideration of 3GW does, in fact, seem to describe what he has postulated for those GG's. (Although, there's still some doubt to be offered on that possibility.)
  • 4GW and 5GW greatly differ from the other three in the abstract processes an attacker wishes the target to utilize when making a decision.  Both approaches tend to operate over a longer time frame than 1GW, 2GW, and 3GW, vis-a-vis an enemy's cognition loop relative to any given actions.  Thus, each attempts to influence the enemy to form Mental Constructs in line with the 4GW message or 5GW paradigm, to be utilized by the target when analyzing or synthesizing future new information.  This is a kind of attrition directed toward an enemy's thought processes, and is represented by the Information Flow back to Abstract Observe from Mental Constructs.  1GW and 2GW plan for the enemy to come to a specific understanding, as well; and, any future Abstract Observation will be influenced by that understanding; but either of those approaches depends more on a heavy influence by new data and less on the influence of abstract data, or Old Information, in their approach.  4GW and 5GW, however, are not likely to be approaches made successful merely through the application of great force, or great and widespread manipulation of the physical world.
  • Incidentally, another significant note: Any of the three types of action may occur during any war, regardless of the generational tactics being employed; but, like the Enemy OODA Target, the type of Acts being marked are the intended primary acts one wants an enemy to make.  For instance, Impulsive Acts committed by an enemy are almost always going to be beneficial to the attacker.  It's just that 3GW is an operational style which depends more on that type of act -- if paralysis isn't achieved -- than any of the others. (For one thing, 3GW cannot risk an enemy's being able to decide on a course of action that would severely infiltrate the 3GW's home territory while the 3GW force is making its audacious moves about the map....)
  • Thus, all generational approaches besides 3GW would primarily seek a Focused Act committed by an enemy, through a Choice-Act  -- just one that is influenced by the attacker and to the attacker's benefit ....
  • ...except for 4GW and 5GW, which would also seek Habitual or Reflexive Acts.   Remember, in Part One, the description of such Acts: 
    In fact, we will likely find that habitual acts tend to occur most often when quite familiar situations occur frequently; i.e., when physical Observation of the World quickly matches up with whatever Mental Constructs we have previously formed — and, thus, not requiring further contemplation or hypotheses.
    The process of "helping" an enemy to form particular understandings of the world would lull the enemy into repetitive thought processes greatly informed by those Mental Constructs, and thus into reflexive or habitual acts.  1GW and 2GW, because they depend more on changed New Information for influencing an enemy's decision-making process (and less on "operational art" -- as termed by Lind -- if at all) do not focus as much attention on the creation of repetitive thought processes.

By George, That's It!

Well, probably not it, but it for now.  This post may undergo revisions -- annotated -- to fill in blanks and perhaps clarify a few things:  After about 14 hours, I think it's time to hit "Publish!" even if I have spelling errors or garbled syntax.

Three last notes.

First, although I believe that 3GW still has great utility -- technological advances may easily allow a force to impede a foe's ability to Decide (and thus, to act in any way but impulsively) -- the ability of any future 4GW or 5GW attacker to strike deeply into a 3GWarrior's homeland may be quite significant, given the processes of globalization well under way.  John Robb's Global Guerrilla theory may or may not be 3GW; if 3GW, it is merely the GG's ability to strike deeply and quickly, confusing enemies by overloading Orient, on a scale unlike anything we've yet seen from 3GW.  Technological advances developed for use by individual operatives, such as nanotechnology or even new uses for biological, chemical, or nuclear warfare on such a localized scale, may make GG's or their equivalents the epitome of quick-moving 3GW forces able to paralyze a foe. ("3GW infantry forces".)   4GW forces and even 5GW forces may also be able to use these technologies to strike deeply and quickly into a typical 3GW state's homeland.  I'm less sure that a 3GW state will be able or even likely to attack another 3GW state effectively, save though a much superior technological advantage:  too much observational ability on either side, with no clear advantage.  Too much chance for mutual destruction.

Second:  Technological advances may actually threaten war outside the realm of EBO.  Complete and utter destruction of all entities in the enemy host may well be possible, if not quite now then in the future.  Anything other than such destruction is likely to fit within a 3GW, 4GW, or 5GW framework.  1GW and 2GW really do seem to be things of the past, save for isolated and quite localized pockets in underdeveloped regions.

Third:  There are other ways to change the concrete world besides warfare.  Thomas Barnett's approach, for instance, may alter the concrete world in ways that may greatly influence targets' OODA loops, leading to acts beneficial to those who would employ TB's EBO.  It is still to be seen, perhaps, if similar forces as TB would employ will have an unguided effect similar to those effects he would set as his operational goal. 5GW theory, in some respects, also suggests way of manipulating the concrete world through non-violent means, although violent means are also often discussed by 5GW theorists. In fact, TB's theories also skirt the bounds between violent and non-violent means.




NOTE: Links to the original blog posts have been altered to direct to the cross-posted entries here on Dreaming 5GW.

Effects Defined

Effects consist of a full spectrum of outcomes, events, or consequences that result from a particular action. An effects based approach to operations stresses the value of connecting all actions (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) to operational and strategic outcomes. In the most basic sense, effects-based operations are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes. The three essential features of effects-based operations (EBO)—planning, employment, and assessment—cannot be separated from one another.

[Sonny, at FX-Based, in "Deployment (From Hell)"]

Dr. Challans’ critique of [EBO] reminds me of criticisms I have made against Objectivists — and I am not surprised by this:  Objectives/Objectivists.  My central criticism is that Objectivists often fail to acknowledge 1) their limited sensory perceptions (experience), 2) their limited ability for analysis (which may be genetic; which may be a result of cognitive insularity), and 3) the objective reality of subjectivity (we do not have an objective theory of mind, but only hypotheses), while supposing that they have everything they need to make grand pronouncements on the shape and functions of the world and to prognosticate future events.

[CGW, Phatic Communion, in "Emergence and Warfare: Notes and Hypotheses"]


Introduction

I have previously approached a criticism of Effects-Based Operations at the link immediately above in a cursory review of an essay by Dr. Tim Challans titled "Emerging Doctrine and the Ethics of Warfare" made available by the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE).  In that essay, Dr. Challans uses philosophical arguments to attack the notion that EBO can be successfully applied as a strategy in warfare to subvert or defeat an opponent:

But just as philosophers of science consistently demonstrate that the scientists  themselves are not aware of the deep structures of their own practices, the same is true of philosophers of social science and social scientists. This difference in viewing the  concept of causation as it relates to human action has perhaps always separated those who approach human activity philosophically from those who approach it scientifically. Within the effects-based approach, the military is attempting to cause effects outside the realm of the physical world; they are trying to bring effects about in the realm of human activity. Causation is not the proper concept when dealing with human activity. Many advocates of the effects-based approach have even attempted to make their so-called scientific approach to appear to be philosophical by looking toward the philosophical literature on causation. They mistakenly believe that something as complex as human activity can be rendered and reduced and mutilated to fit the Procrustean bed of behaviorism, choking the mental realm into lifelessness with their chains of cause and effect. This attempt by EBA [effects-based approach] advocates is both pseudo-scientific and pseudo-philosophical....

The deep assumption here is that people can be caused to behave, and modifying behavior is simply a matter of adjusting input to get a different output. Action theory recognizes that the mental realm falls outside the normal physical realm of cause and effect. One simply cannot cause another person to act a certain way; people act for reasons, not causes.

[Dr. Challans]

This makes much sense, which is why critics of EBO have such solid footing.  Who hasn't attempted to modify the behavior of a child, a spouse or significant other, or employee by introducing a change in the physical environment -- only to have an entirely unexpected and undesired effect when the subject of our experimentation decides upon a course of correction we did not anticipate?

Sonny of FX-Based has recently responded to critics of EBO -- particularly, to an essay by Ralph Peters titled "Bloodless theories, bloody wars; Easy-win concepts crumble in combat" -- with a defense of EBO in three parts: Part One, Part Two, Part Three (with more to come.)  Sonny writes one of the top-notch military blogs around, and his arguments against various assertions made by Ralph Peters are highly recommended reading.  Essentially, Sonny argues that EBO is not a strategy involving high-tech attacks on the infrastructure of our enemy, per se, but a broad approach to warfare which recognizes the very real reality of cause & effect during wartime activities.  Dr. Challans may be quite correct when he suggests a difference between causes and reasons for human activity, but by disregarding any relationship between concrete effects and the reasons humans choose for acting is to disregard humanity entirely:  man may not live by bread alone, but without it or some substitute, he will die

I.e., We live within the world and reason from it.

Consider again the child or the spouse.  We have sufficient proof that the threat of physical force, particularly if it follows previous applications of physical force, can modify a child's or spouse's behavior.  Children locked in cycles of physical abuse, just like spouses locked in those cycles, may submit; or, maintain the secrecy of the situation while acting according to the will of the abuser.  Their reason for doing so is a memory of the consequences of not doing so, consequences which have a very concrete nature.  However, we must ask if a new spouse or newly adopted child unfamiliar with such consequences will submit to a new threat or a new and unexpected act of violence; perhaps the child or spouse will run away or in fact attempt to kill the attacker.  Thus, are the limits of EBO, very broadly stated, limits which will make more sense if we consider more fully the Revised OODA loop......

Almost Everything

In Part One of this series, I redrew John Boyd's OODA loop to more fully take into consideration the distinctions between the concrete world and the abstract world:

RevisedOODA.jpg
[Links to a larger image.]


Boyd left the distinctions ambiguous; he blurred them, perhaps as a result of the limitations of his combat experience, since so much observation and activity during a dogfight occurs within a very localized (limited) environment between individuals with very specific limitations already long-set.  The fighter pilot only has so much concrete data to observe, within very limited time frames, and will be engaged in very conscious observation of that data while putting much abstract observation on "autopilot."  The past experiences, genetic heritage, cultural traditions of both pilot and his enemy operate in the background -- i.e., on autopilot -- and would have only tangential affect on Observation and Activity, so Boyd did not need to more fully consider how these affect observation and activity even if he did manage to include their effects within his Loop through hazy subprocesses.  It was enough to say that these factors have an effect; but the concrete realities of weather, instrumentation, and enemy maneuvers were primary.

Boyd's decision-making process as a fighter pilot, because it occurred within very limited milieux, did not need to more fully take into account the distinction between the abstract world and the concrete world, since the abstract world only had tangential effects on the concrete activities of either fighter pilot.  Either would be much more focused on a shared concrete domain (i.e., the sky, the fighter jets.)  Changing an enemy's relation to his past experiences and cultural traditions would have been largely unimportant during a dogfight, even if these factors were exploited: The pilot would exploit long-standing factors, but would not need to more fully engage those factors.  It was enough that they were there. 

Unfortunately, for any confrontation beyond the immediate -- e.g., in longer campaigns -- such long-standing factors would affect so many other variables, in so many directions, that putting a consideration of them on autopilot would likely prove disastrous -- this, in a nutshell, is Dr. Challans' criticism, Ralph Peter's criticism, and the general criticism of EBO.

When we consider Effects-Based Operations, then, we need to consider more fully:

  1. How a concrete action can change the concrete world
  2. How such a change is observed by the enemy
  3. How the enemy further interprets that observation, in order to react to it.
Of these three, we have much more control, or decision ability, over #1.  Every time we act physically, some part of the concrete world is changed.  Because of the complexity of the real world, our acts may not always change that world in expected ways, however.  But if we decide to bomb a bridge, we are likely to be able to do that, since our own past experience in combination with our physical arsenal enables us to do that.

We have some control over #2, because humans in general -- including us, including our enemy -- view the concrete world similarly.  If a bridge is blown up, both parties are going to see that in fact it has been blown up.  But observation for humans is two-fold, since it includes not only concrete sensory perception but also how that concrete information is turned into an awareness within the brain.  The old argument about the tree falling in the woods with nobody present would serve as a good example.  Does it make a sound?  Technically, no, since it creates vibrations in the air and ground and nearby objects, and it is only our mind that interprets the presence of these vibrations as sound.  That is a facile example, and most humans have very similar interpretative abilities -- would be aware of sound if present at the tree's falling -- but the process of cognition is very quick and will include many more things during the individual's observation of phenomena, such as previous experience of phenomena.  Thus our control over an enemy's observation, or #2 above, is only partial, because his past experience was long set before we blew up the bridge.  Furthermore, the enemy's concrete observations of things other than the bridge, which also enter his decision-making cycle, may alter his awareness of what has occurred or limit his awareness of the blown-up bridge.  (If he's deeply entrenched in a bunker, he may feel the vibrations through the ground without being aware that the bridge itself was destroyed.)

We have the least amount of control over #3.  Although we may have some idea about our enemy's habitual thought patterns, experiences, etc., these tend to be things which are previously set for our enemy -- and, for us.  I.e., we may easily create a concrete effect in the world, but we cannot so easily go back to our enemy's childhood and reconstruct his memories and past experiences, his cultural traditions, up to the point of that concrete effect, in order to give that concrete effect an interpretation (by the enemy) of our choosing.  The enemy may have past awareness -- past experience -- of tunnels he uses for supply routes and may interpret the destruction of the bridge as an only incidental occurrence.  In particular, our own history of observing that enemy -- intelligence information -- may seemingly give us more or less control over #3, although even the smallest gaps in our intel could produce resulting gaps in our ability to control our enemy's interpretation of events.  Plus, quite idiosyncratic and personal behavior may be quite unknown to us, at least the extent to which such behavioral traits might influence enemies; e.g., Saddam Hussein's megalomania (or, Hitler's, at the time of WWII.)

These factors correspond to the Concrete OODA of the Revised OODA:

EBOConcreteOODA.jpg

[Concrete OODA]

Note that although I have not drawn a direct line from Act to World, the line is implied, since our physical acts alter the concrete world.  Also note the most obvious and most important implication: that our ability to affect an enemy always stems from manipulation of the physical world. Until psychic powers are realized, this will remain the case.  (And even then, I would bet that stimulation of brain waves by some mechanical means, from outside an enemy's body, would best be considered a physical act.  If such a thing ever comes to pass.)  Finally, note the degree to which such a consideration ultimately confounds many theories of 4GW and 5GW or at least limits them -- and the way such a consideration severely limits what may be accomplished via EBO.

On that last point: Too often when reading theory of 4GW, 5GW, and EBO, I detect a belief -- or, call it a faith -- that we may directly affect an enemy's abstract processes.  For instance, when we talk of moral and morale manipulation as methods used by a 4GW fighter, some mystical direct link is implied: "4GW insurgents sap our will to fight."  That is putting it too simply, however, and risks devastating illusion by putting too much faith in that illusion of a direct link, or of a direct operation on our own abstract processes by the enemy.  This is not to say that our morale cannot be sapped, but it is giving the enemy too much credit for that effect.  Sonny of FX-Based,  in his defense of EBO, gives a very good example of the process in his response to Ralph Peters:

...strategic bombing preceding D-DAY did play a crucial role in Nazi Germany's defeat. The main problem was that one of our main pre-war suppositions proved to be incorrect: the German industrial infrastructure proved to be more resistant to attack than what we originally expected. However, the USSBS showed that aerial attacks had actually worn out the morale of the German people and had increased absenteeism to some extent in the later phases of the war. The attacks conducted by the AAF and the Royal Air Force (RAF) from July to December 1943 did not obliterate all of the German industrial machinery, but they did compel the Germans to disperse manufacturing functions at a critical point in the war.  [ed. -- emphasis added]

[Sonny, at FX-Based, in "In Defense of EBO"]

We might argue whether such an EBO effect -- lowering morale -- would be inevitable in every situation, including possible future scenarios; and, we would be right to do so.  For instance, I suspect that the German response was also a result of comparing past status to the status created by aerial attacks and seeing a major difference -- but some future enemy might never have had a highly efficient and safe environment prior to such bombing, and the morale-sapping effect might be less.  I.e., this future foe might not have had a previously bloated image of self due to a productive environment, thus would not be as greatly affected by having that environment systematically destroyed -- This is the "ascetic bin Laden hiding in mountains" effect.  Other factors might limit the drop in morale; consider, for instance, Britain and Churchill under repeated bombings.

The arguments against EBO are really arguments against limited deployment of EBO.  I.e., they are arguments against robotic, ill-conceived, limited and repetitive operations regardless of environment and enemy, and such arguments are spot-on.  Although to some degree we can anticipate very similar reactions for most people in response to large-scale devastation -- we are all human -- the limitations on devastation imposed by modern warfare strategies and the general so-called "laws of war" severely limit our ability to affect large numbers of people successfully.  So much that is common between people that would give us a better understanding of reactions to operations also becomes a barrier to what we may do to a people.  The Golden Rule has limited EBO warfare.   When Ralph Peters uses the phrase "sterilized techno-wars," he is on the right track -- especially also since those we most need to affect, the enemy's military, may be quite separate from the people, or hidden among the people, and even less susceptible to the manipulation of a concrete environment than the person on the street:  The abstract processing of those in the military forces may be quite unlike the abstract processing of the typical citizen of a society.  High-tech bombings may terrify and disrupt the person on the street, but guerrilla fighters might go underground and wait it out -- worse, such a bombing campaign may not affect everyone in the general populace the same way and could lead to larger numbers of guerrilla recruits.

At the same time, the link between cause and effect in the concrete world is omnipresent and difficult to refute; as Sonny at FX-Based has said,

An effects-based approach is a common-sense and intuitive way to conduct operations.

[Sonny, at FX-Based, in "In Defense of EBO - Part Two"]
How, pray tell, can we conduct a war without creating changed concrete environments through physicial acts -- whether it is "EBO," or 4GW or 5GW? 

Everything in war is effects-based -- almost.

Reason Is Almost Because

It's just that cause and effect are omnipresent, the World is complex, and Observations -- whether concrete or abstract -- are going to be limited, stretching from the past through the present and into the future.  Thus, reason is limited.  When Dr. Challans criticized EBO, this was his primary argument, if not stated in so many words.  Our errors in war are, in effect, errors in effects-based operations, and they have come about because we failed to know our enemy well enough to be able to anticipate -- foreknow -- how that enemy would react to our acts upon the world.

Almost.  Because the only sure way to know how our enemy will react to our actions is to kill him.  EBO as a theory is a theory of how to cause a living enemy to do what we want, whether it is to make a horrible move or to surrender, and the desire to understand EBO well enough to employ it comes from an understanding that we cannot completely and utterly destroy our enemy physically, at least not at the moment.  If we could destroy him utterly through a physical act of our own, we would not need to have an EBO theory.

Although we may act only physically upon the world -- despite the superstitious theory that we are all somehow "connected" via a "network" and able to act upon each other metaphysically or outside the realm of physics -- we have some limited ability to Go Deep into the enemy's abstract processes or gain an objective understanding, even if limited, of those processes.  In order to do so, we must remember how those abstract processes occur and not leave such things as "cultural traditions" and "past experiences" cloudy and completely removed from a consideration of the physical world.

EBOAbstractOODA.jpg

[Abstract OODA]

All mental constructs -- previous experience, memories, ideologies, understanding -- are a result of information flowing from the exterior world over a lifetime, which has been analyzed, synthesized, perhaps re-examined multiple times (Decide-Hypothesize), and no doubt often corrupted, before becoming "imprinted" within the mind.  (Remember, genetic heritage, including all physical processes -- meaning even those shaping analytical ability -- are a part of the concrete world constantly feeding into the Abstract Observation of a person.  We are dynamically alive, and such factors can change throughout a lifetime.)  When we act upon the physical world, changing it, that new information enters the enemy's Abstract OODA in the Abstract Observation along with old information previously imprinted.  Dr. Challans' argument that human activity should be considered from an understanding of reason rather than of cause-effect is only partly true, since many concrete causes have shaped our mental constructs; but reason is limited because our life experiences are limited by such factors as:  our physical being (including sex, including the functioning of our senses, including our mental capacities); our family and early environment; and the dominant culture(s) of our society.  Thus, we might often act from reason more informed by old information than by new information; or, vice versa.

So there are two processes occurring, which might or might not align:  our action upon the world and our enemy's reaction to the changed world.  EBO is what we do, but "EBR" or effects-based reaction is what the living enemy does -- in fact, is what we ourselves may do in reaction to that world we have changed, when we observe it.  EBO is not everything in war, just as the Concrete OODA is not all that occurs for humans:  Cause and reason. But since reasoning will almost certainly include old information, the strict physical cause-effect basis of some EBO theory is insufficient for understanding the successful employment of EBO, since our enemy will not be reacting strictly to the changed environment or to that physical cause but also on the basis of prior learning, cultural traditions, and experience, etc.  So more properly speaking "EBR" should be renamed "EIR", or effects-influenced reasoning.

To contemplate an EBO approach without first considering the mental constructs of our enemies -- largely by ignoring how our enemies' environments have shaped their mental constructs -- should not be considered an effects-based operation whatsoever.  It is really an ideologically-driven operation, since we are operating more from our own pre-built abstractions of our enemy, and how our enemy will react, than from an actual understanding of that enemy.  This is the argument Ralph Peters makes when he criticizes certain high-tech and "sterile" approaches to warfare advocated ad infinitum by certain Pentagon officials.  Essentially, whether he knew it or not, Peters was criticizing our tendency to approach our enemies as if they were all carbon-copies of each other likely to always react in the way previous foes have reacted to such effects-based operations.  I.e., those carbon-copies are just our abstractions of the enemy -- more likely, our abstractions of the enemy's Abstract OODA -- rather than actual enemies.  Incidentally, however, Peters may have some carbon-copy alternatives himself, since he appears to assume that the approach is always doomed to failure or often doomed to failure, at least against the foes we are likely to confront in the short term. (He may be correct in this; but that's a subject for a different post.  I doubt that he should make a universal evaluation of such a limited EBO campaign, however.)

Sonny at FX-Based, as quoted in the lead-in to this post, has expanded the concept of EBO beyond Peters' consideration, and would not limit EBO to only one style of fighting:

An effects based approach to operations stresses the value of connecting all actions (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) to operational and strategic outcomes.

[Sonny, ibid.]
This is good as far as it goes, but it should not go without a consideration of the Abstract OODA.  I.e., as we decide which actions upon the world are required for influencing an enemy that we aren't simply wanting to utterly destroy and able to utterly destroy, we must remember that an enemy's past will filter every observation of the world that we have altered by our acts.  We must know his cultural environment, his past environments, etc., as well as we can before drawing any conclusions about how he will react to our actions.  And, while we might read in a textbook or hear a lecture about cultural influences, past experiences of our enemy, and the like, these remain mere abstractions for us until we have been able to witness them in action in the concrete world; thus, some amount of experimentation, or preliminary acts, might be required in order for us to draw a conclusion that an enemy will react the way we think he might react.  Like the enemy, our abstract processes are our own, but we may see in the physical world concrete manifestations of those abstract processes -- or, Acts.

There is at least one universal "truth" we might draw from the Abstract OODA, however, vis-a-vis EBO.  Impulsive Acts are those committed with more of an eye on unfolding circumstances than on past experience and other mental constructs (even if these also influence such action.)  I gave this example of an Impulsive Act in Part One of this series:

...consider a different Impulsive Act:  While at the Mall, a person suddenly hears lots of gunfire near him, sees people falling, and rather than quickly duck behind a convenient metal barrier starts running around, screaming — and, gets shot.  But a person who has been in combat situations might quickly duck behind the barrier:  a reflexive act based more on past experience than on present new information and sudden ideas of impending death.

[CGW, Dreaming 5GW, "Rethinking the OODA"]

Present new information and sudden ideas of impending death. -- One we might create by our action, if only we can know that the new information is really new for a target; the other is a common fear for most people but not all.  As a metaphor, however, this would suggest how rapid changes within a concrete environment, of a certain type, might cause an enemy to react impulsively.  True, we might have no firm understanding of exactly how he will react, but the fact that his action will be impulsive might be enough, particularly if we could create a quick recycling through O-O-D(Hyp.) and back to O of the Abstract OODA of our enemy.  He would be forced either into paralysis or into committing an impulsive act.

And Again, Beyond

I had intended only two parts for this series, but this look at EBO warranted a post of its own -- especially since, as I would assert, all warfare beyond absolutely destructive warfare is EBO or ought to be considered such.  We act through the concrete World and we seek a corresponding beneficial reaction from our enemies.  EBO is not a so-called "generation" of warfare, although I am beginning to believe that understanding the concept of EBO will be very important in understanding William Lind's Generations of Warfare.  I intend to address those generations, in further consideration of the Revised OODA, in a third part to this series, since this post has already grown to a...sufficient length.



NOTE: Links to the original blog posts have been altered to direct to the cross-posted entries here on Dreaming 5GW.

Rethinking the OODA

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"First, does the word orientation in the phrase ['homosexual orientation'] match up with the orient of OODA?

"Most gays who use the phrase actually use it to describe the physical being (or preconditions) rather than as we might use the word in OODA: 'We’re born that way! It’s genetic!' etc. In this case, orientation does not match up with orient...."  [CGW]

"Unless a strict genetic determinist model is being argued here, the words 'orientaiton' are being used the same way. Genetic factors are part of Orientation, as they are in life. But so is conditioning, cultural factors, synthesis and analysis, etc."  [Dan, tdaxp]

"No, I do not believe so. I think you are dead wrong on this, and I think that diagrams like this diagram are either wrong or perhaps misleading...."  [CGW]

Introduction

The conversation excerpted above took place in Part Two of my series on "Homosexuality and Globalization" -- 'Homosexualism' vs Homosexuality vs 'Heterosexualism' -- as an interpolation to debate over whether exclusive adult male-adult male homosexual relationships occurred before modern times.  That series has been temporarily postponed while I've considered the significance of our disagreement over the placement of genetic heritage within the Orient phase of the OODA loop -- not because our disagreement has derailed that series but because the new subject will likely have a large bearing on the subjects of homosexuality and globalization, and other subjects, and deserves special attention.

Dan's understanding of John Boyd's OODA loop may be a reflection of diagrams such at this diagram at  Wikipedia or perhaps this variation of that diagram at Value Based Management.net.  In these diagrams, the decision-making process first outlined by John Boyd shows four primary stages -- Observe, Orient, Decide, Act -- and various subprocesses such as Feedback and Implicit Guidance & Control, shown here in an original diagram inspired by those and closely following those:

OODA%20Boyd.jpg


Specifically, the idea that genetic heritage influences the decision-making process most in the Orient stage may be a reflection of Boyd's more detailed schematic of the Orient stage shown in those linked diagrams but excluded in my simplification above; i.e.,

BoydsOrient.jpg


This description of the Orient process may seem to meet the needs of commonsense, because a person's physical being (as influenced by genetic heritage) pre-orients a person, or sets very real limits on a person's relation to the world.  Everything from I.Q. to mental disease to physical deformity to sex to skin-deep appearance may affect a person's orientation within the world as well as a person's ability to organize and consider data for purposeful orientation (i.e., decision-making.)  Similarly, a person's cultural traditions will have great bearing on a person's orientation within society, whether his own society or some other society.

Unfortunately, this schematic of the Orient phase is quite misleading.  In fact, the diagrams I have linked are also quite misleading, considered as wholes, and perhaps deserve revision....

John Boyd, First

I do not want to refute John Boyd's characterization of the decision-making process.  OODA has proven useful for many scenarios, and in many ways, utilitarian; but at the same time I cannot help considering the context of Boyd's conceptualization.  As a fighter pilot, Boyd had to react quickly to unfolding situations, and his enemies were individual pilots; these two considerations alone point at the way his concept of OODA always had preconditions:  Boyd with his genetic heritage and cultural traditions and his enemies with theirs;  Boyd in a fighter jet and his enemies in theirs.   I.e., in any person-to-person combat, or in fact in combat between large groups, these factors would already be long-set, influencing each party's ability to make decisions.  Plus, quick-thinking and short reaction times, and the very environment of being the operator of a fighter jet or helicopter, etc., already eliminate many factors that might influence a person's actions.  (For instance, using a pistol would have been long ruled-out in any confrontation between fighter pilots.)  Similarly, previous experiences in different combat situations would have been long-set, for Boyd and his enemy. 

When Boyd considered observation, then, that observation would be temporal and quite conditional.  The fighter pilot's cultural traditions are not much on his mind, in the sense that he would need to observe his own cultural traditions -- he has observed them long ago, when a child.  No, what he needs to observe will range from weather conditions, time of day, the instruments on his craft, his enemy's maneuvers, etc.  However, not having a long personal memory of his enemy's cultural traditions would perhaps require an abstract "observation" or consideration of his enemy's background as the fighter pilot makes decisions during combat, even if such consideration is not on the forefront of the pilot's mind.  His own past experiences might or might not be at the forefront, depending on the unfolding situation; if not consciously considered, those experiences might nonetheless influence quick reactions .  On the other hand, a conscious consideration or "observation" of his enemy's past experiences, if these are known, might be very much on the pilot's mind.  The Wikipedia article linked above actually includes a similar consideration of the Orient phase; cultural traditions and genetic heritage are assumed to refer to the enemy's traditions and heritage, not the pilot's.

We see in Boyd's diagram for Orient these long-set factors:  genetic heritage, cultural traditions, previous experience.  It is less clear to me that new information would be long-set; but obviously, new information would interact with our memories of past experience, cultural traditions, etc., to affect a person's ability to orient to any given unfolding of circumstances.  In fact, Boyd seems to have desired a consideration of Orient in which all these factors interact to form a type of understanding of how one should act.  Analysis & Synthesis is the fifth element included under Orient -- that the diagram at Wikipedia goes a step further in drawing the subprocesses of Orient as a well-defined pentagram, is interesting, because of the mystical implications.  These are assumed subprocesses, each interacting with each of the others, but unlike Dan, I do not see these things as being co-equal in the Orient phase.  That is, one's cultural traditions or genetic heritage are not analogous to the processes of analysis and synthesis.  They influence analysis and synthesis; or, analysis and synthesis use the information provided by these others.  As a mystical diagram -- a fuzzy schematic of what happens during Orient -- Boyd's concept might be better imagined as a Magic Cloud.

Magic Cloud OODA: tdaxp

Dan of tdaxp has addressed the magic of Boyd's cloudy diagram before: "Quality 5, The Magic Cloud".  Following Boyd's diagram of the Orient phase, Dan redrew the diagram to show Orient as individual subprocesses interacting with Observe, Decide, and Act:

tdaxpMCooda.jpg
[tdaxp original image]

But such a consideration of Orient would be messy, confusing, especially since we do not know exactly how each of these assumed subprocesses interact with each other; in Dan's words,
But this becomes a mess -- we don't really understand how the different parts of Orientation work together, and all the excess information confuses the eye. Plus, each of the new boxes are truly unknown themselves -- genetic heritage is an area of new research, not known facts, etc. We know each of the new boxes are sub-processes -- genetics don't "stop," nor does reconstruction of old experiences, but how do they work? Unknown.

[Dan, tdaxp]
Such a consideration may lead us to think of Orient as a "Magic Cloud." The process may be cloudy, but we know that something happens within the mind during the thought process, in which all these pieces interact to orient us; and thus, this cloudy understanding is magical:  we don't understand it, but it understands or continues to operate.

Unfortunately, I've never liked magic clouds, because so much superstition can be similarly lumped together through the magic of what is commonly called faith.  How can we have faith that our limited understanding of the decision making process is not in fact incorrect or misleading?  To what degree can we have an accurate understanding of these things, if we are in fact ignorant of much that occurs within our minds?  Most importantly: How can we use the fact of our own ignorance as we move toward making decisions of what to do about that ignorance?

Grossly Speaking: 'Metaphysics and Physics'

John Boyd's concept of OODA obviously assumes preconditions for any action, but within a localized environment, many preconditions can be safely ignored.  If one is in a fighter jet, one does not need to consider sand traps on a golf course several miles below the dog fight (unless, of course, one does not want to shoot down an enemy's plane while people play oblivious below...that might not be the most important decision, however.)  Rethinking the name given to a pink flower by Grandmother when one was seven-years-old is also going to be unnecessary.  In fact, it would be distracting.  Thus, context plays a major role in the OODA diagram put forth by John Boyd.

Others have since attempted to utilize Boyd's OODA for describing other phenomena.  For instance, I introduced the subject of OODA when debating "homosexual orientation."  Business persons have found much in OODA of a utilitarian nature, which was not the original intent of John Boyd.

Dan of tdaxp has recently hinted at a use of OODA for understanding Thomas Barnett's concept of SysAdmin work and even for handling insurgencies, among other things, by considering genetic factors and memetics.  Applying the Loop to general theories of cognition would stretch the original concept even further -- particularly when we fall into the orthodoxy that cultural traditions are somehow always long-set for people, even from birth.  For Boyd, the point at which fighter pilots come into conflict occurs after much learning; but for a general consideration of OODA in human cognition, we cannot avoid a consideration of how humans in fact learn cultural traditions.

During intense combat, much observation will concern the concrete world -- "unfolding circumstances" & "outside information" -- whether that observation is of weather, the enemy plane, or the instruments of one's own jet; much less time will be spent in conscious introspection, except for a consideration of past experiences, perhaps.  In general life, however, such fast-thinking will not be as necessary much of the time, and much more time may be spent in introspection.

Boyd's Loop confuses the exterior world and the "interior world," or the concrete world and the abstract world.  These things are addressed in the Loop, but their demarcation is not clear.  The lines between them are blurred, and this can lead to misunderstanding.  Let's take another look at Boyd's OODA Loop:

OODA%20Boyd.jpg


Most everything after World is intended to represent the abstract --
Middle English, from Latin abstractus, past participle of abstrahere, to draw away : abs-, ab-, away;  + trahere, to draw.
-- i.e., we may think of this as "drawing in the mind" of the concrete world, even if that is the wrong draw; or we might say that after observing the World, we then "draw away" from that world and begin to consider it abstractly.  We analyze these abstracts, synthesize them, think about them, and make decisions about them, whether consciously or subconsciously.  Not everything after World is abstract, however; Act is a physical action, and Unfolding Interaction w/ Environment [UIE] is how we make changes in the concrete world based on our considerations of abstracts of that world.  Thus, I consider the feedback line from Act to Observe as being somewhat a blurring of the concrete and abstract, since in all actuality, our action upon/within the world changes that world.  The line should have been drawn back to World, and then we would follow the line from World to Observe for an observation of our unfolding action upon/within the World.  [This, incidentally, will figure significantly in my consideration of EBO, or Effects-Based Operations, in the second part of this series.]

That blurring of lines between the concrete and abstract becomes even more problematic when we consider the other feedback loops.

In the Feedback shown leading back from Act to Observe, no distinction is made between one's physical act upon the world [UIE] and one's consideration of that physical act. Thus, we might wonder if the two types of feedback would be confused.  For instance,
  1. if I decide to take out an enemy's supply route because that would greatly interrupt that enemy's ability to act,
  2. I follow through and actually take out that node,
  3. then I may think, "Ah, success!  The enemy is greatly disrupted!"
  4. but if I have not continued to observe the actual physical effects of my action, I many not see that the enemy has not been greatly disrupted after all!  Perhaps he has several alternative routes he is using...
I.e., #3 is the result of my abstract thoughts about the effects of my action, largely pre-formed before I even decided to act.  #4 would be an observation of unfolding interaction with my environment, if I kept looking at that objective environment.  The first is an abstract observation, or quite within the mind; the second, an objective observation, or concrete observation.  Boyd's loop actually includes both types of observation but blurs the lines between them.  We might say that a person actually following the loop consciously would have an abstract and a concrete observation of the effects of the action, would see that they do not match, and would then choose some other type of action the next time around.  But all too often, such careful consideration does not occur, particularly when life-threatening situations involving a necessity for quick action are not involved; i.e., during strategy and longer-lasting operations.

The feedback loop from Decide to Observe is almost entirely abstract.  Boyd listed the subtitle "hypothesis" for Decide, in which case we hypothesize an action and then "observe" the effects of that theoretical action, against the physical situation, before acting: quite abstract observation, there. If our action fails and we see that it has failed, we may seem to have a feedback from that Decision after the fact, but only in a situation requiring quickly looping OODA; and, that isn't so much a direct feedback from Decide as it is a combination of UIE and a memory of past activity or past experiences. But this process of remembering a past decision is not clearly addressed or delineated in Boyd's OODA loop.

Each of the Implicit Guidance & Control shortcuts are intended to represent the way a person's orientation may affect either his observation or his actions in a subconscious manner.  Perhaps in considering the direct step from Orient to Act, Boyd wanted to show how a fighter pilot might act instinctively, without having to hypothesize or decide an action.  These are truly Magic Cloud material, because they represent largely subconscious or even unconscious processes in the Loop which are not well understood.

Part of the reason the Implicit Guidance & Control steps were introduced to the diagram may be the inclusion of things such as genetic heritage and cultural traditions in the Orient stage, even of past experiences in that stage.  Suppose a person is born blind; his blindness will greatly affect his ability to observe the world as well as his ability to act upon it, below or beyond his conscious decision-making process/ability.  But such a consideration also points at the way the concrete, objective world has been blurred with the abstract in Boyd's OODA, since physical blindness is quite obviously a matter of the concrete world even if those who are blind have built up abstract considerations of their own blindness during the course of a life.  Other things, like extreme mental retardation, may be entirely physical, especially if those having such conditions are incapable of introspection about those conditions.  Boyd, when considering the decision-making process of fighter pilots did not need to consider congenital blindness or extreme mental retardation, however.

The inclusion of cultural traditions and past experiences within the Orient step represents abstractions; but how those abstractions have been formed is not clear from the OODA loop as it is normally diagrammed.  These things may well subconsciously influence a person's observations and actions, simply because they represent either habitual thought patterns or limitations on past observation of the concrete world.  If one has not experienced the taste and physical effects of a particular berry, he is not going to know if it tastes bad or is extremely poisonous, when he is trapped in the wild behind enemy lines.  But he might eat it anyway if he is starving (a physical condition) and if it looks a lot like a blackberry.  He might not.  If he bases this decision on his limited past experience with berries, he is basing his decision on an abstract, and he might come to regret that decision if he has never before experienced the effects of eating such berries.  In a different situation, the same man might not be very hungry and might avoid taking the risk.  His state of being starved, or not starved, is not a long-standing condition, nor an entirely abstract condition, but a relatively new physical condition, even if it is also a result of genetic heritage.

We are also not able to draw a distinction between the subconscious or unconscious "decision-making process" implicit in Implicit Guidance & Control and the conscious decision-making of Boyd's OODA loop.  A cultural tradition may have larger sway over one individual than another within the same culture, for instance.  The Magic Cloud of Boyd's Orient does not discount this possibility, but neither does it attempt to clarify such a possibility for those not engaged in live-or-die dog fights.  Thus we might attempt to use Boyd's OODA loop for understanding how a particular element within a culture can be coerced into engaging in some particular activity (EBO, 4GW, 5GW) but severely mistake that person's cultural traditions for personal obsessions which are in fact not present.  I.e., going back to the consideration of interrupting supply routes, we may have a very abstract idea about cause-effect, based on abstractions of others' abstractions, without considering exactly how an unfolding action upon the environment may greatly influence that other person's abstractions (his relation to his cultural traditions.)  Without a careful observation of that particular enemy in reaction to similar concrete actions (UIE), we may greatly misjudge, mis-decide, and mis-act. 

Furthermore, lumping cultural traditions, genetic heritage, and past experiences with analysis and synthesis greatly blurs the real-world environment and the abstract processes of the mind. Analysis and syntheses are mental processes, but genetic heritage is a physical condition/process, and past experiences and cultural traditions have a direct precedent in a person's objective environment (even if these two have subsequently been idolized or ideologized into abstractions.) By considering an enemy's abstractions without also considering an enemy's physical environment, we are assuming a cognitive process for our enemy that is entirely ab- stract: i.e., a cognitive process entirely drawn apart from concrete reality. This is a severe confusion between the abstract and the concrete, and may lead to the belief that our abstractions of the enemy and even our enemy's abstractions are in fact concrete realities when they may have very little relation to objective reality. The degree to which a person may "live in the abstract" (at its extreme: ideologues, fanatics, the insane) rather than according to objective observation is not clearly addressed by Boyd's OODA.  In fact, his loop almost entirely addresses the abstract portion of the decision-making process -- which is why things such as genetic heritage and feedback from Action to Observe are left rather cloudy or inexact.  Boyd seems to have wanted to address both the abstract and the concrete, but by using cloudy feedback loops to combine the two "worlds" and types of process.

Re-Vision of the OODA

In consideration of the above, I have tentatively redesigned the OODA to address some of the cloudier aspects.  Obviously, not every process is clearly understood, by me or by anyone; but in particular I've wanted to address a division between the concrete world and the abstract "world," or between what exists and our thoughts about what exists:

  • between the concrete and the abstract processes of 'observation'
  • between concrete and abstract decisions/hypotheses and acts/activities
  • between conscious, subconscious, and unconscious observation and activity.


This is a first reworking of the loop, and I have largely kept Boyd's terminology even though later clarifications might necessitate a new set of terms, preferring to build upon Boyd's Loop rather than replace it -- it is a good starting point.

RevisedOODA.jpg
[Links to a larger image.]

As you can see, I have attempted to separate the objective and concrete from the subjective and abstract, resulting in two different OODA loops. The first OODA loop represents the concrete:

    WORLD
  • Exterior Physical Environment
  • Personal Genetic Heritage (Body)

    OBSERVE
  • Sensory Stimulation
  • Genetic Information

    ORIENT
  • (Abstract OODA)

    DECIDE
  • Choice-Act

    ACT
  • Physical Act


In actuality, this is a move from the concrete world, to the concrete interaction between world and person (reception of information), to the abstract decision-making process (contemplation/analysis of information), to a physical act -- with a potential choice-act, or conscious and focused decision to act upon the physical world. So it is movement beginning and ending with the concrete world.  Unlike Boyd, I have included Genetic Heritage in the exterior environment.  In the first place, when considering future warfare, we will need to consider potential viruses and biochemicals capable of altering the genetic structure similar to the way that present methods of warfare may alter -- injure, destroy -- a person's body or other parts of the concrete world like infrastructure; such alteration affects a person's observation, and hence decisions and activity, but it does so through acting upon the physical environment, or concretely.  In the second place, a thinking being must exist before cognition may occur, and Orient is a process of cognition.  Also, because human beings are dynamically alive, genetic information is always new information, consistently feeding into the abstract portion of the OODA.  We may think that the information is static, but it is not; e.g., genetically I am a male, but that could change due to physical alteration (whether genetic or not) -- it's just that, until a physical change has occurred, the same genetic information is continuously passed and continues to affect the later stages of the OODA loop.

Genetic heritage affects not only one's ability to observe via the senses -- e.g., congenital blindness -- but also continues to inform the process of cognition via other genetic information, such as mental retardation, biochemical differences between the sexes, and through biological signals for starvation, pain, etc.

When considering the decision-making process, it will be important to remember the distinction between concrete information and what I've called "old information" in the abstract OODA loop of the ORIENT stage.  Both types of information feed into the Abstract Observation stage (within ORIENT), and different individuals in different situations may well give more "weight" to one type of observation than the other.  Mark Safranski of ZenPundit has recently written on the subject of paying attention:
As poorly as we sometimes are at paying attention extrospectively - we could benefit far more by greater attention or some old fashioned Zen "mindfulness" being directed inward. Metacognitive regulation requires an introspective monitoring of one's thoughts and ideas, which means active, conscious, effort to pay attention.

[Mark Safranski, ZenPundit]
I suspect that such Zen mindfulness, though on the surface seeming quite introspective, is in fact a method of disentangling oneself from inordinate focus on abstract thoughts.  I.e., we are often "viewing" our own thoughts when we think we are engaging in "extrospection" -- really, we are not distinguishing between the two -- and by making ourselves more aware of our internal cognitive processes, we may become better able to separate what is real and what is only a memory or pale imitation of past extrospection (if even that.)  Interestingly, Mark mentions master Yogis and Zen monks who were able "to effect significant physiological changes" merely by focusing inwardly.  This may seem like a refutation of the Revised OODA loop, in that mind acts directly on the physical world rather than the other way around, but it's not.  In fact, such a decision and act are methods of acting physically upon the world, or upon one's own physiological being; our minds have brains and a body of electro-chemical processes which may act upon the world just like hands and feet may act upon the world.  So these Yogis and master Zen monks have an ability to Observe the physical world -- their genetic heritage, or bodies -- and act upon it.

Clearly, however, a wide gulf separates such Zen mastery and wishful or superstitious thinking, probably since the latter remains focused more on past information than new information; i.e., on ideology or memory or other mental constructs rather than on one's own physical being or any other aspect of the present and concrete world. 

I have loosely defined three types of action: the impulsive act, the focused act, and reflexive or habitual acts.  Within the abstract OODA of the primary ORIENT stage, I have attempted to show (loosely, again) how each type of act flows from the cognitive process.  Specifically, I have given two abstract "worlds":

  • Mental Constructs which tend to be longer-lasting information and sets of information, probably reinforced via multiple iterations of the entire OODA process but which are set by the Abstract OODA loop.
  • Conditional Constructs which are short-term:  individual present ideas and new but hypothetical sets of ideas, which one reviews before coming to an understanding of the information or even a formal ideology built from multiple sets.


Reflexive and Habitual Acts originate from previously formed mental constructs and are loosely analogous to Boyd's fighter-pilot reaction to familiar situations.  One might  wonder if such a quick-looping through the Abstract Act phase can occur, but remember that the cognitive process is generally rather quick.  I.e., before the Abstract Act stage, information has fed from the outside (his enemy's actions) as well as from past experience (Mental Constructs), they have been compared (Analysis & Synthesis), the fighter pilot may decide the comparison fits rather nicely (and so not question it through another OO cycle), and then may come to an Understanding (Abstract Act) before acting.  In fact, we will likely find that habitual acts tend to occur most often when quite familiar situations occur frequently; i.e., when physical Observation of the World quickly matches up with whatever Mental Constructs we have previously formed -- and, thus, not requiring further contemplation or hypotheses. (However, the viewer may be mistaken about the World, due to subterfuge; as will be considered in part two of this series.)

Focused Acts also come from an Understanding, informed by Memory and Past Experience and perhaps Ideology, but are not reflexive or habitual -- probably because whatever information is entering the ORIENT phase from the outside World includes unexpected information.  This might be because:  the viewer is in a new environment; an old environment has changed; or perhaps a viewer's sensory ability, or physical Observation, is quite new.  Consider what happens when the power goes out in the middle of the night and we must make our way to a flashlight or a fuse box in complete darkness.  Or, consider what would happen if we suddenly went blind for no reason -- or what we would do if we heard a very large animal outside our tent!

Impulsive Acts are quite different than the other two, although they may appear to be related to either.  Retailers know the importance of placing novelty items within quick and easy reach of shoppers.  And, twentysomething partygoers may end up in a bed they never expected to see, regretting their "decision" later.  Many impulsive acts have some relation to Mental Constructs -- "Oh, so-and-so wears that cologne, and everyone likes it; I must buy some too!" -- but this is because those past experiences feed into the Abstract OODA; when the person comes to decide an action, on the spur of the moment, he usually does so from a belief that his hypothesis is an understanding: "If I wear that cologne, I'll get laid!"  If such a decision-making process is made in advance (he goes to the store planning to buy the cologne), it would be a Focused Act, whether it leads to a desired changed World or to some disappointment.   But if the act flows from suddenly new information without  passing into a resilient understanding and careful decision-making process, it is an Impulsive Act

Arguably, Conditional Constructs and Mental Constructs could be combined within the internal OODA, since both are created through operation of the Abstract OODA, but to do so would, I think, obscure the decision-making processes.  For instance, consider a different Impulsive Act:  While at the Mall, a person suddenly hears lots of gunfire near him, sees people falling, and rather than quickly duck behind a convenient metal barrier starts running around, screaming -- and, gets shot.  But a person who has been in combat situations might quickly duck behind the barrier:  a reflexive act based more on past experience than on present new information and sudden ideas of impending death.

From There to Here and Beyond

Many of the distinctions I have just made could be made in consideration of Boyd's OODA conceptualization. In fact, without Boyd's conceptualization, I might not have begun to consider these distinctions.  It is only in futher consideration, of new applications of the OODA loop, that new distinctions need to be made.  For instance, Dan of tdaxp has previously theorized an overlap between Boyd's OODA loop and William Lind's theory of generations of warfare, in “Go Deep (OODA and the Rainbow of Generational Warfare).”  That is a post that I will address in the second part of Rethinking the OODA.  For instance, if we theorize a 5GW that works on an enemy's ability to Observe, are we thinking of the primary, physical Observe or the internal, Abstract Observe?  If 4th Generation warriors work on the enemy's OODA between Observe and Orient, as suggested by Dan, which OO are we discussing?  Furthermore, which are we considering when we decide to make war on an enemy: his primary, physical OODA loop?  his Abstract OODA? Both? Or do we sometimes mistake our own Abstract Constructs for a physical observation of his loop(s)?  These are questions I'll address in part two of the series -- along with a consideration of Effects-Based Warfare and, if I can manage it, Network-Centric Warfare [pdf link].







NOTE: Links to the original blog posts have been altered to direct to the cross-posted entries here on Dreaming 5GW.

Skinning the Gap

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The concept of progress acts as a protective mechanism to shield us from the terrors of the future.

[--from "Collective Sayings of Muad'Dib" by the Princess Irulan (Frank Herbert, Dune)]

Elsewhere in Dune, Muad'Dib is said to be half-ogre, who ordered battle drums made out of the skins of his enemies; and throughout the book, particularly the latter half, we are given signs that Paul Muad'Dib feared the things he knew would be done in his name, but that he went ahead with "progress" anyway.  So the saying seems to be a defense of his choice, as if he chose to confront the terrors of the future directly while letting others find solace in the idea of progress.




In my couple of years of Blogospheric reading, I have often noted the sentiment of an element on the American Right, that those on the Left preach progress while constantly standing in the way of progress.  On the matter of the WoT -- which some call the GWoT -- the Left is said to be susceptible to dreams of dhimmitude, called by them "progress,"  while ignoring the terrors dhimmitude would bring.  The Rightist theory could be broadly restated: The Left would like to synthesize with the Islamist culture, or at least with Muslim culture, rather than see that culture for what it is, an antithesis to the Western political, economic, and cultural progress that has been effected for millennia now.

Meanwhile, that particular American Right would like to destroy Islam utterly.  That, they say, would be real progress.



I mention these things by way of introducing a few blog posts I have been following in the last few days, in which notions of progress, and the terrors they bring, have perturbed the writers.  But I'll have to warn in advance, also, that I'm only using this post to introduce those other posts and a few reactionary thoughts I have had while reading them.  This is begun as no comprehensive essay, merely a kind of note-taking, although given my penchant for verbosity....

It's nice to know that while I piddle about, dependable bloggers continue their heroic output.

Mark Safranski of ZenPundit has been reexamining globalization and the problems that come with globalization -- "Network Theory, 'Noise' and Al Qaida" and "PNM Theory and the Question of Metrics" -- with a host of links in either post that should keep readers busy.

I confess to being both inspired and daunted.  Sometimes, the ideas circling among the intelligence-types and Blogospheric foreign affairs analysts appear to continue suggestive work while missing too many points.  But when I consider what is missing from these explorations, I am assaulted by vague impressions and then, thinking I should add my own interpolations, I am left dreading the prospect.

Three points:

  1. Whether networks, waves, noise, complexity, influence, etc., the forces of globalization are almost always explained in ways that should make solidification of the process impossible.  Once they are solidified, they are no longer networks, waves, noise, complexity, nor influence -- at least, on that last point, not subtle influence.

  2. Despite the apparent and assumed impossibility, assumptions are also made that these processes can be explained or "discovered."   Paradoxically, the more detail that is used to explain them, or to explain the discoveries, the further away from reality these theories appear to draw.  At least, for me.

  3. At heart, the attempt to isolate, quantify, and qualify the processes of globalization leave me thinking that what is really happening among the intelligence-types and foreign affairs analysts is the imposition of order onto complex/chaotic realities: sometimes, the attempts appear to be ye old love of hierarchy and hierarchical -- perhaps, scaled -- modes of operating being expressed in new ways or, at best, circuitously.
I have myself circuitously approached such criticism before, usually with some significant incoherence.  For instance, in that linked list of notes and reactions, I questioned John Robb's assertions that the emergence of global open source guerrilla movements will be too complex to isolate in advance -- mostly because he then goes on to make qualitative (and somewhat quantitative) predictions related to such an emergence.  Which is it, impossible chaos or mere complexity?  Often, I seem to detect a belief in demons or angels that will operate on the world stage, which will be too vague to call anything else, combined with a wish to declare how they will appear and what they will do and what we can do in reaction to their appearance.

In another, older entry, I compared Thomas Barnett with Alexander the Great:  Alex either truly believed in improving the world by bringing Macedonian culture and structure to that world -- while incorporating the useful structures other cultures suggested -- or Alex merely wanted to control the world.  (Historians disagree.)

I have also stumbled over the term "rule set," since any utilization of the term rule leads quite naturally to thoughts of rulership and rulers of a very human nature.  But since I've made the point several times, I'll not link any given entry.

But, I will say that so much depends on whether those rules are naturally organic -- we discover them -- or are mere mortal creations.

And, I will say that the efforts of Blogospheric theorists on the subject tend to incorporate both kinds.

Thus, all the effort expended on creating definition for globalization and globalism appears to be the work of Grand Masters and their proxies -- although, who is who is not as easy to discern -- and, as a response to emerging paradigms and conflicts, has a very, very, very 5GWish aspect.

Punditry and 5GW

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I will want to take a closer look at this topic.  I once remarked that, "We certainly cannot discount the possibility of a messianic politician, celebrity, or religious figure for a 5GWarrior — nor, some powerful celebrity scoundrel, who offers the negative to reinforce our positive," and in hindsight, I am recognizing the truly difficult task of separating the messianic figures from the celebrity scoundrels.  How, indeed, could we possibly know that the overt message is the key message, rather than, in the case of scoundrels, the negative to reinforce our positive?

I ask, because Gus Van Horn, in his latest post on his eponymous blog, fisks a theocratic pundit who bemoans the lack of government sponsorship of Christianity --

Not only will the liberals aggressively work to prohibit the State from green lighting and recognizing Christianity as a legitimate and positive force in our land, they will also attempt to stifle Christians from influencing the path of government.  [Emphasis added -- ed.]

[Doug Giles, on Townhall.com]
Of course, this sounds just like a messianic message for Christian believers -- to come to arms -- but, really, if it were a conscious 5GW move, would we be better served to consider the possibility that it is a negative to reinforce our positive?  5GW tactics will be similarly confusing, purposely, and intended to make us think one thing while reinforcing another.  I doubt this is such a move by Doug Giles, however; but it does raise questions for the future of 5GW in our media age.

This ties in to my last post, obviously, on 5GW and Christianity.  I'll return to it when I have more time.

Yesterday, while earning a little cash as an election judge in a local election, I had the opportunity to begin reading a book I've owned for about six months but had put off reading: Pattern Recognition, by science fiction and technology guru William Gibson.

So far, I've only made it to Chapter 9; but Chapter 7 surprised me, because Gibson, through the character of advertising mogul Hubertus Bigend, describes 5GW, with a little help from the main protagonist Cayce Pollard:

[Bigend] "This business of ours is narrowing. Like many others. There will be fewer genuine players. It's no longer enough to simply look the part and cultivate an attitude."

Cayce has imagined something like this herself, and indeed has been wondering whether she's likely to make it through the narrowing, into whatever waits on the other side.

"You're smart enough," he says. "You can't doubt it."

She'll take a page from his book, then. Caltrop time. "Why are you rebranding the world's second-largest manufacturer of athletic shoes? Was it your idea or theirs?"

"I don't work that way. The client and I engage in a dialogue. A path emerges. It isn't about the imposition of creative will." He's looking at her very seriously now, and to her embarrassment she feels herself shiver. She hopes he didn't notice. If Bigend can convince himself that he doesn't impose his will on others, he must be capable of convincing himself of anything. "It's about contingency. I help the client go where things are already going. Do you want to know the most interesting thing about Dorotea?"

"What?"

"She once worked for a very specialized consultancy, in Paris. Founded by a retired and very senior French intelligence type who'd done a lot of that sort of work on his government's behalf, in Germany and the United States."

"She's . . . a spy?"

" 'Industrial espionage,' though that's sounding increasingly archaic, isn't it? I suppose she may still know whom to call, to have certain things done, but I wouldn't call her a spy. What interested me, though, was how that business seemed in some ways to be the inverse of ours."

"Of advertising?"

"Yes. I want to make the public aware of something they don't quite yet know that they know -- or have them feel that way. Because they'll move on that, do you understand? They'll think they've thought of it first. It's about transferring information, but at the same time about a certain lack of specificity."

And there's so much more. Cayce is a "footagehead," a member of a worldwide subculture cutting across other subcultures, who are addicted to analysis of a series of short, anonymous video releases appearing on the Internet. No one knows who is creating those videoclips, whether a full and completed feature is being released piecemeal or is being continually created as each clip is released. The MSM has largely ignored the phenomenon; or, when trying to present coverage of the phenomenon, fails utterly to reproduce the same excitement elicited by the release of the footage. Bigend, being the marketing guru he is, wants to learn more about the author of those clips; i.e.:

[Bigend] "...I'm not asking vis-à-vis segments of a narrative, but in terms of the actual sequential order of uploaded segments."

Cayce isn't used to thinking of the footage in those terms, although she recognizes them. She thinks she knows where Bigend is probably heading with this, but opts to play dumb. "But they clearly aren't in a logical narrative sequence. Either they're uploading them randomly--"

"Or very carefully, intending to provide the illusion of randomness. Regardless, and regardless of everything else, the footage has already been the single most effective piece of guerrilla marketing ever..."

So far in the book, the footage is being characterized -- by Bigend -- as "guerrilla marketing." But many chapters are left, and the novel's introductory blurb gives a fuller picture:

"...Cayce is soon traveling through parallel universes of marketing, globalization, and terror, heading always for the still point where the three converge...."

Initiating 5GW

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"Truly formless 5gw," Younghusband on Coming Anarchy

"5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading," Dan on tdaxp

"Riding the Tiger," Chet Richards

"Emergent Intelligence in Open Source Warfare," John Robb on Global Guerrillas

And on Phatic Communion:




5GW: Greek Tragedy

Recent conversation at Coming Anarchy has motivated me to revisit the subject 5GW: fifth-generation warfare, with a slightly different focus than I have already used -- and, generally, with a different focus than has been used by Dan of tdaxp and most recently by Younghusband of Coming Anarchy.

Much of the prior focus has outlined the most general aspects of theoretical 5GW.  For instance, both Dan and Younghusband have recently focused on a broad outline of how 5GW might operate, paying attention to OODA loops and how the loops can be used -- or, even, subverted -- by the 5GWarrior.  Dan tdaxp, as can be surmised from the title of the link to tdaxp above, has, in particular, devoted much time to the theoretical qualities of 5GW: soundlessness, formlessness, polish, leadership -- and secrecy.  These are qualities that may inform the actual decisions and activities of 5GWarriors, they are pointers for anyone wishing to engage in 5GW or wishing to defend against 5GW, but they are not themselves the actual decisions and activities we might expect in 5GW.

At the recent Coming Anarchy thread, one commenter wondered about something that has been asked before at tdaxp in discussions concerning 5GW:  how does 5GW differ from 4GW?  4GWarriors are often fuzzy, may be quite indistinct, and use tactics to confuse their opponents or overwhelm their opponents' control over a situation.  4GWarriors may be involved in loose networks, with cells hardly cooperating directly with one another, and largely depend for their success on an emergent order over which they, themselves, have little individual control. [Tangentially, John Robb's concept of "emergent intelligence" speaks to this last point -- also contemplated here at P.C.in "Emergence and Warfare: Notes and Hypotheses."]  When speaking of secrecy and formlessness, the fuzzy image we have of 4GW insurgents or global guerrillas, who may hide among civilians and have few known identities and known locations, may lead us to question how 5GW can be distinguished from 4GW.  If leading our opponents to where we want them to be is a description of 5GW, it is nevertheless also a description of 4GW and a tactic utilized in even earlier forms of warfare.  Polished warriors have been the best, going as far back as human conflict.

In comments to the thread at Coming Anarchy, Dan reintroduced the concept of greater effectiveness for succeeding generations of warfare -- a 5GWarrior would, theoretically, be 20x as strong as a 4GWarrior, or able to kill (or neutralize) 20-times more 4GW opponents as a 4GWarrior would his 5GW foes.  Whatever the actual number, such a concept makes sense, or else there would be no evolutionary reason for succeeding generations of warfare.  But the concept makes claims which have yet to be supported in our theory of 5GW, since we do not have a clear concept of how the 5GW neutralizes 20x 4GW opponents if the two are in combat.  I mentioned this problem at Coming Anarchy:
Dan’s broad characterization of the effectiveness of 5GW forces who are fighting prior-generation forces is a little too abstract or even inconsequential, since it does not describe exactly how a 5GW force may fight a 4GW force. I’m talking, nuts and bolts. Consider the effective 4GW forces that have emerged in modern times; then ponder how a shadowy—indeed, a formless—5GW force will fight a 4GW force in order to achieve the 20x advantage.

I.e., I know that previously I’ve been considering how a 5GW force might defeat a society or NGO or coalition of states—without giving much thought to how the force would combat other actual military forces. It’s much easier to see how a 5GW might destroy a state than it is to see how a hidden organization might defeat a fuzzy 4GW force.

This is a major problem in the theory of 5GW.  Although we have a working theory of broad qualities of 5GW, I wonder if we can think our way through proofs of these qualities.  In Greek tragedies, some disguised god or goddess would lend a strategic hand or lay traps for the protagonist; and, in 5GW mythology, we so far have dreams of such gods and goddesses who accomplish their tasks with magic.  We do not really know how they do it.

5GW: The Power of the Gods

I have previously approached consideration of an outline of definite actions for 5GWarriors in two of the linked P.C. entries listed above.  In the first, I considered "effectors," which, for a theory of 5GW, is a pretty good term:

ef•fec•tor

n. One who brings about a result or event; one who accomplishes a purpose.

[via Webster’s Online Dictionary, The Rosetta Edition™]

In order to develop an idea of actual 5GW activity, we must have a realistic concept of 5GW actors.  However, in discussions with Dan tdaxp, I have previously mentioned the god-like quality of these actors:
I was thinking more along the lines of a scenario in which multiple, seemingly unrelated events hurt one nation (or a group of nations) repeatedly, as if “the hand of God” were behind those events: say, one major terrorist act, one major financial crisis, one upsurge in bird-flu, one natural disaster, one power grid failure, and a case of a targeting error in some ongoing conflict (killing many innocents), over the period of 9 or 15 months.
Dan thought that such a repetition of disasters -- however unrelated on the surface -- would tip off a target that something unnatural was happening; but, I thought that these types of disasters stood a good chance of accomplishing some goals for a 5GWarrior, since in the first case, a targeted nation would be forced into a reactionary stance to each disaster -- would be occupied mitigating the destruction -- and in the second case, these things might each suggest a multiplicity of causes.  A nation suffering these disasters might even be prone to blame itself; indeed, a lot of internal bickering about "laying the blame" could distract the nation from discerning a SecretWarrior.

In another slim post (broadly called "5GW Tutorial' -- linked above), I contemplated the possibility that bin Laden and other actors on the world stage may have taken the Katrina Disaster Lesson: just look at how America can become self-preoccupied as a result of "natural" disasters.  Was the disaster in New Orleans a natural disaster?  Yes, some will say:  The hurricane was an act of God.  Others may say: No, we failed to prepare in advance, we neglected the levies, we have a very bad system of state and federal response to disasters, residents of New Orleans failed to leave the city when warned; the disaster was a result of human failure.  Was it a natural disaster?

If we are to consider how a 5GW effector may lead an opponent down a destructive path, or how a 5GW effector may distract an opponent in potentially disastrous ways, we cannot dismiss the possibility of man-made "natural" disasters.  But catastrophes have the potential of "outing" 5GWarriors.  When writing the entry about Katrina, I pondered the possibility that a terrorist could have placed bombs at strategic locations along the levees in New Orleans and set them off as the hurricane hit.  This would have offered the best chance that he might have had to accomplish the task without being discovered -- but such an action would have risked discovery anyway as debris was examined.  (Those studying why the levees failed would have noticed burn and blast marks.)  A viral epidemic could be created by a 5GWarrior, but some geneticist could perhaps track the spread back to a source nation or a source lab.

In Effectors, I posed three questions I'll reintroduce here:
  1. The yakuza boss, when killed, would no longer appear to be alive. That is, if an action occurs, its effects are always observable, even if we don’t happen to see the action itself.

  2. What kind of effects will a 5GW warrior desire? What kind of activity will the 5GW warrior attempt in order to obtain the results desired? Specifically, why would a 5GW warrior engage in activity the results of which are entirely unobservable; would such results truly be results, if they do not produce cascading effects or a changed reality?

  3. If results are observable, to what degree can the “secret” in terms such as SecretWar and SecretWarrior, obtain or persist?
In 5GW discussions, I and others have contemplated the utility of playing forces against each other.  Younghusband in the recent Coming Anarchy thread considered something similar:

It reminds me of The Usual Suspects and the legendary crimelord Keyser Sozé. Was he an actual person or simply a myth resulting from a series of loosely related crimes? “The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist.” Could the opposite be true? Could the greatest trick a terrorist movement ever pull is convincing the world that it did exist? I could see how warring on this myth (effectively a figment of the paranoid imagination) to the ends of the earth could definitely bankrupt a state.

So, to recap, Dan’s version of 5GW has a key player acting behind the scenes that cannot be OBSERVEd. Younghusband’s version has a non-existent actor that is being perceived as OBSERVEable.
In that last paragraph, the Hidden Actor and the Observed Chimera are really two sides of the same coin.  No organization could "trick" an opponent into seeing the chimera if it, the hidden organization, did not exist -- because non-entities cannot act!  Now, whether the Observed opponent is real or imaginary will make real difference in the 5GW, since different goals will have different requirements for how the target should be misled; but in general, the end results will be the same as far as the 5GWarrior is concerned.  So a non-natural natural disaster could be laid at the feet of a real or imaginary proxy or patsy, although, again, one must wonder if a real patsy would stand up and say, "Uh, we hate you, but we did not do it!"  In fact, the 5GWarrior's best option in such a case may seem to be the creation of an imaginary foe for its victim to fight, just as Younghusband described.  No actual foe could be found because the non-existing Observed Foe does not exist.  The paradox of such an action, unfortunately, undermines the 5GWarrior: as the victim attempts to outline its Observed Foe in greater detail, the victim will be looking for the 5GWarrior! They are the same coin.  So explosives, viruses, etc., will be examined, and there is always a chance that some bit of forensic evidence will lead back to the actual 5GWarrior.

Thus, the better bet for a 5GWarrior would be to frame an actual organization -- but an organization that the victim will not believe no matter the number of denials issued by that organization.  But the best bet would be to first find an organization that hates the primary target and is more than willing to accept responsibility for whatever disasters beset the victim.  The problem with this tactic is simply the fact that the patsy might eventually have a change of heart or might be destroyed by the primary victim; out of desperation, the patsy may deny ever having been complicit.

But then, as mentioned in Effectors in answer to my own question about ultimate secrecy, the 5GWarrior may not care if his designs become fully known if the primary victim has already been forced to cross the rubicon.  If the victim is already in a downward spiral from which he cannot emerge, then no revelation of deception will do the victim any good.  Many unnatural natural disasters are of a type that require immediate attention that will serve to preoccupy a target or force a dissipation of powers to the point of allowing no exhaustive search for Actors real or imagined, anyway -- particularly if there are successive disasters.  But such an application of forces might indeed be godlike, perhaps beyond the powers of any potential 5GWarrior organization (especially if the target is a highly developed, resilient target.)

Whispers in the Ear: 5GW Epiphanies

In considering unnatural natural disasters, my primary focus, though unstated, was a consideration of the use of physical force: how could a 5GWarrior utilize physics to goad a target down a path, confuse a target, and ultimately create effects beneficial to the SecretWarrior's war on its target.  But each of the methods mentioned or implied has a weakness, since the creation of unnatural natural disasters, the application of terrorist acts, etc., are traceable.  Such acts have effects which are not only obvious -- thus, may raise suspicion -- but because they rely on the physical world, they allow the target to piece together physical evidence and, thus, they allow the target to build a clearer picture of the cause.  They allow the target to observe what is real even though a target may fail to do so and therefore may fail to properly piece together the physical patterns.

Framing a patsy or proxy may serve to confuse the target for a time; it might be an effective tactic, leading to a false puzzle as pieces of physical evidence are joined; but as already implied, the 5GWarrior may not want to depend so much on a patsy's complicity -- and, physical evidence never lies, though a victim might fail to hear the truth.

How does a 5GW force initiate activity; or, put another way, how does a 5GW force influence its targets to take the steps toward self-destruction?  One way may be through some application of physical force, but a direct application risks discovery.  Framing a patsy risks discovery.  What if, however, another organization committed the act?  What if al Qaeda or some domestic terrorist organization could create the disaster the 5GWarrior wants to inflict (as a goad) on the target?  But then, how do you get that organization to do it?

One way might be a cross-framing, which is an old method: simultaneously commit acts against two parties who already hate each other, but make it look to each of them as if the other did it.  Done well, such a framing -- or, multiple framings in quick succession -- could lead to the escalation of conflict between the two parties, and once the conflict reaches a certain tempo, the original acts are nearly forgotten.  Cross-framing is a risky enterprise, however, because unless conflict escalates at a very quick rate, the target of 5GW may have time to observe the physical evidence of the terrorist acts.  For instance, 9/11 has been observed and studied, over and over, in the current GWoT; if al Qaeda had been framed -- a favorite conspiracy theory -- chances are good that we would have discovered this fact and tracked the evidence back to the actual perpetrators.  At the very least, we would be looking for those perpetrators.

What things are hardest to track? Answer: memes.

I think that it may only be fitting for 5GW to derive its difference, its evolutionary superiority, from the greater role of meme transference in our modern world; and that, in general, successive generations of war have developed as technologies and societies developed.  The quick media cycle has observable effects on policy and decision-making, and 5GWarriors will make full use of media.
Dan tdaxp, quoting a song by VNV Nation:

"Soundless:

I'm saying nothing for the good of myself
but I'm still talking and you're not listening"
Why are you not listening?  You are not listening, because you are already deciding, adding your voice to the chatter (if only mentally.)  Listening is a different function than hearing.  The 5GWarrior may still be talking, you may be hearing, but you are not listening.  Why?  Because you already agree or disagree with what is being said -- I'm saying nothing for the good of myself.  The 5GWarrior is speaking so that you have an opportunity to agree or disagree; he is giving you the opportunity to take a position and, thus, is making you free.

In Effectors, I contemplated on one nature of the SecretWarrior: The SecretWarrior as Benefactor:
No society is 100% homogenous, but the most influential members of the society (whether the society is a small group or a nation) are those who can promise the most benefit to the other members of society, whether the benefit is material in nature or psychological or social. To give an example: should a string of natural and not-so-natural disasters occur, those leaders, thinkers, and other members of a society who are able to mitigate or nullify the effects of those disasters are most likely to have the freest reins. They are certainly more likely to avoid suspicion — if, and only if, their efforts actually seem to lead, and ultimately do lead, to benefits.
A couple of successive comments on the Coming Anarchy thread point in a similar direction:
arherring said:

I agree that 5GW will be a networked organization, but I think the main weapon it will wield will be the idea of connectivity. I imagine it to be sort of viral, with each person in the organization being a vector to spread the idea be they a soldier, a diplomat, an engineer, or a relief worker.

John Robb said:

I’d like to offer an alternative to the above. What if GG’s ignore the decision making of the government entirely (their entire OODA loop) and focus directly on the population/economy. This is the equivalent of turning the government’s decision making loop into a tire in mud. You can work perfectly, but it can’t get any traction.
A 5GWarrior may indeed focus on the population and may suggest methods of connecting, by offering new methods to arouse agreement or disagreement -- depending on the effect he wants.  How direct will the offering be?  We certainly cannot discount the possibility of a messianic politician, celebrity, or religious figure for a 5GWarrior -- nor, some powerful celebrity scoundrel, who offers the negative to reinforce our positive.  But there may be other ways to do it:  a new book is published, a new movie made, a new pop song is created, which strikes the right chord and influences large numbers of people; then, the SecretWarrior is not seen, because that actor is thought to be some member of the intelligentsia or is an artiste just doing his thing, and the new idea introduced is just "an idea whose time has come."

The 5GWarrior may operate in relative isolation, as well, as some adviser to a politician or business mogul, as a ghost writer, or as a friend or inspiration to an artist, who whispers in the ear of (media) power. This may be the most effective form.  Certainly, this will be the least traceable form.  He might be the friend of the adviser; there could be networks spanning across many fields.

Thinking of John Robb's implication in Emergent Intelligence (but also my follow-up conceptualization) that individual members of an emergent system may not even know they are members of that system -- they are focused on local effects and activities, but their activities lead to the large-scale emergence -- leads me to wonder if whispers in the ear might be tracked back to 5GW operatives by individuals. Those who have heard the whispers may later be able to know and remember who whispered, but because they are not fully aware of the total emergence in advance, they can't put 2 and 2 together until it's much too late to do any good.  But on the other hand...

...the 5GW network will use physical force in a way that is not traceable to the 5GW network, because others will choose to be the actors.  The patsies have chosen to be patsies, but they think they are doing their own work.  What happens when you introduce the idea of "a clash of civilizations," in the right way to the right people?  For instance.  [Not that this is actually what happened.]  So this 5GW theory is not mere politics, diplomacy, business, or punditry.  Actual force, and particularly the reaction to force, are methods utilized by 5GW actors.

The 5GW force, in order to be effective, will look for emergence in advance, and will create the memes that will lead to the desired emergence.  "Emergence in advance" is potential, unformed, no-form.   In order to be effective, the 5GW force will highlight inequalities and insufficiencies which are already present although perhaps largely ignored; they will be market creators:
A more powerful reason that innovation is related to market shaping goes back to the military idea of the initiative. Companies take the initiative in the marketplace by offering a stream of new products and services. Where do new products and services come from? The only answer possible, discounting elves and gamma rays, is through the initiative of the people who work for and with the organization. A market creator uses the almost symbiotic relationship all of its people have with its customers to generate ideas for new features or capabilities or whatever. Stalk and Hout were dead on, when in the middle of describing how agile companies become entwined with their customers, they observed that "Sometimes it's difficult to know who's leading whom." [ed. -- emphasis added.]

[Chet Richards, Riding the Tiger]

The Tao also describes the phenomenon, when describing the best leaders: 
Hesitant, he does not utter words lightly.
When his task is accomplished and his work done
The people all say, 'It happened to us naturally.'

[last lines of #17, cited in Effectors]

Dan tdaxp, quoting himself in an earlier entry:
Formless:

In contrast to "hearts and minds," 5GW focuses on the enemy's "fingertips and gut." "Fingertip feeling," what the Germans called fingerspitzengefuhl, is the ability to know without thinking. This is what Americans call "gut feeling." To a certain extent, it means a commander trusting his intuition. It is critical in 5GW because fingertip feelings, or "hunches," will be the only way for the enemy to sense the fighter.
I think, however, that the target will not sense the fighter for a slightly different reason.  The 5GWarrior does not subvert fingertip-feeling or confuse it.  He utilizes it.  The target has a true fingertip-feeling, but he is put in the position of having that particular hunch by the 5GWarrior.  Part of the positioning is the introduction of data which then causes a "click" in the psyche of the target.  The data can be a meme, and so influence rather directly; or, the data can be a physical manifestation of power created by the person who has been influenced by a meme.   Such data can play into ignorances, biases, and bigotries, much in the same way that the introduction of a new product on the market can play into insecurities, fetishes, and hungers.  Hunches are sometimes proved wrong -- too late.  (So when I say, true fingertip-feeling, I'm relying on this aspect of hunches.)  In order to influence the largest number of people however, the data must be true if partial.  Its partiality may serve to confuse in a larger system, and debate may then paralyze the target; but it is certainly true from some perspective, or the debate would be resolved rather quickly.  Ideology and religion are powerful tools of the 5GWarrior, but the trappings of science may also serve the fighter. Once these things have "taken hold" of a society, tracing them back to the origin is nearly impossible.

So, then, how could a hidden 5GW force defeat a fuzzy 4GW force?  Influence it to fight another force, one it already despises  -- and, preferably, one it cannot defeat.  Or, introduce dispute within it, of the sort that would paralyze its activities, create massive amounts of in-fighting.  Or, befriend it; give it real accomplishments (perhaps by surreptitiously influencing other parties who can give them these) which, nonetheless, lead to final outcomes quite different than it originally intended. Because a 4GW force tends to be decentralized, dependent on local actors and local activities, focus on influencing them. Do not try to destroy the 4GW force; focus on changing it.


5GW: No Gods, but Men.  And Women.  And Others.

Structure is so intimately bound up with strategy that it is difficult to imagine how one could make any lasting change in an organization's behavior without first making equally profound changes in its systems.

[Chet Richards, Riding the Tiger]
I think that, unlike 4GW networks, 5GW networks will not tend toward emergence but will consciously utilize emergence.  They will not focus on local activity and a repetition of tactics on local scales hoping for an emergence of Victory!, nor will the masterminds simply deliver grand objectives to focus their low-level warriors on those local tasks.  Because the direct application of force will rarely be a tactic used by 5GW operatives and psychological manipulation will be a primary role, each operative will be required to be a mastermind of sorts.  Secrecy will require less communication with the actual mastermind if such a person exists, although networks of communication might be established between operatives which will be the typical communications networks for the positions they have secured.  If low-level operatives are utilized, they will not realize they are being utilized, or at the very least they will not be aware of the 5GW organization.

Similarly, close-knit cells may or may not exist in 5GW networks, since quite possibly each 5GW operative will be assigned one person to influence, and operatives may be spread far apart.  Such cells may form eventually as centers of power are created; but as this occurs, the cells will become dormant for a time or at least the operatives within them will be much less active.  (If they act, they risk the discovery of the entire network.)  Whatever nodes are created, in the form of close-knit cells, may be abandoned after a certain objective is achieved; i.e., these nodes may be receptors of information which will be used by other operatives in other places.  Operatives in these cells will no longer work on manipulation, but will provide the information for those in other places who do manipulate.  However, individual operatives may be assigned to individual targets within a single organization to better gain influence within that organization -- they are essentially operating alone, however, on individual targets.  (Each strategy of manipulation is highly dependent on the character, intelligence, and history of the target.)

Unlike 4GW networks and the organizations of other types of military organizations, 5GWarriors will utilize 4GW, 3GW, etc., forces to accomplish their goals, as well as financial organizations, NGO's, artists, journalists and celebrities.  This might not necessarily be an attempt at destruction of any of these other entities, since the 5GW network might actually benefit from the ascension of another force.

The strategy of a 5GW force, in utilizing emergence, is the shaping of new paradigms which will shape the geo-economic-social-political framework.  The only theater of operation is global; and the only goal is global domination.  But most people will not realize that they have been dominated.

The title of this entry may be misleading, but only because it's sensational. Actually, an entry on NewsHog by Cernig suggests a possible attempt at psychological and economic warfare by Venezuela, through the wholly state-owned oil company CITGO:

It seems that Chicago Transit Authority have kept secret an offer from Venezuela and its oil company, CITGO, to provide discounted fuel oil - 40 or 50% below the current price - for CTA's fleet of buses. The one stipulation, at the bidding of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, was that the CTA, in turn, pass those savings on to poor residents in the form free or discounted fare cards. [link: Chicago Turns Down Discounted Venezuelan Oil.]

This is stunning, actually. But Cernig berates Chicago's Transit Authority and offers a quote from a poor resident of Chicago: "This is going to hurt the poor and the minority people, like me." So not only is Chavez attempting to spread his vision for a socialist society via an export of his particular brand of populism, he may also be stoking the fire of racism (or at least, "minoritism.")

Yes, folks, HUGO CHAVEZ LOVES YOU, unlike those corporatist American government officials who'd rather raise transit fees by 25 cents than lower fees for the poor.

5GW Tutorial

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At one of the online poetry workshops I occasionally visit, the moderator, Rob Godfrey, made a parenthetical comment while discussing the political after-effects of Katrina:

(obviously it would have been very easy for terrorists to blow/breach the New Orleans levees).

I don't know the accuracy of the supposition, but suppose myself that causing such a structural failure would have been relatively simple if explosives had been placed at the right points.

In earlier 5GW discussion, particularly also related to the Chinese concept of Unrestricted Warfare, the possibility of man-made "natural disasters" was mentioned. At the time, I wondered what sort of natural disaster, beyond viral epidemics, could be effected by a 5GW entity, from a practical point of view. Now I have a better idea.

As I said to Rob, bin Laden is probably taking notes, among others.

Preamble: Auden, Emerson

There are two kinds of political issues, Party issues and Revolutionary issues. In a party issue, all parties are agreed as to the nature and justice of the social goal to be reached, but differ in their policies for reaching it. The existence of different parties is justified, firstly, because no party can offer irrefutable proof that its policy is the only one which will achieve the commonly desired goal and, secondly, because no social goal can be achieved without some sacrifice of individual or group interest and it is natural for each individual and social group to seek a policy which will keep its sacrifice to a minimum, to hope that, if sacrifices must be made, it would be more just if someone else made them. In a party issue, each party seeks to convince the members of its society, primarily by appealing to their reason; it marshals facts and arguments to convince others that its policy is more likely to achieve the desired goal than that of its opponents. On a party issue it is essential that passions be kept at a low temperature: effective oratory requires, of course, some appeal to the emotions of the audience, but in party politics orators should display the mock-passion of prosecuting and defending attorneys, not really lose their tempers. Outside the Chamber, the rival deputies should be able to dine in each other's houses; fanatics have no place in party politics.

A revolutionary issue is one in which different groups within a society hold different views as to what is just. When this is the case, argument and compromise are out of the question; each group is bound to regard the other as wicked or mad or both. Every revolutionary issue is potentially a casus belli. On a revolutionary issue, an orator cannot convince his audience by appealing to their reason; he may convert some of them by awakening and appealing to their conscience, but his principle function, whether he represents the revolutionary or the counterrevolutionary group, is to arouse its passion to the point where it will give all its energies to achieving total victory for itself and total defeat for its opponents. When an issue is revolutionary, fanatics are essential.

[W.H.Auden, The Poet & The City]

These exacting children advertise us of our wants. There is no compliment, no smooth speech with them; they pay you only this one compliment, of insatiable expectation; they aspire, they severely exact, and if they only stand fast in this watchtower, and persist in demanding unto the end, and without end, then are they terrible friends, whereof poet and priest cannot choose but stand in awe; and what if they eat clouds, and drink wind, they have not been without service to the race of man....

But their solitary and fastidious manners not only withdraw them from the conversation, but from the labors of the world; they are not good citizens, not good members of society; unwillingly they bear their part of the public and private burdens; they do not willingly share in the public charities, in the public religious rites, in the enterprises of education, of missions foreign and domestic, in the abolition of the slave-trade, or in the temperance society. They do not even like to vote....

Amidst the downward tendency and proneness of things, when every voice is raised for a new road or another statute, or a subscription of stock, for an improvement in dress, or in dentistry, for a new house or a larger business, for a political party, or the division of an estate, -- will you not tolerate one or two solitary voices in the land, speaking for thoughts and principles not marketable or perishable? Soon these improvements and mechanical inventions will be superseded; these modes of living lost out of memory; these cities rotted, ruined by war, by new inventions, by new seats of trade, or the geologic changes....But the thoughts which these few hermits strove to proclaim by silence, as well as by speech, not only by what they did, but by what they forbore to do, shall abide in beauty and strength, to reorganize themselves in nature, to invest anew in other, perhaps higher endowed and happier mixed clay than ours, in fuller union with the surrounding system.

[Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Transcendentalist]

Considerations by the Way

The title of this subheading is also from Emerson. For visitors who have waded through the lengthy preamble, I will try a shorter list of considerations. I have been delinquent in my blogging, for the last however many days, because recent discussions concerning "fifth-generation warfare" have left me unsatisfied to the point that other considerations, on other topics, have seemed pointless. Often when I'm in a muddle, I withdraw to Emerson and others, in an effort to reacquaint myself with all the old arguments that have thus far shaped my outlook (pro- or con-); and certain irregularities in the discussion of 5GW seem to have been clarified in my reading of those works.

First and foremost, the consideration that 5GW entities would likely be small but determined forces seemed too fanciful:  Small 5GW forces would defeat whole societies; but, whole societies are composed of many small forces.

Secondly, if attacking the intelligence is the primary modus operandi of the 5GW force, that force would need to be, er, quite intelligent indeed in order to have any hope of success. Intelligence can take many forms, but whatever form is operative would need to be highly developed. Moreover, that intelligence would need an extraordinary understanding -- a fundamental comprehension -- of the targeted society or force.

Thirdly, as mentioned in my last entry on 5GW, no society is homogenous. Any 5GW entity would need to target the most influential members of a society (thereby spreading the 5GWarrior's influence, as with a megaphone or a ripple effect) in an effort to influence that society's dominant decision makers, or would need to create situations most likely to influence those who vote for or otherwise support the decision makers -- but in an open society such as America's, or indeed almost certainly in any society, individuals or groups of individuals will exist who are not so easily fooled: the disenfranchised, the sub- and counter-cultural groups -- in short: those who do not subscribe to the worldviews shared by most members of that society.

Some 5GW discussion has addressed the types of defense required to protect a society from fifth-generation warfare. The greatest defense is the overwhelming unlikelihood that all the people will be fooled all the time, and it is a natural defense. The chance that some small but highly organized force will have the intelligence and knowledge required to fool most of the people of a much larger society most of the time is similarly small. Larger 5GW forces (say, nations), though they may have a larger supply of highly intelligent operatives or masterminds, will draw more attention because they have more fingers and more fingerprints: another strike against 5GW activity.

The greatest weakness for a democratic society in combating 5GW -- say, America -- is the doctrine of "majority rule." Those who do not participate in the system or indeed who oppose the political system also do not wield the power that has been concentrated (consecrated) at the topmost level of that majority. A 5GW force, should one of sufficient ability ever form, would only need to influence the majority and the leaders of that majority, or indeed create a majority will via stimuli such as catastrophes ("natural" or man-made), and sit back to watch the application of a force which it knows will rebound on that society.

The disenfranchised (whether by self-determination or by exterior exclusion), the subcultural or countercultural elements, the criminals and hermits of a society, are likely to be the canaries in the mine: A 5GW force will use the weight of the dominant segment(s) of society against that society and not waste effort on the seemingly powerless members of that society, and the oddball elements of a society are more likely to be sensitive to changes in the majority opinion than those who hold the majority opinion. (I'm not excluding the 5GW potential for using criminal elements and homeland terrorists against a society, however.)

I can easily imagine the formation of a counter-5GW development in a targeted society: If a small 5GW attacker succeeds in manipulating the wielders of conventional power and the conventional power brokers, a small 5GW defender may mobilize within the targeted society. The oddness of such an event is quite pertinent: The 5GW defender may or may not know of the true attacker; but either way, the defender may appear to be attacking the dominant elements of the society to which he belongs. (Those dominant elements have already been motivated to follow a self-destructive path, if a 5GW attacker has been successful.)

A brilliant 5GW attack might indeed include, perhaps will require?, instigation of civil war, particularly if the targeted society is a large, highly developed and complex society; but then, perhaps there would still exist the possibility that the counter-5GW force will win and then turn on the original attacking 5GW force?

5GW Effectors

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effector
A molecule, chemical, or structure that regulates a pathway by increasing or decreasing the pathway's reaction rate.

An organ (a gland or muscle) that becomes active in response to nerve impulses.

A nerve fiber that terminates on a muscle or gland and stimulates contraction or secretion.

Actions carried out by nervous impulses and hormones that are activated by receptors. [Biology-Online.org]

end effector

In robotics, an end effector is a device or tool connected to the end of a robot arm. The structure of an end effector, and the nature of the programming and hardware that drives it, depends on the intended task. [Whatis?com]

ef•fec•tor

n. One who brings about a result or event; one who accomplishes a purpose.

[via Webster's Online Dictionary, The Rosetta Edition™]


-----

Long Preamble

Recently, I suggested at tdaxp the possibility that successive, seemingly random events might be used against an enemy to weaken or destroy that enemy as a strategy in fifth-generation warfare:

I was thinking more along the lines of a scenario in which multiple, seemingly unrelated events hurt one nation (or a group of nations) repeatedly, as if "the hand of God" were behind those events: say, one major terrorist act, one major financial crisis, one upsurge in bird-flu, one natural disaster, one powergrid failure, and a case of a targeting error in some ongoing conflict (killing many innocents), over the period of 9 or 15 months.

At first, Dan considered the possibility that the SecretWarrior would walk without rhythm to avoid attracting the worm, until it occurred to him that random occurrences have a tendency to draw attention, something the SecretWarrior would not want:

Because randomness is very attractive, a succession of "random" catastrophes striking a nation will be very, very suspicious. People are superstitious -- they are gifted with "fingertip feeling" or Fingerspitzengefuhl -- and will implicitly decide that something is doing this to them. To a 5GWarrior, who cannot afford to have her cover exposed, a paranoid victim is a dangerous victim.

These considerations led me to wonder about the type of activity that would be utilized in 5GW and what kind of actor.

Dan gave an example of a "Plain Jane" who does not draw attention to herself as she attempts to kill the "Yakuza Boss" on a dance floor -- and my first question was whether a Plain Jane would be allowed into the party or the club, although I didn't ask it at the time. Instead, I wondered whether randomness, when expected, would serve to obfuscate whatever patterns might actually be present: the target who expects randomness is less likely to see hidden patterns, especially when occurrences do have a "seeming randomness" to them.

The expected randomness, because it is expected, would create the regularity Dan said might lull the target.

On the other hand, the Plain Jane (were she even allowed into the party) most likely wouldn't approach the yakuza boss directly, in a straight line aimed at him. Her movements would be random: she would take an offered drink, she would walk to the man who bought it for her to chat him up, she would dance to a song, she would go to the bathroom to powder her nose (heh, not Pulp Fiction, but Kill Bill vol. I), etc. A straight line to the yakuza boss would be an easily definable rhythm, one foot after the next on the path to her prey.

Dan gave an example of randomness that is attractive, attention-grabbing: a radio station that plays music from several different decades in no particular order. I thought that the random song wasn't likely to be Egyptian, German, etc., or classical music: the randomness still has a definable, indeed an expected, parameter.

Surrounding these thoughts came others:

  1. The yakuza boss, when killed, would no longer appear to be alive. That is, if an action occurs, its effects are always observable, even if we don't happen to see the action itself.
  2. What kind of effects will a 5GW warrior desire? What kind of activity will the 5GW warrior attempt in order to obtain the results desired? Specifically, why would a 5GW warrior engage in activity the results of which are entirely unobservable; would such results truly be results, if they do not produce cascading effects or a changed reality?
  3. If results are observable, to what degree can the "secret" in terms such as SecretWar and SecretWarrior, obtain or persist?

In fact, I began to wonder if an entirely secret SecretWar is possible, and I wondered if maybe the concept of an absolutely secret SecretWar has led some of our recent brainstorming on 5GW down the wrong path. If, indeed, absolute secrecy is impossible, then a SecretWarrior might need to shape the processes by which her opponent reacts to the effects of 5GW.

Crossing the Rubicon

When the yakuza boss is dead, he's dead. Anything that happens after Plain Jane's action will not change the fact that he's dead. His closest associates will likely know that he's been assassinated, unless his death is made to look natural in all respects. In fact, Plain Jane might not care if his associates know he's been assassinated, because the world after his death will no longer be what it was before his death, and that would have been her objective after all.

His associates may scramble to fill the vacuum, possibly warring with one another and laying blame for his death on one another. A rival gang may see the power struggles and attack, entirely destroying or subsuming the now-leaderless gang. If the dead yakuza boss already had an appointed heir, that heir may be of inferior quality or have plans for the gang which vary greatly from the dead yakuza boss's method of running the outfit. Alternatively, the heir may follow entirely in his predecessor's footsteps and refuse any suggestions for improvements or variations on the pre-existing scheme.

What exactly follows the yakuza boss's death isn't particularly important, because Plain Jane already knew what would happen following the death: that is why she killed the man.

The SecretWarrior will not care if the effects of 5GW activity are apparent if the effects leave her adversaries on the other side of the rubicon. This would be a case of "knowing too late," in that the sudden revelation that a SecretWar had been underway in no way mitigates whatever position in which the target now finds itself: The target would have a new set of circumstances requiring immediate attention which could not be ignored, and from which the target is unlikely to emerge unscathed. A successful 5GW will leave the target on a downward spiral into insignificance. The target's knowing it has been a victim won't save the target from the spiral.

At the same time, some effects of 5GW pre-conclusion may be apparent to the target, thus influencing the target to cross the rubicon, although the target will not know that he's about to cross such a rubicon. Motivating the target to move down to the river, and to cross it, would require observable effects, problems to solve, the solving of which can only be effected by going to and then across the river. If the target at any time senses it is being manipulated down a path, the target will resist and the SecretWarrior risks being discovered.

The SecretWarrior as Benefactor

Phil at tdaxp has recently offered thumbnail character sketches of possible SecretWarriors:

In 4GW the enemy attempts to use the target country’s media as a vehicle to sap the people’s and political leaders’ will to fight. In 5GW the enemy actually becomes the media and the political leadership. In 4GW a terrorist organization might attack a school or a courthouse in order to show that the government can’t defend itself; in 5GW the enemy would become the teachers and judges. It doesn’t get much deeper than that.

Like the first commenter in that thread, I immediately questioned the sketch work. It has the Red Scare sound, brings to mind the House Un-American Activities Committee, and such a comparison would serve to distinguish 5GW warriors from what has gone before: even the smallest hint of variation in character, philosophy, or creed will out the SecretWarrior, or at least attract too much attention.

So Dan's Plain Jane has this limit. In the yakuza boss's world, plain would likely be only too obvious. A Plain Jane probably wouldn't be allowed into the type of club the yakuza boss frequented; if she was, she'd likely stand out from the other women. The best person to assassinate the yakuza boss undetected would be an associate or someone with whom the yakuza boss is on very close terms. The assassin might even be a Brutus, the yakuza boss's best friend.

Dan's consideration of rhythm and randomness is important in the way it brings "framing" into the discussion of 5GW. (See Anger Management's recent considerations on "framing" here and here.) The radio station that randomly selects songs from different decades nonetheless selects songs within a certain framework -- pop and rock, or country western, English language songs, etc. -- and the randomness enjoyed by that station's listener seems particularly "random" because so many other radio stations do not select their music the same way. The common thread running through those songs goes unquestioned because that thread already conforms to the listener's most basic expectations (inner framework); whereas, the expectation of a limited selection (per other radio stations) is subverted in the selection of songs from many different decades (outer framework).

In order to remain secret, the SecretWarrior would need to avoid drawing the attention of the targeted society, NGO, or nation. Anything, anything which might suggest an unusual motivation will draw attention. When considering Phil's thumb sketches, I realized that a 5GW warrior-organization isn't likely to be able to insert so many operatives into the schools, government agencies, churches, etc., because 1) the more people who are "in on the plan," the more chances for leaks and switched loyalties, and 2) chances increase that the internal framing -- opposition to the target -- of those operatives will lead to external displays of that framing, and suspicion of the operatives will occur. A single 5GW intelligence -- the mastermind -- will not even consider planting so many operatives into a targeted society.

One feature of HUAC was its targeting of media, particularly of Hollywood, in the search for Commie Sympathizers. In modern America, the media is consistently the target of speculation and paranoia, more so now perhaps than before. Any 5GW warrior who sought to use the media to influence or turn a society runs into the barrier of skepticism, particularly when whatever message is chosen is likely to have so many opponents within the society. The easiest use of media would be to inspire internal strife and conflict, especially given the tendency toward skepticism. Using the media to create unsuspecting pawns may actually be effective, and this may lead to terrorist activity or other covert activity against a target within its own society; but, again, many within the society will be suspicious of media's role and at least somewhat aware that some members of its society have been so affected by the media: such opposition to the society is not 5GW activity, anyway, although it may serve to distract the target.

I was very aware of Phil's suggestion that our neighbors will be SecretWarriors, and this plays into what Dan suggested about the Plain Jane. It also plays into the consideration of one of the commenters at tdaxp, who suggested that jujitsu tactics will be used, or a target's "weight" will be used against the target. The only type of SecretWarrior who will be able to move freely about without ever raising suspicions will be the one whose activity most matches the expectations of the targeted society, the internal and external framework most shared by the members of that society: most likely, that society itself.

No society is 100% homogenous, but the most influential members of the society (whether the society is a small group or a nation) are those who can promise the most benefit to the other members of society, whether the benefit is material in nature or psychological or social. To give an example: should a string of natural and not-so-natural disasters occur, those leaders, thinkers, and other members of a society who are able to mitigate or nullify the effects of those disasters are most likely to have the freest reins. They are certainly more likely to avoid suspicion -- if, and only if, their efforts actually seem to lead, and ultimately do lead, to benefits.

A society that believes it's moving toward a better future is a society less suspicious. The distrust of leaders (whether governmental or academic or social or business), combined with uncertain forecasts, elevates suspicion, doubt, and resistance; but a society in which vast numbers of its members believe they are co-authors of the success, co-conspirators in progress, will happily walk to the river and the Promised Land on the other side of that river.

In order for a target of 5GW to never have a suspicion that a war had ever occurred, that target would need to be left with the impression that it had succeeded in its endeavors. So while a successful 5GW might leave a target in a hopeless downward spiral -- all too obvious to the helpless victim -- it might also leave the victim with the feeling of success, albeit a success much smaller than would have been achieved if 5GW had not occurred.

Tao Te Ching #17
The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects.
Next comes the ruler they love and praise;
Next comes one they fear;
Next comes one with whom they take liberties.
When there is not enough faith, there is lack of good faith.
Hesitant, he does not utter words lightly.
When his task is accomplished and his work done
The people all say, 'It happened to us naturally.'

[trans. D.C. Lau]

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