Micropowers and the Art of 5GW

With Georgia on his mind, John Robb wonders,

Georgia does have a way out of the predicament. It could adopt the global guerrilla methods (aka fifth generation warfare) and use system disruption as a strategic weapon to coerce Russia to relent. Like the Ukraine found out (I suspect unwittingly), the best way to coerce Russia is to disrupt its export of natural gas/oil. Fortunately for Georgia, Russia’s vast distances yield a pipeline transport system that is both heavily concentrated and extremely vulnerable (I’ve done the network analysis and it would be very easy to do, it is rife with systempunkts). A dozen small teams (2-3 at most, my personal choice would be mercenaries to enhance plausible deniability) dedicated to blowing up sections of these pipelines (either within Russia or in 3rd party nations like Poland and Ukraine), would likely yield a 20% to 30% sustained reduction in Russian exports.

I find it a little odd that he has called GG methods 5GW when elsewhere he has said they are 4GW — but not so odd that the question of any distinction ceases to be important to the discussion of GG.  I haven’t read the book and do not know the full scope of Robb’s theory of GG.  In other respects, GG seems 3GW.  Of course, this inability to tag GG with a neat designation would itself suggest a possible 5GW reality, or for those squeamish of such designations, perhaps a 4GW+ reality.  For my part, the argument against a 5GW categorization of the tactics Robb suggests for Georgia is two-fold:

1. Directly hiring terrorists / mercenaries to carry out the operation may be old school very shortly.  It allows too much opportunity for tracing the activity back to the employer, threatens the very secrecy necessary for running a successful 5GW operation.  So while Robb considers the necessity for ‘plausible deniability’, the consideration itself suggests to me that the methods are not 5GW at all.  A 5GW method would be to influence al-Qaida or some other anti-Russian group to come to the conclusion — ‘all on their own’ — to destroy those pipelines.



2. System disruptions may be a useful tool of 5GW planners (although the actual operatives doing so are not those 5GW effectors nor their hires), but creating a forward-looking paradigm for the target is not much mentioned in this scenario.  Again, we have the standard GG and 4GW  ‘negativity’ approach, of merely:  disruption, chaos, confusion, destruction.  5GW may indeed use these things, but the ultimate goal is not so much systempunkt as the creation of new orders that will continue to operate long after the 5GW force has finished its operations.  Disrupting a long-standing and typically resilient system may be the first step in creating a new paradigm — destroy the old to make way for the new — but as I’ve said before, 5GW will be much more about establishing order rather than inaugurating perpetual chaos.
   

On that last point: John Robb gives his idea of the ultimate goal of systempunkt:

Within a market, an attack on the systempunkt destabilizes the psychology of the market to induce severe inefficiencies and uncertainties. The ultimate objective of this activity, in aggregate, is the collapse of the target state and globalization.

That, to me, suggests a 4GW mindset.  Of course, in the very localized version described above, Georgia’s ultimate goal would be to create a new paradigm:  mainly, that Russia should not f—- with Georgia while Georgia secures ‘a place in the West’  —

John Robb suggests Georgia adopt GG methods to attack Russia’s energy infrastructure which would provide just that. His analysis of Russia’s vulnerability and the ease of attack is spot on, but he misses the bigger picture, namely that Russia would have to know Georgia was behind it but Georgia would have to deny it vehemently.

[Chirol, Coming Anarchy, “Georgia: Little Engine that Can?”]

A 5GW approach might prove much more effective.  System attacks on Russia conducted by a third party would weaken Russia’s standing in the world — Is it or is it not a ‘3rd-world’ nation or a ‘Core’ nation, is it reliable and stable, able to defend itself, etc. — which would not only diminish in the eyes of the world whatever moves Russia might make but would also make Georgia’s move toward the West entirely reasonable (in the minds of everyone but Russia.)  No ‘plausible deniability’ would be required.  The paradigm being built is:  “See how the West is a much better option, all in all?”  And of course, this same paradigm might prove seductive for Russia as well, given a successful 5GW operation.

We see something of the opposite right now, in the way the U.S. standing has been repeatedly attacked, although to be sure the attacks on the U.S. have been much too limited to make that particular paradigm stick.  So far.

In fact, the discussion concerning micropowers raises many questions for 5GW theorists.  If these powers are indeed ‘small’ in many respects, they may easily see how open confrontation with others might work against them but open confrontations between those others could benefit them.  Chirol gives a very neat example in his list of characteristics of micropowers:

Create external vulnerability and thus internal stability.

[“Becoming a Micropower”]

He explains this idea better at John Robb’s Weblog:

I’m also unsure today as to whether the second to last point was clear. It reinforces earlier points that by making outsider players vulnerable if you “go offline” you create internal stability.

[Chirol, commenting on “More on Micropowers”]

By doing so, the micropower may succeed at turning eyes away from its own operations as long as it appears to remain ‘connected’; the exterior forces see an attack on that micropower as an attack on themselves, whether such an attack comes from outside the micropower or from within the micropower as an effort to ‘disconnect’ itself.  And this may potentially leave the micropower in a state of suspended animation — a rock of stability in an otherwise unstable region.  I.e., conflict between those outside the microstate will consume most of the attention.  (I hope my interpolations do not detract from Chirol’s very interesting point!)

Mark Safranski of ZenPundit adds a twist to the discussion: ‘geographic micropowers that are economic macropowers’.  He gives Singapore and the U.A.E. as examples; but recent reading on Thomas Barnett’s weblog would inspire a third: Qatar.  If you can believe that.

These considerations of states in ‘suspended animation’ provoke in me a consideration much in line with these other considerations:  that the most effective positioning tool may be studied non-interference.  It isn’t that the states are not animated, so much as that they continually highlight how they generally benefit their neighbors and the world while seeking to offer no objections to the roles they have assumed.  This is in stark contrast to the U.S. PR campaign, and even to Russia’s since Russia quite openly appears to wish to be seen as one of the energy top-dogs everyone must placate.  Even China risks too open a display of its centrality in world dynamics.  States like Iran and Venezuela also appear to be falling into this trap of inviting opposition.

So the rise of micropowers may set the stage for 5GW activity.  Open activity — confrontation, expansion, power projection — becomes detrimental.  This dynamic closely resembles the move from totalitarianism to democratic reforms, or the move from centrally dictated paradigms to a broadly dispersed field for paradigm growth:  I.e., control becomes much less of an issue than influence, and the complexity created by dispersing centers of influence allows and may require a round-about route toward gaining ‘ground.’   Give the little guy the feeling that he may operate freely — he will surely claim such a right, anyway — and you gain another hand in the field. But tell him or show him that he must supplicate before the Greater Power, and you alienate him.