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A commenter at John Robb’s Weblog asks the question,
If 5GW is getting others to do what you want them to do of their own free will (though maybe that is not the best definition?), where is the “war” part? [Ryan Luke]The question is in two parts and inspires a third.
On Free Will
First, the question of free will seems to assume that merely because a target acts according to the dictates of his own free will, he must have perfect freedom. Without going into a long philosophical treatise on the subject of free will, I’ll just point out that whatever will is exercised will be exercised in relation to the environment surrounding — and having surrounded, in the past — the target. To the degree that his capability for observation is and has been limited, his reasoning will also be limited, and the will to act flowing from that reasoning will be limited.This is accordance with the operation of the Revised OODA, and why I repeat that reasoning operates outside the strict lines of cause & effect. For instance, Americans and Iraqis may interpret the destruction of a mosque in different ways and come to different conclusions and ultimately decide on different acts responding to such an attack. Or, think of a church being destroyed in America and a mosque being destroyed in Iraq, or a cartoon attacking Christianity being published in America and a cartoon attacking Islam being published in Europe: While true that the actual act is slightly different in each case — one is a church, one a mosque; one attacks Christianity, one attack Islam; one is in America, the other is in Iraq or Europe — the actual acts are quite similar but the reasoning utilized to come to an understanding of such events will be informed by past observations including upbringing, tradition, past experiences, etc. which are not as similar.
You might argue that cause & effect is ubiquitous and can be used to understand the differences in conclusions reached by different people — and, many network theorists put their faith in such an argument — but even though the universe operates by cause & effect, increased complexity and human cognition result in lines of cause & effect between observation and act which span multiple time frames and multiple environments outside the strict lines of present time and present environments. Moreover, for any individual the chances for observation have been limited by his mortality and his ever-real limitations in perceptual observation, regardless of the time he has lived and the environments he has witnessed. His will to act will also be bounded by these limitations.
So much for ‘free’ will.
For a philosophical treatise, read Plato, who thought that the leaders of the Republic should often lie to its citizens simply because those citizens would create lies of their own quite naturally anyway, and that the Republic would be better served insuring that the lies believed by the citizens were productive and beneficial for the Republic (and thus, for the citizenry). There are those who hate the thought — but their faith in ‘free will’ requires faith in human omniscience and human omnipresence. (One might make a utilitarian argument for such unbounded faith in ‘free will’, or even a 5GW argument, however….)
5GW effectors will recognize the bounds of human observation and thus the bounds of free will.
On “the ‘war’ part”?
This manipulation of observation would appear to be non-war by traditional definitions. The glory of dismembering bodies and destroying infrastructure in the pursuit of ‘showing the enemy what’s what!’ would seem to be sidelined. In fact, the question seems almost to come from a 1GW perspective, and I have occasionally witnessed the greatest disdain for 5GW theory coming from soldiers and their officers in the field. They have after all been trained to dismember enemies and destroy battle placements, or to wipe out an enemy’s operational capability through a quite limited EBO which seems less limited simply because the devastation can be directed over large areas through targeted aerial bombings and missile strikes.We are witnessing the effectiveness of these strategies in Iraq and on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are we not?
The ability to motivate an enemy to surrender or to take that reaction out of the equation by utterly destroying the enemy will prove less and less effective as that enemy host disperses over a larger battlefield and hides its fluid— dynamic — placement. You may destroy Zarqawi utterly, but his death is not the death of Muhammad or bin Laden or any of any number of other enemies lurking elsewhere who may in fact be motivated to continue fighting by their personal salvation from the fate that came to Zarqawi. Showing that enemy ‘what’s what!’ is exactly what you are doing: “I can kill this person quite easily, see! (but you, alas, have been able to escape me.)”
Or: “See how easily I destroy weapons depots, bridges, and roads! (and how easily you can maneuver around these losses).”
What’s what is the question in 5GW, really.
Giving your enemy the ‘free will’ to act is not giving your enemy an unbounded freedom to act, although because 5GW does not rely on being able to utterly destroy the enemy or infrastructure or at least dismember that enemy, it would seem to be something other than war to those whose concept of war is not in the context of anything else.
Fifth Generation War
It may be that those who understand war through a limited context of concrete destruction will prove by their belief to be the very best methods by which a 5GW effector can accomplish his goals. In response to that comment on John Robb’s weblog, I referenced an old post on a purported al-Qaida document discovered in Iraq after Zarqawi’s death: “Al-Qaida Goes 5GW — or not.”In the document, al-Qaida operatives consider the possibility of embroiling America in another war — against the Shi’ites in general, or against Iran in particular — in order to weaken America. I.e., if America’s concept of showing the enemy ‘what’s what!” remains what it appears to be, then an organization such as al-Qaida (who operates similarly) might well depend on America’s faith in concrete destruction of perceived enemies. Help America to perceive new enemies, and you motivate America to dedicate the type of resources America believes will be necessary for destroying that enemy. Changing that enemy may be less of a concern for America than destroying that enemy; or, rather, the only methods for change understood by the American Administration are methods of direct physical change via a limited EBO, etc. —
So, then, how could a hidden 5GW force defeat a fuzzy 4GW force? Influence it to fight another force, one it already despises — and, preferably, one it cannot defeat. Or, introduce dispute within it, of the sort that would paralyze its activities, create massive amounts of in-fighting. Or, befriend it; give it real accomplishments (perhaps by surreptitiously influencing other parties who can give them these) which, nonetheless, lead to final outcomes quite different than it originally intended. Because a 4GW force tends to be decentralized, dependent on local actors and local activities, focus on influencing them. Do not try to destroy the 4GW force; focus on changing it. [Initiating 5GW]
— of course, such methods may be quite effective if the target of EBO — the perceived enemy — has a quite similar concept of warfare. However, the 5GW effectors who have motivated America to utilize EBO in such a manner can sit back and watch the devastation caused by that EBO, to both parties.
So while I hypothesize an ultimately non-violent low-grade-fever type of 5GW sometime in the future, the fact remains that any 5GW organization will need to work with and within the belief systems currently in place. You motivate by triggering faith or else by creating a new faith; and as long as faith in ‘the war part’ remains what it is, plenty of dismembering and devastation may play a role in any 5GW plan.
My reason for hypothesizing a development toward 5GW planning now lies in the growing general understanding that 3GW and even 4GW will prove less and less effective because the devastation possible in either type grows exponentially as technology advances and because global society is becoming interdependent (what some call ‘networked’.) So for instance China might be modernizing its military, preparing a kind of MAD stalemate for third generation warfare between great powers, and any sort of move China would like to make for advancing its influence in the world would be informed by the understanding that 3GW between great powers would be counterproductive. As the technology increases destructive capability, more and more actors on the world stage may see this as a signal for both: 1) avoid open confrontation yourself, 2) but embroil your enemy in such confrontation with a third party, if possible.
Posted by Curtis Gale Weeks on Oct 12, 2006 01:48 PM
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8 Comments
I find the discussion of 5GW valuable, and I am not convinced that it is the right framework for deeper understanding.
The idea of manipulation of enemies is great. And less bloodshed and destruction is also great. But violence and the threat of violence are an integral part of war. If a 5GW force depends on others to do the violence that it deems necessary, that 5GW force will always ultimately be at the mercy of the force with the power of violence behind it.
I think that what you call 5GW will prove to be an integral part of the evolution of war. I just don’t think that is is a new generation, it does not fit into that framework. Instead, it will be an essential piece of the strategy of 4GW groups that learn how to build a meaningful victory out of the destruction of war.
I like this exploration of 5GW. What I am even more interested in is the development of ways of engaging with war (violently and non-violently) that can achieve meaningful and lasting victory in the modern era.
Victory Over War!
;)
It seems that comment I made on yesterday’s post would be more appropriate today. One point is that a 5GW action would not be understandable by the opponent, related to Kuhn’s incommensurable of rival paradigms concept. Another point is that Barnett’s 5GW effort in his books would be his optimistic viewpoint, the idea of winning the peace, versus a 4GW or 3GW idea of winning the war. The opponent would come to the idea of cooperation rather than competition due to his own logic: a win for him would be in his own best interest, of course, and if he was presented such an agenda he would pursue it. If such an agenda were actually originated from the other side, then the other side wins while the enemy also thinks they won. Sounds like win-win, which many business people think is just a scam to cool out the actual loser. In a 5GW sceanario a similar effect would be had. You can also read the entire post 5GW quantum shift.
to RyanLuke:
William Lind says:
“All of these elements already exist. They are not the product of “futurism,” of gazing into a crystal ball. We are simply asking what would we face if they were all combined? Would such a combination constitute at least the beginnings of a fourth generation of warfare? One thought that suggests they might is that third (not to speak of second) generation militaries would seem to have little capability against such a synthesis. This is typical of generational shifts.”
So of course the elements we see in earlier generations will be used in 5GW and some of them will be moved to the forefront. I go into greater depth in my post 5GW quantum shift.
Bah,
You beat me to it Curtis. I saw that very same comment and spent all day at work mapping out my post in my head. I was going to go at it more from the direction of Clausewitz “War is the continuation of policy by other means” though.
I’ve spent a little time catching up to this discussion and following links, and feel like I’m gaining an increased understanding of what you all are talking about.
I still do not feel that this body of work should be called 5GW, because I still do not believe that it is a generational extension of the 4 generations of modern war theory.
The 4GW theory is now a couple decades old I believe. Thinkers in this area have started to label various forces as “4th generation.” I think though, that all we really have is theory at this point. What we call 4th generation forces have not yet begun to really defeat forces of other generations. Therefore, our concept of 4th generation is not the real thing as of yet.
The idea of incommensurable rival paradigms is very helpful. It has been argued that 5GW is the next generation because the paradigms of previous generations are unable to fathom it. But I think that you are projecting a worldview to be the 4GW worldview (then claiming to have transcended it), when that worldview has not yet truly formed. No group has even attained a fully developed 4GW worldview. We know this because no 4GW forces have been truly victorious.
I believe that Mr. Lind has said that all the concepts and technology for 3GW were in existence by the end of WWI. Yet one could not really say that 3GW had yet proven itself to be a next generation, because it had not yet been proven on the battlefield.
The path to 4GW seems to be progressing slightly differently though. I’d say that 3GW broke onto the scene quickly and in full strength with the Germans in WWII. 4GW has developed much more gradually. It has been proving itself on the battlefield in a step by step manner, not by decisive victories.
Perhaps this is because the tools and technology to win 4GW exist, but the paradigm to take advantage of these tools to attain real victory is lacking.
Let’s look at this from the perspective of the moral, mental, physical. The physical tools for 3GW were available at the end of WWI. The mental tools were also developed, the ideas that would give rise to the practice. The moral cohesive force was also in place: it was the State.
Now, similarly, the physical and mental tools are present (though they will surely develop much more). But there is no moral cohesion behind it. There is a vacuum filled by competing ideologies and loyalties, none of which can win because they cannot come to a vision that unifies, they can only fracture and destroy.
The most valuable aspect of this 5GW discussion is that it is trying to develop and understand a paradigm that can be victorious in modern war. It is trying to develop a paradigm that can be victorious in the environment where states are dissolving. That is 4GW. But it is 4GW for real. If it is successful, it will be implemented and 4th generation forces will become dominant.
I want to mention a couple more things here. First is security. The military is about protection and security. I don’t believe that a 5GW force as conceptualized here would be able to provide that. We are seeing the end of monopolies on violence (States). But people will be turning other directions and banding together in new ways for protection. For a force to be effective, it has to be seen to be doing its utmost to provide security for its supporters.
The second point is secrecy. I think that the discussion of secrecy has led people a little astray. A visible presense is essential. If we really want to engage in 5GW, we shouldn’t be talking about how 5GW is a manipulation of free will. We should be declaring that individual freedom is essential to victory. We should not be talking about manipulating people into win-win situations that are beneficial for the 5GW force. We should be declaring that this perspective of conflict integrally requires a victory that transcends typical views of “us and them.”
Acting decisively on a moral stance that people all over can empathize with is the key to victory. Basing our moral clarity on the premise of freedom is strong ground to fight from. And if 5GW is about free will, 5GW actors will be most successful in an environment where free will is least constrained by violence or the threat of violence. Creating that envirnment requires security, which paradoxically, requires the use of violence.
To succeed in this kind of war, we have to allow our own assumptions and paradigms to be shifted and expanded.
RyanLuke,
May I ask if you have ever had the opportunity to read the Sling and the Stone by Thomas X. Hammes?
I would point out that Mao Zedong prosecuted a very successful 4GW campaign against the Kuomintang during the Chinese Revolution. If that isn’t a ‘defeat’ by 4GW forces I don’t know what is.
RyanLuke,
You make some interesting points in your two comments here:
If a 5GW force depends on others to do the violence that it deems necessary, that 5GW force will always ultimately be at the mercy of the force with the power of violence behind it.
I don’t think this is so, but it is an interesting consideration. If the 5GW force is secret, it will not be at the mercy of those who have that conventional force. In fact, not every ‘pawn’ in a 5GW scenario will be led to defeat, since the 5GW force might benefit from the ascension of one force over another. For instance, imagine a corporate 5GW force — whether legal or largely illegal — that desires certain trade agreements and so forth which are opposed by the U.S. or by some other power; that corporate 5GW force might benefit if another major power or group of nations, one more inclined to support certain types of trade agreements, gained more influence in the world while the other lost large amounts of influence. So it introduces conflict for the obstructionist, works for a loss of resiliency (material and PR) and so forth for that obstructionist, while another power begins to look better and better in the eyes of the world and finds itself in the position of having greater negotiating power vis-a-vis certain trade agreements.
But the point is particularly interesting because it introduces the question: What does the 5GW force have to gain. It seems you are approaching the topic from a standard state/3GW (or earlier form of paradigm), in which gaining territory or at least control of access to territory — and thus, being able to protect it — is assumed to be the very reason for going to war. There are many valuable things in the world over which standard military forces have very little control, and these things will grow in number; in fact, many of these things have control over standard military forces: such as economic vitality, the ‘democratic wish’ or global PR, technology, and so forth.
What we call 4th generation forces have not yet begun to really defeat forces of other generations. Therefore, our concept of 4th generation is not the real thing as of yet.
Yes and no. Once under a post on PurpleSlog which considered Robb’s GG theory, I commented,
I think, however, that keeping the definitions of ‘4GW’ open so that whatever appears can be swept into that category — a psychic prediction that is vague enough to insure its ultimate fulfillment — is counterproductive. These designations of ‘generation’ are frameworks we use for understanding what has happened, what is happening, and what may happen, and keeping them vague in order to score a point for being the first to ‘see’ them will not be very useful. Whether we call a paradigm 4GW or 4GW+ or 5GW will not in any way alter what is occurring and what will occur. However, the theory of 4GW as it has been explored thus far has not gone very far to include what many 5GW theorists are suggesting, and I’m content to call these things 5GW in order to distinguish them from the sort of ‘spontaneous chaos’ propounded by John Robb in his form of GG 4GW (he has called it 4GW) as well as from the standard ‘insurgent / guerilla’ 4GW theorizing. In fact, lumping these three approaches into one category may prove quite counterproductive, because they are quite different.
The very idea that the next generation of warfare must always defeat a prior generation force is too much of a truism, anyway, since quite obviously a poorly-run 3GW might lose to an efficient 2GW force or a meager 4GW showing might fail against a top-notch 3GW force — and none of these situations would ‘prove’ the non-existence of the latest generation. In fact, if we are determined to differentiate generations of warfare on the basis of how they are conducted, then whether they succeed or not in any particular situation should not be the standard by which we name them. You could make the argument that various ‘mongrel’ forms of warfare come and go, never having much succeeded, and that only those that prove consistently successful should be labeled a new generation; but in this case, I think it might be too early to suppose any sort of real ‘4GW.’ Lind himself made the leap from what has actually been to what seems likely to be — and these are two very different modes of observation.
First is security. The military is about protection and security. I don’t believe that a 5GW force as conceptualized here would be able to provide that.
This, again, appears to come from the standard State-ist sort of p.o.v. It assumes a separation between the force and some other group that will benefit from the operations of that force, the two perpetually interdependent or codependent; whereas, I imaging that the 5GW force will not give much of a damn about any other group except insofar as that group’s benefit will go to benefit the 5GW force. One might well consider how a state could employ 5GW to benefit its citizenry; but that’s a special case, surely.
We are seeing the end of monopolies on violence (States). But people will be turning other directions and banding together in new ways for protection.
Yes, and that’s good for conducting 5GW. How will the people decide to bind together: with whom and for what purpose? Surely, the answer will depend on who appears to offer more protection, more benefit, etc.; how will people make that determination? And how can the 5GW force utilize the fact that the old lines are breaking down?
If we really want to engage in 5GW, we shouldn’t be talking about how 5GW is a manipulation of free will. We should be declaring that individual freedom is essential to victory.
No and yes. Do you want terrorists to have individual freedom? This talk of freedom — platitudes, really — may well be essential for 5GW, simply because a people that is being told, “We are manipulating you!” will prove less pliable. Make them believe they have absolute freedom to act: Yes, of course. Convince them they have the power to change the world…because changing the world will require a lot of hands in the field. But the platitude-pushers fail to realize that many people are not idiots; the people know that not everyone will have perfect and absolute freedom. Platitude-pushers have a very limited capacity for motivating the public, particularly when the reality doesn’t match the platitude.
It is limited thinking to equate war with just kinetic power and fighting.
War is conflict and competition between global actors to survive, hold, flourish and grow. This can be zero-sum or non-zero sum.
Increasingly in the modern world, the actors are not state actors. Part of the emergence of 4GW has been in the environment of more non-state global actors (or the breakdown of the state as Lind and others call it).
The shift on the Generations of War framework from 2GW to 3GW and from 3GW to 4GW can partially be seen as developing new means to avoid the firepower of the previous generation, but also to broaden the scope of what “conflict” is considered.
Perhaps of the ‘Generations of Modern Warfare” framework would best be considered the “Modern Global Conflict” Framework.
Given this, it is logical to assume an emerging 5th generation will continue this shift to more non-kinetic (as opposed to kinetic) means of conflict/completion/war.