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It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation.—i.e., a multi-domain approach, with a recognition that each domain affects the others and the whole system. Many paths to victory, and every one important. However, during the news conference, James Baker stressed the decision not to use the term victory in the report, when asked by a reporter whether this bipartisan plan should be viewed as a blueprint for victory or for merely avoiding defeat. Reporters like mincing words like that, as they pluck daisy petals in order to discover absolute finality.
[The Iraq Study Group Report, pdf via CNN.]
It is an ambitious plan, and far better than anything we have heard from the President; but as with all overt activity in a complex world, it will inspire opposition as well as attempts to preempt its implementation. The fact that each domain — security, politics (internal and external), economics, and diplomacy — must be manipulated in order to bring about the desired results, and manipulated in particular ways, i.e. with an eye on achieving the main goal of success, and that done transparently, dooms it to failure:
- Mr. Bush will not like much that he finds in the report, and we are being set up for a massive confrontation between the Executive branch and the Democrat-controlled Legislative branch: As Baker and Hamilton stressed, lack of a bipartisan approach in favor of a bipolar approach will doom the Plan and every other foreign policy plan to failure. Add to this the roles of the MSM and the blogosphere and the already tense divisions in American politics, and the potential for greater domestic turmoil (in America) as a result of this report should be apparent. (Which is too bad, but there it is.)
- Iran and Syria have been given the tools of manipulation beforehand, since diplomatic playing cards have been dealt face-up in the report, and those cards will not inspire an easy or even an uneasy alliance between the U.S. and those two nations vis-a-vis Iraq.
- In fact, many diplomatic cards have been dealt face-up. While acknowledging the potential for Saudi Arabia to offer strong support of Iraqi Sunnis in the looming regional war, the authors of the Report fail to fully assess the role of al Qaeda in the region. They suggest that al Qaeda is merely interested in recruitment, a base of operations, propaganda coups, and pitting the Shiites and Sunnis against each other in Iraq. While these are important strategic goals for al Qaeda, the real goal has always been to inspire a Sunni-Shiite war across the region. In fact, there are some indications that al Qaeda may see Shiite Iran as its main enemy — and Shiites in general — rather than America, a point of view relatively absent from American analyses. Al Qaeda will continue to work for such a conflict by increasing tensions between Shiite elements and Sunni elements within Iraq — an easy enough task, as is! — in the belief that Saudi Arabia will almost certainly be forced to step in to offer its support to the Iraqi Sunnis. Any steps we might take to keep this from happening will be offset by al Qaeda; and, AQ now has the strategy outlined in the ISG report: The ISG believes that a fear of such a regional conflict may be used to garner support from Saudi Arabia, and perhaps from Iran, for stabilizing Iraq, but ground realities as well as domestic U.S. realities will almost certainly nullify this card.
- Baker and Hamilton stressed the possibility that unforeseen developments could nullify the entire plan. That, dear readers, is an open invitation to opponents of a stabilized Iraq (not all of whom reside within the Middle East, one might suppose.) In the news conference, Hamilton responded to a question by a reporter by offering some of the specific ways that a changed ground reality could nullify the plan: so, not only an invitation, but a blueprint openly offered to opponents of Stable Iraq.
The Good Ol’ Boys of American politics would have had a greater chance of success — and such an increase in chance for success was their stated goal at the news conference, rather than victory — if they had formulated this plan and then seen to it that the multi-domain approach occurred largely behind the scenes. The steps they outline are not altogether bad, and in fact their analysis of the relevant players and domains — or, of the battlespace — is generally quite good indeed. But they have only accelerated the process of defeat.
UPDATE:
Dan of TDAXP has cherry-picked the ISG report. I suspect that this sort of approach will also be followed by GWB, individual Congressmen and Senators — and even by foreign players, whether those hostile to the vision of a stable Iraq or those in favor of a stable Iraq — but that each of these players is likely to find a different set of ideal cherries than Dan has found. Who knows what will emerge as the result of so much friction?
Mark of ZenPundit has found a pragmatic-political interpretation of the ISG report in which the individual suggestions given in the report are far less important than the fact of the report’s existence and the general tone of the report. His ideas are related to ideas given by RyanLuke in comments to this thread — the report is basically a 4GW maneuver (my characterization) to get the Ship of State moving by breaking up ice flows — but I wonder if geopolitical warming means that there has actually been much less ice at the various poles than we often believe. I do not believe the ISG report (its substance, its very existence) can be wisely considered only within the context of domestic logjam.
Mark also gives links to other assessments, many of which seem to be Rightist knee-jerk reactions to the report. (I have not read all, particularly not the most recent links.)
UPDATE 2:
Thomas Barnett thinks the report was a charade — and a kind of failed charade, at that. Instead of providing political cover to allow for a real change in course, GWB will use it as cover for the fact that he’s not about to change course: i.e., so he can say, “Options? Darn tootin’ I’ve got options! Lots to consider, lots to consider…” while in reality planning to carry on as before.
I’m not sure that will actually happen. Finger-tip feeling or no (i.e., perhaps complete fantasy), I suspect we’ll see some major changes in the Administration’s approach. I just think those changes will be a huge shock to America when they happen, and they’ll have virtually nothing to do with the ISG report. Time to play wait-and-see.
Posted by Curtis Gale Weeks on Dec 6, 2006 01:03 PM
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Billions Later, Plan to Remake the Coast Guard Fleet Stumbles It really isn’t that I think Curtis’s theory on 5GW is wrong, or full of s#$t as he so delicately put, the thing is I think he is trying too hard to find it and is looking in th… Read More
13 Comments
“If complex plans in a complex world are made transparent, an extraordinary level of vertical force is required to keep those plans on track.”
I am not sure this is always the case. When complex plans in a complex world are made transparent, the people whose plans are transparent only have to act. the people who are receiving the vertical force has to react, which to me requires a greater vertical force than merely acting.
While I don’t pretend the Baker report is any way a grand strategy, a transparent grand strategy would require less vertical force, as long as tactics were not disclosed. It is not necessary a disadvantage that your enemy knows your coming, only if they know when, where, and how. I am not sure the Baker report actually says any of these, although imbedding must have made them snicker just a bit.
Not so, because the people who know beforehand what those plans are will preempt them, forcing those with the plans to react to changed ground realities. Similarly, those anticipating the vertical force are able to act preemptively, rather than react to the vertical force. (In a 5GW scenario, it’s quite possible they’ll have set other things into motion which will cause the vertical force to produce results not planned by the first party…)
On strategy vs tactics: That’s a valid point, but I think that the question of tactics will become less important for the target if he understands that transparent strategy, and particularly when the successful strategy is dependent upon careful management of various domains. The target can work to knock only one leg from the table, which means not having to work within so many domains, and judge his own effectiveness by whether the table continues to stand. That the leg may be reinforced in 5 different ways but will actually be reinforced by only one is less important — although in this case it is true the target may be forced into a reactionary stance. Maybe not; the first actor may be forced into reactionary measures if his action is preempted, or may be forced to choose another of the 5 original tactics. If most of those have been anticipated by the target — i.e., having awareness of the transparent strategy, the target is capable of imagining the most likely tactics that will be used against him and proceeds to work to preempt them — then the original actor may write later in his biography that it was a very good plan on paper.
The benefit of transparent plans is in leveraging multiple groups to act on them without hierarchy. If a complex plan in a complex world is aimed at guiding the actions of one hierarchical organization (eg the US government), it opens up all sorts of opportunities for adversaries to undermine it. But if a plan is geared more as a vision that can be shared and acted on by many independent actors (4GW), it may have a much greater chance of success. For example, the “plan” to end the US occupation through the use of violence can’t be carried out by one group alone, but when multiple groups act together, the goal becomes achievable. The tactics of the organization that initiates the plan should revolve around inspiring (encouraging, tricking, forcing) others to help acheive the goals.
When looked at from the 5GW perspective, the only difference is that the stated plan may not be the real goal of the originating group - what appears to be a strategic plan to acheive a certain goal may in fact simply be a tactic to create an environment in which a more important goal becomes acheivable.
Excellent comment, RyanLuke!
I largely agree, but would add that, in a society that demands transparency — such as the U.S. — some level of transparency will need to be offered. The ISG report is largely political, and appears to have been designed more for domestic ears than other ears although it was built with knowledge that other ears would be listening. It seems far more 4GW than anything else. If the intention is to leverage GWB by shaming him, it is 4GW; if the intention is to build morale within the U.S. — and the calls for bipartisan action have been blunt — then it is 4GW.
However, it could be a 5GW obfuscation, using the guise of transparency; this ‘leveraging multiple groups’ may not mean, leveraging them to follow through on the plan. It could be an attempt to leverage them to work against the plan. (This returns to my last comment.) I do not see this being the actual case with the ISG report — but 5GW maneuvers will be difficult to detect, by nature! ;)
Not cherry picking — just recognizing that the ISG wants the US out of Iraq by 2008, so then putting every recommendation in the context of an occupation lasting 13-25 more months.
That may have been an inapt phrase.
I wonder how serious the ISG group is when they stress the necessity of a comprehensive approach based on the suggestions they have given, i.e. that it’s an “all or nothing” type of ultimatum. Such speech is probably 4GW; but I wonder which of these proposals they’d actually be quite willing to forget?
(“Cherry picking” might be the correct word for the way various political operatives will approach the report, even if if not for describing your approach!)
Yes so, Stalin knew the Germans were coming, but froze. Your worst fears might be in your own mind.
War is chance. There would be just as great of chance you will have to change anyway. You have to run the loop.
Somehow we’ve veered from a consideration of complex plans made transparent to simple, broad plans — “knowing you are coming” — made obvious, and I think the conversation is likely to suffer.
I apologize, I thought your point was that transparency was a weakness that 5GW didn’t suffer from. I was just trying to point out that it is not always a weakness for your enemy to know you are coming. It worked wonders for the Mongols, in a 4GW way.
The report is written by an establishment that cannot yet really conceive of the possibility of defeat - it is unthinkable because the consequences are so dire. Not only will the press for “victory” continue, that pursuit will fall within very narrowly defined lines. An ideological box with high and very strong walls surrounds the American Establishment. This box has been built by a worldview, and solidified by actions. Going back and rethinking things from the ground up would be a defeat. That is a weak position to be operating from - it has very limited flexibility. The paramaters for defeat are very broad, the parameters for victory are very narrow. These parameters are known by all opponents, who appear to be capable of thwarting them.
The report falls well within this ideological box - I’m sure it is the best recommendations that can be made from that position. And importantly, while it is within the establishment box, it is not within the neoconservative box or the Israeli lobby box.
The establishment is fighting back against the neocons, and out of many unpalatable options, this report may be the best for them. It assumes American Empire, in one form or another, as do the neocons, but it advocates engagement with “enemies” Iran and Syria.
As a strategy for victory in Iraq, it is hopeless. As a political strategy to take the initiative from the neocon camp, it is the best possible option (within the establsihment box).
Neoconservatism is now widely opposed. Differentiating themselves from this failed ideology is the hope of the establishment. Perhaps the real motive for this report is to regroup many mainstream political forces once again beneath the leadership of the traditional establishment. It provides an enemy (the neocons who will predictably oppose key portions), and urges bi-partisan action under the guidance of the old school establishment.
If this is the goal, it is doomed to fail for 2 main reasons. First is that events on the ground in Iraq are the overriding factor right now. American actions now have very limited effects on this reality. The second is that the call for bi-partisan unity is simply a plea. It is not backed by a workable plan or vision that will gather energy. Bi-partisanism in itself does not motivate anyone. Ideally, bi-partisan support is the outcome of a good strategy, without a good strategy, appeal for bi-partisan action will have no power.
RyanLuke: Another great comment!
Yes, it does appear to be a 4GW move to defeat the neocons. What I see is this, very broadly speaking:
For me, it is interesting thinking of the dynamics in these terms, although I would stress that I’m largely brainstorming with this comment in response to yours! (So it might be amended later.) I would also stress that I’m not so much making an evaluation of specifics — e.g., the Patriot Act, or even going to war against Saddam — so much as the way these things were sold in America or accomplished by the neocons, and even then just stating the case from a generational warfare model.
Given the bulleted points, then, it would seem that all parties have greatly shifted to a 4GW model, in these various conflicts, although some have been far more successful than others at this point: our foreign opponents, the neocons against those opponents and against domestic opponents, and the establishment against the neocons. So…
The ISG report, from this perspective, is not really targeted against our foreign opponents but against a domestic opponent. As such, as a 4GW maneuver, it is quite unlikely to succeed in defeating our foreign opponents and quelling the violence in Iraq, although a reorganization of domestic dynamics might actually lead to victory down the long road.
I have some serious questions about whether a 4GW strategy can ever defeat another 4GW opponent, anyway, especially one that is quite motivated and entrenched (or already advanced down its own road to victory.) This would include not only GWB’s 4GWish maneuvers against global Islamism (as basic and inept as those maneuvers might be) as well as an ISG 4GW maneuver.
On the other hand, if the report is considered outside the realm of a domestic 4GW vs 4GW conflict, i.e., with attention to its multi-domain approach, I might be tempted to call it an embryonic 5GW strategy — albeit a failed one. Multi-domain approaches are not altogether new, and the old-school realism that would take into account multiple domains is not really 5GW if it is conducted openly.
Larry,
I’ll have to get back to you on that, after I’ve come to grips with your latest post.
[*Note: I should have been a little more specific when mentioning the “Culture War” above, since I did not mean an East vs West sort of meme but the cooptation by the Bush administration of the Religious Right agenda — a move that recently has motivated some on the RR to scratch their heads or, in some cases, even attack the GWB Admin.]