A Kinder, Gentler Definition

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For the past few days I’ve been kicking my Working Definition up against Curtis’ Kinder, Gentler War, just trying to see if it stuck and what it stuck to. As a result, I’ve come up with a new definition that I think is more in line with the direction of Curtis’ post. In the interest of full disclosure I do not think the direction Curtis is going with his consideration is “warfare” by any kinetic definition. Personally, I’ve never been a member of the flowers and rainbows crowd. I view warfare with the mindset of leverage, force and the exploitation of critical vulnerability and that’s a pretty bloodthirsty outlook to approach this idea from but I’ll give it my best shot. My greatest fear in this line of thought is that if 5GW emerges to be primarily shaped by the practice of co-optation through love of an enemy or opponent as explored by Curtis it could run the risk of being far enough outside of the generational warfare model that it may not be considered by many to be a part of that framework. I will say that I do think where Curtis is going is an expression of 5GW thought. Giving an enemy a victory that is also your victory has to be the ultimate expression of the manipulation of actors and domains. I’m just not sure it is the best or most complete expression of Fifth Generation Warfare.

A Kinder, Gentler Definition of Fifth Generation Warfare:

A theory of warfare(?) premised upon the manipulation actors in order to create a situation where all sides are working toward a result that is perceived by the actors to be beneficial to their own personal goals and desires.

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7 Comments

It's a great, succinct, definition.

And it goes back to the beginning of military thought as well. Sun Tzu's thought was centered around a similar view of strategy.

I agree with A.E., it is a sound general definition and it does sound a bit like Sun Tzu (utilize terrain, strategy and politics in an effort to leverage the least amount of effort to achieve a strategic objective.)

What I'm a bit unsure about is why you hold the GW framework as a some sort of validating principle for your own theory. From where I'm standing you (and Curtis and Dan) are thinking beyond the decidedly (IMO) historically overlapping GW framework. You've all three got a firm grasp on the historical aspects of war strategy and a focused (but not too focused) vision of the 5GW theory, why cage it?

I am wondering how this,

I view warfare with the mindset of leverage, force and the exploitation of critical vulnerability

differs from what may seem the general thrust of the considerations in the Kinder post?

Your Kinder, Gentler Definition™ bends over backward too hard in an attempt to recharacterize whatever I put into the Kinder post -- or so it seems. Maybe you have taken something from that post while excluding other things or have spotted something I did not quite intend. For instance, I'm still fairly happy with a 'revision' definition I gave in the last Working Definition thread:

An emergent theory of warfare premised upon manipulation of multiple actors in multiple domains, via the creation and presentation of actionable and persuasive data (to include both information data and material data), to produce fundamental changes in systems through the willful activities of those actors (i.e., by creating a confluence of effects which will lead to a self-sustaining and resilient system.)

Where I have used the term "willful", you could mark a footnote and then give your Kinder, Gentler Definition™ as the footnote: How, indeed, produce sustained activity from actors if they do not see benefits from that activity? Perhaps crucial to the footnote, as well, would be the use of the word perceived that you have included.

RE:

I do not think the direction Curtis is going with his consideration is “warfare” by any kinetic definition.

This observation would seem to exclude the entire conclusion of the Kinder post, particularly this:

I.e., for the current discussion, perhaps creating a particularized love, a self-interested vision, is much easier than eliminating such from the world altogether — especially given the tendency to artificially eliminate complexity by building a myopic dream of reality. Complexity remains, but the dreams war and, because they are sharp lines leading through the cognitive chaos, they tend to manifest linearly as well, or through applied kinetic force.

There you have the perceived you have recently provided -- those myopic dreams of reality -- and you have applied kinetic force. The Kinder post was inspired by Barnett's thoughts; I had in the back of my head, as I wrote those lines, that these perceptions of benefit (which align with the myopic dreaming) would manifest linearly in multiple ways, whether "blow 'em up" kinetic force or the sort of kinetic force that makes infrastructure spring from the ground and machines manufacture and so forth. The conclusion of the Kinder post was a riposte to the preceding considerations -- and a roundabout answer in answer to the question mark in the title.

While it is true that I think manipulation informed by love will have greater long-term viability than manipulation informed by hate -- the latter becomes all too transparent to the target, as A.E. suggested in comments, even if the target is not fully aware the manipulation is happening; i.e., the target will "re-set" (and probably often in unexpected, unplanned ways) -- I also believe

  1. in the short term, the kinetic activities of targeted actors may well take a destructive course, especially since early stages of a 5GW campaign will have preexisting "dreams" (targets') with which to work; and
  2. that a stick can be used from love as well as a carrot, sometimes more effectively. Spare the rod, spoil the child. Tough love. Pick your cliché.

I think that your "leverage, force, and exploitation" are rather abstract. We've had this disjunction before when considering the various working definitions: it's all well to talk about "leverage" and "force" but those terms need fleshing out, literally.

I'll add an addendum to that comment by directly addressing this recent definition:

a situation where all sides are working toward a result that is perceived by the actors to be beneficial

IMO, this is completely wrong and I do not see where I have suggested anything of the sort in the Kinder post. (My memory could be off.) The error is on the singular: a result. That makes the Kinder, Gentler Definition say that all these actors are working for the same result. No, they don't all perceive a (singular) result, and they do not all consciously act to achieve that common, apparently beneficial goal.

I've worked with tweaking the Kinder, Gentler Definition; but I'll leave off posting it for now, because the effort of tweaking it has actually caused a spark to go off in my head that may lead to a much better conceptualization -- involving, btw, a dynamic definitional continuum depending on the stages of a 5GW campaign. I'll have to give it some more thought...

Curtis,

I'm thinking that what led me somewhat astray were these statements from Kinder, Gentler War.

"The trick: getting them to believe that what they want is achievable, and then giving them the methods for achieving it..."
"With co-option, ‘fair fights’ do not happen. Where there is only one side, fairness as a form of balancing act ceases to be of importance."
"The trick: our foe’s victory must become our victory, in all the meanings of that word."

I personally like your revised definition much better. I feel it represents the broader scope of 5GW thought much more completely. I guess I took a step or three further down the non-kinetic path than you did, and read more into it than you ever intended. Let me assure you, it doesn't bother me at all to walk back up that path.

Arherring,

It is interesting to go back and read those out of context.

"The trick: getting them to believe that what they want is achievable, and then giving them the methods for achieving it..."

These things they want may be quite particular or domain-specific and not need to be the same ultimate goals others have or of the 5GW force. Yet, when all the strands are combined -- the particularized loves -- the overall System begins to take its ultimate form. In fact, foes may not know exactly what they want or may be confused about what they want -- say, the caliphate for some Islamists may only be a desire for purity, certainty, control, security, etc.; can those individuals be given these things without having to achieve a caliphate? So there may be some room for negotiating terms, or tweaking terms, even if they, our foes, do not realize this.

"With co-option, ‘fair fights’ do not happen. Where there is only one side, fairness as a form of balancing act ceases to be of importance."

Here I was thinking that the "one side" is the overall system which the 5GWers are creating. Others may not even realize (for a time) that they are on the same side, the "side" of that system, even though their actions are creating that system.

"The trick: our foe’s victory must become our victory, in all the meanings of that word."

Here, I was playing loose and yet inclusive with the meanings of the word "become." So, it becomes you would mean, it makes you look good; their victories may make our victory look good, ultimately, as their victories build a better picture of our victory, or The System -- and as that System looks better and better (and simply comes into view), they might begin to target their activities to creating it, themselves. Others might as well. This would be a case of shifting definitions of "victory" or "goals" -- the particularized versions -- as the 5GW campaign unfolds. (Thus, it's also tying into the 'definitional continuum' idea I've lately had...)

I enjoy being confronted, put to the question, etc. I reach plateaus or slumps and need confrontation to knock me about, inspire me (to evolve, clarify, or alter) and basically keep me interested! So keep at it. Your "step or three further down the non-kinetic path" may indeed be a few steps further in the definitional continuum: or, somewhat how a 5GW campaign may look near its completion. I mean, really, what System would be worth creating and defending that is not informed by love? ["To In-form": to give form to, to put the form in; i.e., a system which ultimate gains its form from love -- now that's "flowers and rainbows" thinking! But what else is worth spending decades trying to create?]

"Yet, when all the strands are combined -- the particularized loves -- the overall System begins to take its ultimate form. In fact, foes may not know exactly what they want or may be confused about what they want -- say, the caliphate for some Islamists may only be a desire for purity, certainty, control, security, etc.; can those individuals be given these things without having to achieve a caliphate?"

I think with this part you hit at the heart of a successful 5GW campaign. Locating the individual's root desires and appealing to them is essential to advertising campaigns and PR. Perhaps Edward Bernays and Ivy Ledbetter Lee will be just as important to the doctrine as Boyd and Lind. The difference between 5GW and PR, though, is as Curtis notes, is that 5GW comes out of a spirit of love. As I said earlier, manipulations and targeted psywar will be transparent to the target.

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