Politics and Conflict

Five days ago, A. E. of Simulated Laughter posted a follow-up to an entry on D5GW with an entry titled “5GW and Obama — Long Post.”

The Republicans have employed a form of 4GW for a long time. The Democrats did not field a comparable effort, and are only beginning to develop the capacity right now.

I wanted to comment on that entry from the first, but back-end issues have kept me busy working on this site.  You can read the post to see what I meant when I finally commented there that I largely agree with A.E.’s argument.  In fact, his entry ties in rather well with my entry on “Toward a Better Understanding of 4GW” here at D5GW; I had in mind much of what he writes (minus specifics) in his post when I wrote mine.

Don’t be fooled by this snippet of the post; mind the title, since it’s a long post.  However, A.E. doesn’t actually consider Obama much in the entry and does not appear to be calling Obama’s political method 4GW.  I’ve suggested he needs a Part Two to that post.

In other comments there, Dan tdaxp asked an interesting question after quoting something I wrote:

Curtis,

“In any case, proficiency in utilizing a generational style of fighting also usually means greater proficiency at defending against that style, so opponents will need to “upgrade” if they have any hope of winning against a proficient 4GW foe.”

Would you say that higher-G warfare is a product of a more complicated/advanced civilization and/or culture?

I have to say, that commenting elsewhere is not like posting an entry here; I tend to abridge and might even grow sloppy or flippant.  Does greater proficiency in utilization also produce greater proficiency in defending, with respect to a given style of warfare?  I think so, at least statistically.  However, Dan’s question inspired another tie-in, with my look at OODA-xGW, “Observing the Maturing World,” as well as this:

I’m not sure that maturity requires greater complexity, although it probably requires advancement! ;) However, if we think of a move away from largely linear warfare through asymmetric and “widely dispersed and largely undefined” warfare to a sort of expansive and yet inclusive warfare, it may seem like a movement up the chain of complexity from a linearly-restricted or even asymmetrically-restricted p.o.v.

But I would consider the reverse:

“A more complicated/advanced civilization and/or culture” may also be the product of “higher-G warfare.” I.e., the necessities produced by/in conflict have an effect on civilization and culture, as well.

But who knows if any of this makes any sense.  Go read the post on Simulated Laughter, though; it’s very intriguing, extremely well-thought.