Colonel Hammes Enters the Fifth Generation

Let me start with the good part.

I am excited that another military thinker that I admire has begun to explore the concept of 5GW. As far as I am concerned, the old cliché ‘The more the merrier’ is literally true. More is even merrier when it comes from an established author with the credentials and clout to expand the conversation and discussion to new audiences and new viewpoints. This is wonderful and exciting stuff that helps move 5GW from ‘pet theory’ to practical application and proven concept.

Then we get to the bad, or at least disappointing, part.

First off, the article isn’t limited to the concept of 5GW (I wish it was all about 5GW). The first two thirds are about how 4GW has evolved away from Mao’s three-phased insurgency, a shift from military campaigns supported by propaganda operations, to strategic communications campaigns supported by insurgent combat operations. I have absolutely no problem with that. In fact, I agree almost completely with each of the examples he uses to illustrate his point (one exception I will come back to later). I am also intrigued by his exploration of the role of PMCs in 4GW campaigns and will eagerly be watching for future discussion along that line of thought in the media and on blogs that deal more directly with 4GW topics. But since D5GW deals with Fifth Generation Warfare discussion I will delve deepest into the last third of the article and what I found there.

“Like always, the old generations of war continue to exist even as new ones evolve. Today, we see grim 2GW firepower-attrition battles in parts of Africa even as the first hints of 5GW emerge. This should not be surprising—countries that lack the political, social, and economic systems to support new forms of war will continue to use the older forms. Yet a new generation must also evolve and, given the fact that 4GW has been the dominant form of warfare for over 50 years, it’s time for 5GW to make an appearance. We should be able to get some idea of what this new form of war will be by examining how political, social, and economic systems have changed since 4GW became dominant. “

When I first read this I had to smile because it seemed that Colonel Hammes was about to walk down the same road I have been exploring, where the battlefield of 5GW is…

Political,

“Politically, there have been major changes in who fights wars. The trend has been and continues to be downward from nation-states using huge, uniformed armies to small groups of like-minded people with no formal organization who simply choose to fight.”

Economic,

“Economically, we have seen a steady increase in the power of information…The content and delivery of information has accordingly shifted from the mass propaganda of Mao to highly tailored campaigns enabled by the new methods of communication and new social patterns.”

and Social,

“Socially, we have seen a major shift in how communities are formed. People are changing allegiance from nations to causes, a trend dramatically accelerated by Internet connectivity.”

Everything is looking pretty good…

“In sum, political, economic, and social trends point to the emergence of super-empowered individuals or small groups bound together by love for a cause rather than a nation…”

until…

“Employing emerging technology, they are able to generate destructive power that used to require the resources of a nation-state.”

A violent skidding turn away from an exploration of how 5GW works into the technology trap…

“Today, two emerging technologies, nanotechnology and biotechnology, have the power to alter our world, and warfare, even more fundamentally than information technology.”

Ok, if you haven’t stopped reading and are still with me in spite of the gall and temerity of my criticism of Colonel Hammes, allow me to explain the reasoning for my disappointment.

It comes in two parts.

First, technology is a trap in a generational warfare discussion. Panzers don’t make 3GW. The dislocation of an opponent’s mass by a strike at a critical vulnerability makes 3GW. I feel strongly enough about this consideration that I included it as a completely separate Foundations of 5GW post. Technology is a tool and how you use it determines its generational level. For example, use of nanotech to out-mass an opponent is 1GW. Use of nanotech to attrit the mass of an opponent is 2GW. Use of nanotech to dislocate the mass of an opponent is 3GW. Use of nanotech to destroy the will of an opponent is 4GW. Doctrine drives technology. How will 5GW doctrine drive technology? That is the question Colonel Hammes should have explored.

Second, I am not trying to imply that super-empowered individuals and groups are not 5GW, but the bottom line is that to make the generational warfare framework hold water, each successive generation must be able to, and in fact is essentially designed to, defeat the generation one rung lower on the ladder. I see nothing in Colonel Hammes’ thinking that addresses this point. Beside the technology trap, I think this is the biggest hang-up in the whole 5GW discussion. The problem I think is that we, as a society, are so used to being on the defensive, that we don’t often enough ask how 5GW will be, and by necessity should be, used to defeat 4GW opponents. This is an incredibly crucial consideration that must be explored. Bio-weapons are so much more effective the lower you are on the generational warfare ladder that by the time you reach the Fifth Generation they are almost impossible to target. How do you send an anthrax-laced letter to the 4GW al-Queda organization? How does a bio-weapon defeat an insurgency in Afghanistan?

But wait. There is hope! There is light at the end of that tunnel!

Colonel Hammes is so very close. He just needs to adjust his perspective and look at a couple of his own examples from a different point of view.

His example of the October 2001 anthrax attacks can be an example of a 5GW operation, but not in the way he explains. From his point of view the attack was on the legislative body of a nation-state that…

“…Using an advanced biological weapon in support of an unknown cause. This individual or group disrupted the operation of Congress for several months, created hundreds of millions of dollars in clean-up costs, and imposed mail screening requirements (and associated costs) that are still in effect today—not a bad payoff for a few ounces of anthrax and some postage.”

I submit that this qualifies as a 5GW attack only if the intent of the attacker was to ultimately strengthen the security of the USPS regarding bio-attacks. Do you see? As an attack on the U.S. Congress the letters failed miserably. However, as an attack on a flaw in our postal security it succeeded admirably and now a similar 4GW bio-attack will be less likely to succeed.

A second example of where I see Colonel Hammes almost making that crucial connection to 5GW is his evolved-4GW example from the first part of the article examining Hezbollah’s 2006 summer war with Israel.

Hammes starts out with his definition of 4GW, an approach I take myself with 5GW.

“Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.”

He then continues and shifts into a frame that I think is better suited to 5GW than 4GW.

“The key concept in this definition is that 4GW opponents will attempt to directly attack the minds of enemy decision makers. The only medium that can change a person’s mind is information. Therefore, information is the key element of any 4GW strategy. Effective insurgents build their plans around a strategic communications campaign designed to shift their enemy’s view of the world.”

Just substitute 5GW for 4GW and you are very close to the concepts we explore here at D5GW.

I understand what he is trying to show is the shift to strategic communications campaigns as the central effort of 4GW, but for it to still be 4GW it must continue to be an attack on the will of the target.

He shows this in his Hezbollah example. An example that, when viewed as a well-planned sequential 5GW campaign , shows that the target of Hezbollah was not Israel or the West, but rather the people of southern and central Lebanon who, after being caught in the cross-fire of a conflict initiated and brought down on them by Hezbollah, now look to Hezbollah as patron and protector because of their valiant defense of the land against the predations of the Israeli invaders and Hezbollah’s immediate ability to provide the Lebanese people aid in rebuilding while the government(s) dithered. It wasn’t a 4GW attack on the will of Israel, it was a 5GW attack re-directing the will and shaping the worldview of the Lebanese people.

In all, I have to say I am more excited than disappointed by Colonel Hammes’ emergence into the 5GW discussion. Colonel Hammes, welcome to the world of 5GW!