Users of
Internet Explorer 6.x
or before should be aware
that this site works best in
Firefox (best choice) or
Internet Explorer 7.x.
Some helpful links:
 |
| IE 7 at Microsoft |
Disclaimers
The views expressed by contributors to Dreaming 5GW are entirely their own and may not reflect the views of other contributors or the general editor.
Site
Over at Phatic Communion, Arherring has suggested something called “5GW analysis paralysis”:
In other words, what is the effect of the knowledge that you have an opponent merely capable of 5GW campaigns? Given the inherent secrecy of 5GW your opponent has only two real options, (regardless of if you choose the engage in a 5GW campaign or not) he can proceed as if no campaign is ongoing and accept your influence while trying to maintain his objectives, or he can search so obsessively for the 5GW maneuvering against him that he ceases to able to function as a legitimate threat.
I responded with the following.
Or: He can begin to engage his own 5GW plan (if he understands the basic concepts.)
I once mentioned on tdaxp that I thought the only effective defense against 5GW would be another 5GW operation. Dan disagreed. I think that Dan might say that preemptive resilience (institutional, infrastructure, ideological perhaps) would be the first defense and that the secondary defense would be an offense which attempts to “degrade” your 5GW opponent into operating at 4GW or below. I believe the post in question was a consideration of America and federalism; don’t remember, just now.
The problem with each of these defenses:
- Preemptive resilience: The 5GW attacker works with an iterative process; he’s always judging the reality of any present conditions and tweaking his operations. I view 5GW as being the most dynamic of the generations of warfare. Whatever resiliencies you have built will become part of that plan. (Moreover, I wonder if inherent in the idea of resiliency is a dependence not only on that resiliency itself but also on static conditions able to “re-bound” after attacks or changing circumstances. This reminds me of the little quibble I had with DeAngelis once, early on, since resiliency is often thought of in terms of “bouncing/jumping back” into a specific place/condition.)
- Degradation of 5GW: While degradation can happen naturally, through the fault of the 5GW planner, forcing a degradation would require that the defender be able to surpass the 5GW. I.e., it would require some type of 6GW operation — unless, that is, we want to reconsider the generational framework by positing that (x+1)G is not designed to overcome xG, or is not actually able to cause 20-times losses and so forth. A 5GW defense might be able to degrade a 5GW attack; but surely at least an on-par defense would be require for intentional degradation of a 5GW force.
We can put these three possibilities forth, then, for the defender who suspects a 5GW attack is underfoot:
- “He can proceed as if no campaign is ongoing and accept your influence while trying to maintain his objectives.”
- “He can search so obsessively for the 5GW maneuvering against him that he ceases to able to function as a legitimate threat.”
- He can begin 5GW operations of his own.
Each of these possibilities is interesting.
”B” is the worst operational framework, the worst defense, because, in the first place, the 5GW attacker will devise the attack(s) to be entirely unobservable in themselves (although their effects may be observable); and, secondly, because part of the 5GW plan may well be to have the target react rashly while trying to “see” those maneuvers or to run around with his head cut off, utterly distracted. The defender’s search may be a significant part of the 5GW plan.
”A” is not necessarily bad. I have said before, and will say again, that not all prawns — i.e., proxy-pawns — will be targeted for destruction. In fact, a kinder, gentler 5GW may have as its goal the improvement of the system for everyone within the system. If the 5GW maneuvers cannot be seen, acquiescence to them may really be a good thing: “Let those better operators have their full effect; I, in any case, am obviously outside that decision loop.” I in fact wonder if such acquiescence to being a knowing prawn might persuade the attacker to see you as a valuable asset rather than an intransigent thorn in his side. However, if the 5GW attacker has planned far worse for the defender, this may not be the best option.
”C” leaves a little more certainty that the defender could come out of the 5GW in a better place than when the war began. Obviously, we’re down to skill-sets here, which will greatly determine which side becomes “victorious.” Ironically, “A” may be a part of “C”. Quite possibly, “B” will also occur in “C”, in that the defensive 5GW force will need to be able to counter the opponent’s 5GW maneuvers and therefore will need to be aware of those maneuvers somewhat. But generally, I think that much of the observation will be focused on the environmental conditions, the objective reality of the system, rather than on the enemy’s OODA although that (and all other OODAs) will also be considered.
Posted by Curtis Gale Weeks on Jul 29, 2007 04:30 AM
0 TrackBacks
Listed below are links to blogs that reference this entry: Defending Against 5GW.
TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://dreaming5gw.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-t.cgi/154.
7 Comments
Disagree. 5GWs are expensive and costly to organize. Whether down through a secret cell or an open-source swarm, a poorly implemented 5GW does not allow a second chance.
5GW is like Revolution more than poetry. There’s no second drafts.
Dan,
When you say, “a poorly implemented 5GW”, do you mean a fifth generation war, or do you mean a fifth generation attack? (5GA)
Was the theoretical Cold War 5GW, which you have postulated, truly successful? Or is it time to view the surroundings and revise it; i.e., re-iterate?
I believe that following the waterfall model as the only operational dynamic is dangerous to a 5GW force. The world is too complex. This does not mean that no over-arching goal and no over-arching philosophical/theoretical/paradigmatic strategy will not bound the iterative process within a certain scope or certain realms; nor, that a waterfall model is useless for specific fifth-generation actions (5GA’a); nor, perhaps, that the waterfall model is dangerous when followed only within certain domains, limited scopes within the larger 5GW. (It may be quite useful, in fact.)
I think you are wrong.
It was successful. But even before it was successful, it became part of the system. All subsequent 5GWarriors should recognize it as part of the system, and (if it so be in their interest) may manipulate it to their own ends.
PS: My question on the kinds of 5GW was inspired by your comment.
I’m still contemplating your “kinds of 5GW.” I think they were good, but I’m wondering about other types.
There are some who do not believe the U.S. won the Cold War. E.g., Tom Engelhardt wrote an essay for Asia Times claiming the Cold War was lost; I previously blogged about that on Phatic Communion. Whatever you think about his argument, which has some merit, the question ought to be asked whether the current system, Gap vs. Core and 9/11 etc., can be considered a success of the “Cold War 5GW”. (I.e., viewing the Cold War through a 5GW lens.) Additionally, we might ask whether our enemy was defeated or merely forced to change how it advances.
The common wisdom is that the Cold War was won by the U.S. and her allies. A 5GW perspective, if we deign to use such a perspective when contemplating the Cold War, requires us to ask these types of questions.
Curtis,
The Engelhardt piece reads as one of those semi-regular Realist wet-dreams for power balancing.
the question ought to be asked whether the current system, Gap vs. Core and 9/11 etc., can be considered a success of the “Cold War 5GW”.
Could you explain?
Dan,
Short on time at the moment, and flabbergasted that I missed your comment until now. (WTF? Weird, since I’ve been checking the site regularly.)
Generally, I mean look at the state of the world now and contemplate all the many things we suggest for “fixing” it or bringing about a better world. Whatever has gone before has led to this point. More to the point, however, the sort of neglect of the Middle East and Africa — or worse, the training and armament of Cold War proxies in the Middle East, some of whom we are now fighting or have fought — could be considered a very negative effect of that theoretical Cold War 5GW. It was defective; it only saw so far (if it even saw that far.)
Thus, as a “5GW”, I’m not sure the “Cold War 5GW” is a good role model. Again, to the point: 5GW planning must be far more far-sighted, imo, and this may mean that any sort of “limited 5GW” is either not really (wholly) 5GW or else that limited objectives and a limited definition of the scope of the field of battle may not be possible for any true 5GW. What you might have is a 5GA (fifth-generation-action) or 5GM (fifth-generation maneuver) without really having a fifth-generation war.
I am thinking that the cold war was not a 5GW at all levels. The planners who put in place the institutions which kind of ran on auto-pilot until the War won - even if a large number of Americans didn’t want to fight it and didn’t want won - were the 5GW practitioners.
Perhaps it was 5GW at their grand Strategy level and for certain early operations…by those circa-1947 guys were mostly dead or long retired by 1990
Those 47ers got their victory for the benefit of the nation-state even if all the leaders and citizens of the USA nation-state itself were not committed to a victory (or really even thinking about war).
Sure there was some obvious war stuff - Berlin (we won), China (we lost), Korea (we tied), Cuba (we lost), Vietnam (we lost) - but it looked like we were at best holding even and at worse slowly loosing…until the evil empire crumbled (btw, that was a fun time to be taking Soviet government and policy classes at university).
The resistance to victory by the left in American would have been ramped up if they realized we were slowly winning (there’s the Secret War part). The target of the of the 5GW was the US and Western governments and institutions (there is the offense and defense blurring part) to get a result the the 5GWers wanted: a West that survives and flourishes over time, while Communism whithers away over time (not the way Marx figured though!).
There were somethings that they tried that worked better then others. Nor did the 5GW planners no the exact outcome. Victory was possible longer-term with a greater probability then if the 5GW had not taken place.