5GW in Clausewitz’s Trinity
Überblogger ZenPundit has summarized a ten-part series by Fabius Maximus from Defense and the National Interest. Though only posted about two hours ago, ZenPundit’s post has already elicited feedback from FM, as well as myself and D5GW moderator Curtis Gale Weeks.
ZenPundit has underscored a crucial factor in the evolution of the “xGW” model: how does one discriminate between 4GW (culture-based asymmetrical warfare focused on the “rage of the people”) and 5GW (perception-based warfare focused on the context of conflict)?
Recent posts here at D5GW (in particular ARHerring’s “Left of Boom/Right of Boom” analysis of kinetics in xGW, and Curtis’s “X vs. X” follow-up) describe interrelationship of the various “generations” — key to any theoretical framework.
I’d like to add another element to the foundation: the Clausewitzian “Trinity” (developed in Book II of Karl von Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War). Clausewitz, in developing his famous assertion that “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” describes three core elements of any campaign:
Much of the “Cold War” ethos of warfighting was vested in the first premise: the rationality of the state (q.v., “Mutually Assured Destruction” doctrine in nuclear warfare). Similarly, insurgencies like the U.S. faced in Vietnam forty years ago — and in Iraq today — are driven by the third premise: the rage of the people.
Could 5th Generation Warfare (where perception and context are key) be described as a fusion of popular rage with political rationality, where the very idea of “conflict” is altered in order to create conditions favorable to the 5th Generation warrior? Such a feat would logically factor the second premise (the probabilistic calculus of the military commander) out of the equation — or at least reduce its relevance in the larger battle of ideas.
ZenPundit has underscored a crucial factor in the evolution of the “xGW” model: how does one discriminate between 4GW (culture-based asymmetrical warfare focused on the “rage of the people”) and 5GW (perception-based warfare focused on the context of conflict)?
Recent posts here at D5GW (in particular ARHerring’s “Left of Boom/Right of Boom” analysis of kinetics in xGW, and Curtis’s “X vs. X” follow-up) describe interrelationship of the various “generations” — key to any theoretical framework.
I’d like to add another element to the foundation: the Clausewitzian “Trinity” (developed in Book II of Karl von Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War). Clausewitz, in developing his famous assertion that “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” describes three core elements of any campaign:
- Rationality (of the state)
- Probability (in military command)
- Rage (of the population)
Much of the “Cold War” ethos of warfighting was vested in the first premise: the rationality of the state (q.v., “Mutually Assured Destruction” doctrine in nuclear warfare). Similarly, insurgencies like the U.S. faced in Vietnam forty years ago — and in Iraq today — are driven by the third premise: the rage of the people.
Could 5th Generation Warfare (where perception and context are key) be described as a fusion of popular rage with political rationality, where the very idea of “conflict” is altered in order to create conditions favorable to the 5th Generation warrior? Such a feat would logically factor the second premise (the probabilistic calculus of the military commander) out of the equation — or at least reduce its relevance in the larger battle of ideas.
Filed in The Vault and tagged Clausewitz, Fabius Maximus, Mark Safranski, xGW
--from On War.
To me, it would seem that much of the 5GW theory does in fact try to reduce chance or else requires that the rage of the masses will be shaped or utilized by the rationality -- or rational approach -- of 5GW fighters.
In fact, come to think of it, Arherring's and Dan's idea that 5GW would follow a waterfall model closely matches this idea of eliminating the chance involved in warfare.
Curiously enough, despite Dan's frequently preferring automaticity to rationality, his version of automaticity, when applied to war, might be thought of as a kind of waterfall model, in which everything "flows forward" neatly in a line. However, he has recognized some of the detrimental factors of automaticity:
On the other hand, an iterative 5GW process would allow frequent tweaks. Clausewitz seems to have suggested that the probabilistic leg of the Trinity would serve as an inducement for innovation and creativity; it need not be feared as chaos.
Curtis,
Thanks for the link! I posted my paper's latest words on automaticity over at tdaxp, which gives a fuller view of automatization of mental structures.
5GW attempts to disperse the violence of war through a system of systems requires much more rational thinking in the early stages by the warriors, and much less active participation at all in later stages.
I am in the 5GW as iterative process camp. My personal experience work ing on large projects makes me suspicious of the waterfall model. The waterfall model really doesn't work. The project gets tweaked and changed anyways. It is just smarter IMO to assume that at the get go and use a model (like eXtreme Programming) that embraces uncertainty and iteration.
http://purpleslog.wordpress.com/2006/05/22/boiling-the-frog-5gw-style/
(I think) I also see 5GW as iterative process, but I'm drawing on the example offered by Dan awhile ago (regarding the US Army as a 5GW force), so a 'state-without' 5GW. The conduct of that 5GW operation has continuously been subject to slight adjustments and tweaks. Perhaps also the distinction between continuity and change in paradigms of knowledge is also relevant here, as understood by Boyd and described by Osinga. Getting to the idea of 5GW requires a Kuhnian shift away from modern ideas about war, but once 'there', the idea is perfected through its application and learning from the outcome(s). This is the more Popperian side of the campaign which speaks to an iterative process.
WRT to Clausewitz and the Trinity, I see the xGw framework as explaining how the relationship between the state, military, and society develops across history. Although I have yet to read Van Creveld's the Transformation of War, from reading "Through a Glass Darkly" (which according to Fabius Maximus is the article-version of the book), he points to the influence of nuclear weapons on making war irrational, in terms of the inability to use war to advance one's goals, or even survive. So (and this is an assumption based on Van Creveld's work), it would seem that there is no longer a 'rational' reason for the state to wage war. This might be part of the origins of the shift to non-trinitarian warfare, which further exploits the irrationality of war-by-the-state by creating military uncertainty, which leads to actions that turn the rage of the people against the state. Again, this is speculative, because I haven't read all of Transformation of War.
But, if the above is remotely accurate, then it could be said that 5GW is some sort of fusion between rationality and rage, depending on how the idea of conflict is defined, or even constructed. In this fusion, it should only be rational for the state to engage in conflict when the rage of the people is behind it. If the state can manipulate the construction of conflict, and provide information regarding who the enemy is as a distinct Other, separated from the collective Self, then the rage of the people must be channeled through the state, making conflict with the Other rational.
Steve,
Excellent comments, and a compelling thesis. Taking your logic one step further, then the state who wishes to foment conflict need only manipulate the perceptions of the people (e.g., yellowcake from Nigeria ... clear and present danger ... etc. etc.).
One caveat: 5GW is not solely the domain of the state, but can also be exploited by dissociated, non-state actors as well. I suspect you agree too (particularly with your 'shift in modern ideas about war').
vr/ shane
Shane,
I do agree, and I believe this point to the fact that war is now less a matter of physical conquest than ideational negotiation. Power is wielded through the diffusion and acceptance of a 4GW/5GW actor's subjective interpretation of the world. This can be restated in Foucauldian terms: power is wielded and accumulated as one's worldview is adopted by Others through interaction and discourse. By establishing communicative discourse, actors build their power by orienting Others to their own worldview. States have only begun to discover this Foucauldian form of war, but in stable political regimes non-state actors do this all the time, it's just called politics. It becomes war when conducted in a weak or failed-state context, when the boundaries of order and discourse are not set by the institutionalization of ideas about the state.
Excellent observations, Steve!
Steve,
Great correlation! I think Foucault would (1) approve of the role "strategic communications" plays in establishing and maintaining power in today's world, and (2) be dismayed by the poor manner in which the "hyperpower" United States has mishandled this tool.
I'm especially intrigued by Foucault's observation that power (transferred via dialog as knowledge) does not need to be "true", but only passed on as "true" -- extending Nietzsche's existentialism with a dose of social Darwinism.
That said, is the taxonomy of 5GW (i.e., context-based warfare) a new dimension to warfighting, or a re-hash of the foundational principle of warfare: to compel an adversary to do one's will? (Note that I deliberately left off Clausewitz's imperative of "force" in this action.)
Breaking news: Matt of MountainRunner fame has posted a related article on Small Wars Journal that dissects the Smith-Mundt Act and calls for a strategic reassessment of U.S. strategic communications.
Shane and Curtis,
Much thanks. I agree with the link between Foucault and Nietzsche regarding truth. However, I should admit I came across the theory stuff accidently, through conversations with the other grad students at school. So I have a ways to go on getting familar with it.
As for the taxonomy of xGW, I'm almost reluctant to discuss this because I can easily venture in Fukuyamaesque fantasies. But here goes...
Over the summer I was thinking about xGW and constructivism, and how the shift to 4GW/5GW places war in the context of identity formation. After reading a description of teleogical explanations written by Alex Wendt, I thought that maybe the xGW framework is an evolutionary teleological explanation of war in the international state system. By this, I mean that the practice of warfare is an attribute of states in the international system. In biological terms, states can also be seen as a population of organisms that interact and seek to survive. A evolutionary or 'backwards-looking' teleology explains how a system acquires a certain set of behaviors. Thus, a backwards-looking, evolutionary teleology explains how war, as practiced by states, evolves over time throughout the system. It provides a functional utility to states, and as warfare evolves, states practicing war must also evolve to survive in the system, and old forms of warfare lose their functional utility. States that do not evolve to have greater trouble competing. If they choose to continually engage in war, they must adapt to the most functionally useful form of war, or they risk defeat and extinction. Wendt uses the analogy of zebra stripes to explain this:
"A teleological explanation of zebra stripes, for example, would show they were functional for the different retention of zebras in natural selection, just as one of the Westphalian system might show how a monopoly of force gave states a competitive advantage against groups without one." (Wendt 2005, p. 496)
Thus, it should follow that the Generations of War framework shows which behaviors of states - which variations in the behavior of war - give states a particular advantage over others, and makes them more 'fit' in terms of survival in the system. However, as the system changes over time, we should expect a concurrent shift in terms of what behaviors demonstrate fitness, and the ability to survive in the system. The rise of 4GW indicates a loss of functional utility of interstate war and a new definition of fitness, defined by the ability to morally disconnect a state from its population. 5GW, in turn, is about how the state evolves the behavioral adaption necessary to survive in a 4GW, non-trinitarian world, and diffuse potentially morally destructive adversaries by forging a new relationship between the state and the potential friend-to-be. This is the state-without 5GW Dan has defined, and it defines a new level of fitness for state necessary for its survival: the ability to replicate itself and coexist peacefully with all other states. On the individual level, it requires creating a communicative discourse (here's the Foucault) in which both actors define each other as friendly and non-threatening. In this way, war itself - as a behavior of organisms in the system of states, necessary for survival - itself becomes extinct, as it no longer becomes necessary for survival in the world. One can even think of war's evolution in Boydian terms, going from physical, to mental, to moral. War ends, and stops evolving, when victory in moral warfare requires interacting with all actors in the world and forming a single, common Orientation to the world that leaves no one in isolation. This is why 5GW might be last form of war.
I hope this makes sense. I've been thinking about this for awhile now, trying to integrate it into a paper on constructivism and war. Could it work? Did someone else think of this already?
-Wendt, Alexander. "Why a World State is Inevitable." European Journal of International Relations, 9(4), 491-542.
Almost forgot. As the title suggests, Wendt is concerned with a teleological explanation of world state formation. If xGW truly is an evolutionary teleological explanation of warfare as behavior of a population of states/organisms and how warfare itself becomes extinct, then it in fact supports Wendt's theory of world state formation.
Steve,
Fascinating comment. I think you're dead-on regarding the role of Identity in "higher-x" modes of xGW. Several fellow 'bloggers have touched on this topic, including Dan at tdaxp, A.E., Kings of War and fellow D5GWer Curtis Gale Weeks.
Given the dominant impact language and rhetoric have on shaping the perceived "social reality", it seems to me that constructivism is a model of 5th Gen. Warfare that is compatible with both realism and liberalism. So your idea of a paper is both timely and relevant -- especially if you address the role of the "State" in prosecuting a constructivist campaign. While 4GW shows that the State does not have a monopoly on violence, could a context-based 5GW campaign be waged without the communications apparatus of a State? (I think it can, but this is simply conjecture on my part.)
Shane,
Sorry for taking forever to respond. I think a context-based campaign can be waged without the state apparatus. But I speculate that it would have to involve an actor with deep pockets (lots of resources) and connections to means of communication not his/her own, in order to mask his/her identity. It sounds like state-within 5GW, of the conspiracy type that AE has been blogging about. This is part of 5GW that I have to admit I don't think enough about.