Politics and Imperatives

A couple of recent links to D5GW:

Phil at Amicable Collisions linked our Soros post with “Political Activism as a Form of War.”

While I do not agree that the only use for an xGW model is “primarily in showing the sequence of emergence of different forms of war”, the idea that the linearity implied by the generational model may be inaccurate for describing different types of conflict is one that has been expressed often, more often recently than ever before.  Phil makes a very interesting point that save for 1GW, the previous generational styles continue to be viable options for anyone wanting to engage in conflict, and also that choices will depend upon the prevailing conditions for any particular conflict:

So the sequence of emergence over time is irrelevant. Today we can wage the forms of war identified in the generational model as 2G, 3G, and 4G, but not 1G. With the exception of 1GW the emergence of the succeeding generations did not make the previous generation obsolete, rather they gave war-fighters more options for waging war in different circumstances and for different purposes.

That may be a new spin on the xGW theory but is not altogether new, since even Lind argued that many features of succeeding generations are holdovers from previous generations.  A qualitative shift is not a complete break; then, would the possibility arise that whatever innovation defines x+1GW might occasionally be unnecessary in some conflicts, leaving the fighter fighting with x+1GW that just happens to look largely like xGW (in a particular conflict)?

I have been using the term conflict so far, because several of the more prominent (!?) theorists now contemplating the xGW model have long folded into their considerations the idea that politics has emerged as an important component of warfare.  Quite possibly, politics has always been a component of warfare, but to the degree that socio-economic demands have forced would-be fighters to abandon the highly kinetic, in intensity and/or focus, methods, “politicking” has inherited some of that intensity and focus.

A socio-economic influence might be the relative lack of a large economic infrastructure for some 4GW fighters — thus demanding styles of fighting which are asymmetrical — or else a general public squeamishness over the use of force for resolving conflicts.  Interestingly, these can go hand in hand, with one force using asymmetrical kinetic attacks against another force that must tip-toe around the use of kinetics due to some squeamishness on their side of the system:   not only does the squeamishness prevent a symmetrical response, it produces the result desired by the asymmetrical warrior when he places kinetics front-and-center for the squeamish public’s viewing.

Phil introduces this idea of a shift toward the political arena and extends it:

As this phenomena continues to evolve, what would, in the past, have been wars fought with armies will be conflicts fought through non-violent political activism, without a battlefield component at all.

This idea is one I’ve brushed before:  that 5GW may ultimately become socio-political conflict, alone, although such a dynamic is far from actualization at present:

…is it possible that this is the desired paradigm?  I.e., 5GW conflict in which few die but some rise while others fall, unbeknownst to the majority, in largely non-violent conflicts?

[“Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound”]

When I consider the possibility that “5GW will be the last generation of war” — as I’ve only recently written for all to see, this is the sort of thing I have in mind (but not the only thing!)


Phil folds the preceding considerations together to wonder, first, whether such entirely non-violent conflict should be called “war” — an oldish question for many of us — and, second, whether we ought to take a closer look at political activism, perhaps with an eye for distinguishing different types of political activism, similar to the way we discuss xGW for warfare.
Dan tdaxp, A.E., Thomas Barnett, and I myself have contemplated different types of political maneuvering that might fit the bill; but Phil’s call is very interesting for the fact that he would eschew the xGW framework, and any consideration of the styles described by the theory of generational warfare, and look at politics itself.  I.e., whereas the aforementioned theorists find a place for politics in xGW, as if politics is merely one tool of warfare, Phil calls for a better understanding of political activism simply because politics is apparently becoming a primary method for resolving conflict.

What if the prognostications are correct and we find ourselves in a world in which 5GW has fully come into being, nearly eliminating large-scale violent activity for resolving conflict?  If politics in the broad scale (including media, entertainment, blogs, social networks, etc.) becomes the style of conflict, might we benefit from a more thorough understanding of the various ways such conflict may be conducted? [Incidentally, that last question has me suddenly remembering PurpleSlog’s recent post elsewhere…particularly also a comment made there by Colin.  Linked again below.] Even if that actualized ideal 5GW dynamic takes its time in coming, a better understanding of political maneuvering may greatly help us to understand what makes us win or lose other styles of conflict.

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Kent’s Imperative has linked the 5GW Theory Timeline, a post at PurpleSlog, and Shlok Vaidya’s blog with “Intelligence for the sixth generation warfighter.”

A frequent theme at Kent’s Imperative is this: What of intelligence?  The assumption is first made, accurately I think, that much old-style intelligence gathering and analysis is and will be inadequate; then, that we must consider how the intelligence community must adapt to the present and the future world.  A recurring theme at the blog.  Adapting to the future world now may be a problem, for reasons given in the linked entry.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb is paraphrased by Kent’s Imperative:

In this, we would crib Nassim Nicholas’ Taleb’s analogy that in order to predict current events in Mesopotamia from the perspective of the Neanderthal, one has to understand the invention of the wheel first, and every subsequent technological and social change after - an impossible task, given that if one has the knowledge to predict an innovation one usually has the concept required to build it sooner rather than later.

You would think, perhaps, that I would have great affinity with Taleb, given my moniker here (“The Skeptic”) and Taleb’s introduction of himself at the last link:

“My major hobby is teasing people who take themselves & the quality of their knowledge too seriously & those who don’thave the guts to sometimes say: I don’t know.…”


Perhaps I do.  However, I have often said that a true skeptic must also be skeptical of his skepticism!  I.e., even skeptics can be dogmatists.  (I hope you’ll contemplate that koan.)

While adding entries to the Timeline, I came across one from ZenPundit that contained an argument that I had forgotten:  “5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts”.  Mark suggested as much as Kent’s Imperative:

I do have an important caveat in pondering Dan’s excellent 5GW work. What he and other commenters have or may have discerned about 5GW is less than what 5GW will comprise when it is fully realized and a generational shift in warfare has taken place. We have to hold out the possibility that “attacking the enemy’s intellectual strength” and secrecy as proposed by Dan and my “longitudinal vision-short execution” and “shaping the battlespace” may end up be less significant than aspects of 5GW that have yet to materialize. Societal shifts by 2050 or 2080 are likely to be sizable - perhaps more extreme than the changes that occurred from 1860 to 1945 - and these shifts will produce new advantages and conditions that may favor defense over offense.

I would say, instead, that the Neanderthal may have safely predicted that humans would still kill humans in 2007.

One thing I have only once written on the blogosphere while discussing 5GW (I think it’s only been one time), and only in passing, is something I’d propose now.  Arherring and others have been adamant about ruling out the advent of new technologies as a driver of generational shift, while yet others have based their concepts of xGW largely on the technology available to any given era or force.  I am ambivalent vis-a-vis that dichotomy.  I believe that technology is certainly an enabler of conflict, and I am certain that those who fought only with their hands, feet, and teeth most generally fought differently than those who threw stones, used sharp sticks and spears, and fought on horseback, etc. This is common-sensical, and I am often amazed that it is dismissed from some theories.  xGW must take into account everything in existence at the time of conflict, whether some things are broadly addressed and others take center stage.  Let me propose this:  that the preeminent weapon of 5GW — the preeminent tool for conducting 5GW — will be the human.  That is a tool that has only dimly been understood, which accounts for the sloppy use of it pre-5GW.  But 5GW will refine its use.

I suppose the tool can change, or be changed in the future, with various modifications made; but I also suppose that as long as humans are human, there will not be a generation after 5GW.  I dismiss for now contemplating the advent of intelligent machines that were never human and any conflict with intelligent extraterrestrials.