Dreaming 5GW

Arherring’s intriguing reconceptualization of the xGW framework, “XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom”, has inspired me to take my own route tying the concept of “Boom” to the generational model.

The term Boom, as I see it, describes the kinetics which occur during conflict.  We might borrow Arherring’s phrasing and consider only the operative kinetics for each generation — i.e., the type of kinetic activity which defines each generation, generation by generation, and through which each generation succeeds (or attempts to succeed), although many other kinetic activities may also occur — because it is a valuable way of contemplating the generations and kinetic activity; but what if we simply lump all kinetic activity together and call it “Boom”?

Hidden within Arherring’s diagram of the generations in relationship to Boom,is another which may describe each generation in relationship to the generation which precedes it and to the generation which follows it.  Arherring’s approach may seem to leave the question of these relationships to the side; he has considered each generation in relationship to the Boom, and only from that consideration do we find some type of relationship between them.  I have attempted to include these intergenerational relationships in a revisioning of the diagram, or a redrawing, to add new dimensions.

Linear vs. Non-Linear xGW

First, to dispel the false dichotomy:   Viewing the generations in a linear representation, in relationship to the Boom as Arherring has done, may offer insights to different styles of fighting which need not emerge solely as a uni-directional development of warfare.   We might in fact contemplate particular strategies which have been employed throughout the history of humanity (which generally runs along with the history of warfare) and place these strategies either to the left of the Boom or to the right; are they, then, also “generations” of warfare?   The question may be moot, if we are only to consider strategic dynamics as they relate to the Boom, or to kinetics, in the way Arherring has done.   However, to postulate a generational model is to suggest a general uni-directional development through which different strategies emerge as a consequence of previous strategies which have been employed.   A singular generational model need not be applied to the entire history of warfare in order to box certain styles of fighting into specific epochs, and only those epochs, within the history of humanity; rather, a generational model only need show that a given style of fighting has resulted as a consequence of another — and this will usually occur within a specific epoch, or a small time frame, simply because some overlap of generations, or competitive conflict, must occur in order for one style to develop as a consequence of another.


Our xGW:   How Extensive?

If generations of warfare are to be defined as a particular kind of relationship between styles of fighting, in which one style emerges as a consequence of — or, a reaction to — another, we may begin to wonder whether we should speak of 5 generations.   For instance, how has 5GW emerged as a consequence of 1GW, even if we can postulate that 5GW emerges as a consequence of the prevalence of 4GW strategies, or to defeat 4GW?   I.e., for a generational model to cohere, we need to understand how 1GW led to 2GW, which led to 3GW, which led to 4GW, which leads to 5GW, with nary a break between them.

For our xGW, we only need to understand the possessive pronoun.   Criticisms of the xGW theory that is currently propounded usually take the extreme position of pointing out that Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar or some other historical figure or group also fought in an xGW manner or an x+1GW manner; and since the proponents of current xGW theory are assumed to be referring to the entire history of war when they discuss xGW, a theory which one assumes must fit a single uni-directional evolution of warfare spanning the entire history of humanity, those proponents are speaking gibberish.   Well, some are; others concern themselves only with our xGW, limiting the theory to the period since the Peace of Westphalia or in some other way. ¹

This blog post is not intended to be a comprehensive exploration of the shape of our xGW and why it should be considered an authentic generational model of warfare, but will assume some familiarity with the theory and endeavor to present a new way of viewing the progression from 1GW to 5GW.   While other factors may serve more fully to bind the generations together in a coherent progression worthy of being called a generational model, I wish for the moment only to look at the way each of the generations in our xGW may have approached the intergenerational conflict, from which the forward progression took its shape.


Positional Advantages and Kinetics

Arherring’s conceptualization of the “left of Boom” as being a positional strategy which helps to determine the Boom to follow, combined with my thought that all war is kinetics or dependent on kinetics, inspired me to consider how each generation gained superiority over the previous generation by improving upon positioning and the determination of the operative, efficacious — also determining — kinetics.   This led me to redraw the diagram provided by Arherring to show these relationships between the generations:
In this conceptualization, I see a distinct positional advantage which results from a dispersal of kinetics.   Keep in mind, I do not view that dispersal as a diminution of kinetics (an early conceptualization of G introduced by Dan tdaxp ²), but merely as a dispersal.   We might use other ways of phrasing it:   a dispersal of the center of gravity; or, a multiplication of centers of gravity, plural.   The net kinetic activity, the net energy, may actually be greater for succeeding generations of war within our xGW.

We can see this dispersal of kinetics/CoGs³ , in the way each succeeding generation created new points of attack and new methods for accomplishing those attacks in response to a previous generational style of fighting:

2GW defeats 1GW because, 1) 2GW forces can advance at multiple points, with some autonomy for the individual units, and 2) massed artillery is quite capable of dispersing the kinetic attacks on the field of battle.

3GW defeats 2GW because of much greater mobility, circumventing with pro-action the 2GW position of artillery and combat units (not only in space but also in time.)

4GW defeats 3GW because of even more mobility: including even the option of moving among civilians or, indeed, among friendly forces.   Additionally, 4GW begins to make better use of memetic engineering, or of altering observations to create kinetic responses in individuals thus oriented, kinetic responses possibly quite far from the 3GW force’s field of battle: another degree of dispersal of kinetics.   The CoGs may include the morale of the population supporting the 3GW force; the CoGs may include destruction and murder within civilian populations, at any point civilians can be found.

5GW defeats 4GW by refining memetic engineering, mulitplying domains to be shaped, and thus operating outside the scope of the 4GW observational range.   Changes which occur within an agricultural sector in a far removed nation-state (or T.A.Z.⁴ ) may ultimately lead to effects within the 4GW force’s acknowledged field of battle⁵ ; etc.   Indeed, the 4GW force’s concept of the field of battle may be altered.

In each of these cases, the reason the previous generation fails against the newest generation is simply that the previous generational strategies cannot account for the new dimensions of the conflict, or were not formed to address the new dimensions.   Rather, the previous generational strategies were formed to address the dimensions of the generation before, with no leap-frogging to x+2:   When the goal is to win and the present exigencies are pressing, the need is only to be one-up, and resources will be targeted accordingly.


A few concluding notes

By using Positional/Proactive vs. Kinetically Driven/Reactive, I merely mean to show how generational strategies directly in conflict are motivated by the Boom.   Those to the left pro-actively seek to create positions from which they have the most control of the centers of gravity for the conflict to come; those on the right are then reactive and driven by the kinetics created by their opponents.

Obviously (apparently!) any generation can be Positional/Proactive or Kinetically Driven/Reactive in relationship to the Boom, depending on the generational force it opposes.

Finally, I would like to propose that the general progression to the left of Boom, with each succeeding generation, is intimately tied to the progression of the dispersal of kinetics.   This is a subject worthy of a post of its own, I think.
   

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¹ The blogger at Fix 4 RSO diagrammed this period with fairly distinct end-points for the generations, in “Boundaries for the Fourth Generation”; an interesting post, for the curious.

² In “Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW”.

³ see “Center of gravity” at Wikipedia.

⁴ See “Temporary Autonomous Zone” at Wikipedia.

⁵ I once wrote a blog post called “Managing Multiple Strands” which explored this weakness of 4GW, both the limited observational range and the general malleability of “public opinion.”

Filed in The Vault and tagged Boom, Kinetics, xGW