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A New Point of View on the Relationship Between Kinetic Action and XGW.
The Generations of Warfare model is most often viewed as a progression. The term ‘generation’ itself reinforces this, implying the process of one leading to another. As a result, many of the concepts we have studied in our explorations of 5GW in particular, and XGW in general, have their roots in this step-like or ladder-like point of view. A prime example is the consideration that each successive generation is specifically designed to circumvent the relative strength of the immediately previous generation. Another example of progression is the observation that the higher the generation of warfare used by an organization, the more generally dispersed the kinetic activity will be. This point of view contains a great deal of merit and shows consistent results and patterns that help theorists grasp the underlying truths the model contains. However, there are other ways to view XGW that can offer valuable insight.
A New Point of View:
Imagine a continuum in the form of a timeline. In the center of the timeline is a fixed point that represents kinetic action, or the ‘Boom’. To the left of the Boom are events that influence the kinetic action. To the right of the Boom are events that are influenced by the kinetic action. When the operative actions, or the actions that embody the distinctions between each generation of XGW, are placed on the timeline relative to the Boom a very interesting and somewhat striking pattern seems to emerge.
The Operative Actions of XGW
1GW Operative Action: Organization and concentration of mass to move toward or from key points on the field of battle.
Hannibal to Napoleon, the great captains of history knew the key to victory lay in attacking into and from, or holding, the key points of the battlefield. To do this most effectively, they organized their army, and the force represented by its mass, in order to most effectively and efficiently accomplish this. The organization and placement of mass in 1GW puts it just to the left of Boom on the continuum.
2GW Operative Action: Destruction of an opponent’s mass in order to weaken the opponent to the point that resistance is impossible.
As the “King of the Battlefield” artillery ruled the muddy trenches of World War 1, just as air power shattered any resistance inside the “Kill Box” of the First Gulf War, and with the “Shock and Awe” of the Second Gulf War. Both are examples of the 2GW effort to cause enough direct attrition of enemy forces that the opponent is unable to organize and concentrate its mass, becoming unable to effectively resist. However, without the kinetic action the attrition does not occur. This places 2GW just to the right of the Boom.
3GW and 4GW seem to represent a somewhat murky stage where the transition of actual kinetic action to the threat or implied threat of kinetic action causes room to question their placement on the timeline.
3GW Operative Action: Dislocation of the opponent by attacking and defending critical vulnerabilities.
When an opponent is dislocated positionally, functionally, morally or temporally, the opponent loses the ability to oppose effectively, this is the essence of 3GW/Manuever warfare. In relation to kinetics, however, does 3GW move to fight or fight to move? This question has a direct bearing on the placement of 3GW relative to the Boom. While ‘a boom’ may occur before the movement occurs, the dislocative aspect of the movement prior to ‘the Boom’ (or the overwhelming threat of the Boom on a critical vulnerability of the opponent), places 3GW on the timeline farther to the left of both the Boom and 1GW.
4GW Operative Action: Using a disruptive attack or threat of disruptive attack to cause the perception of an unwinnable situation in an opponent, resulting in a loss of morale or will until the opponent is rendered incapacitated.
Even more than 3GW, 4GW employs a threat of kinetic action more than actual kinetic action. At first glance it may seem that the threat of attack always precedes the Boom. However, without the Boom or the perceived threat of the Boom there is no effective attack on the will of the opponent. This places the operative action of 4GW on the continuum farther to the right than the Boom and 2GW.
5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape outcomes and effects.
5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance because the response is by the target’s own choice or follows a previously established pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW and the Boom on the timeline.
The result of placement on the timeline looks something like this:
Conclusions:
The XGW operative actions that take place on the left of the timeline relative to the Boom are positional in nature. Their intent, even if only occurring immediately prior to the kinetic action, is to cause the Boom to best shape the result and accomplish the objective. Operative actions to the right of the kinetic action use the kinetic action itself as leverage or to motivate an opponent. The pattern represented by the arrangement of each generation’s operative action seems to imply an interesting clue to the potential shape of 6GW and other future generations of XGW beyond 6GW.
Author’s Note:
The thinking in this article was inspired by a series in the Washington Post titled Left of Boom. The article chronicles the duel between U.S. Military forces and insurgents on the IED seeded battlefields of Iraq. Tacticians in the U.S. Military have come to look at the explosion of ‘Boom’ of an IED as a point at the center of a timeline with the cat and mouse game of countermeasure, counter-countermeasure, counter-counter-countermeasure occurring to the right of the ‘Boom’. Their effort now is to move the U.S. Military’s focus to the left of the ‘Boom’ and attack the insurgent groups that are planning, improving, manufacturing and emplacing the IEDs. The series is excellent and I highly recommend it.
Posted by Arherring on Oct 21, 2007 12:58 PM
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Arherring’s intriguing reconceptualization of the xGW framework, “XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom”, has inspired me to take my own route tying the concept of “Boom” to the generational model.The term Boom, as I see it, describes the… Read More
3 Comments
I had to read it twice to make sure I was getting it. This is a good post. I like this approach to defining xGW that is independent of history, technology, and emerging one gen to the next).
I had to read the 2GW/Attrition Warfare part a couple of times. That is the only one I had questions with.
I think I understand how you have placed it: the boom (a big one) occurs and that leads to the attrition.
But doesn’t the mass of firepower/manpower/industrial might occur prior to the boom?
I guess all planning occurs to the left of boom, so I am not thinking about this right. So, the key event is the boom caused by massed firepower/manpower/industrial might which leads to the effect of destroying resistance of an opponent. How’s that?
The model appears to use the concept of “Boom” as a concept, an abstraction, rather than as a name for the kinetics that actually occur, for 4GW. A real “boom” must occur prior to the “4GW effect” of destroying morale, etc.; but thereafter, merely the “threat of boom” becomes the Boom.
I like the distinction of positional strategies for defining those generations to the left of the Boom: they position in order to define the real kinetics that come afterward. While we might say that all generational styles do this, it would seem that those to the left are fundamentally dependent on positioning, first, for the effects they seek whereas those on the right achieve a position after utilizing kinetics. This may be a small hair for dividing the two sides, but it does raise interesting questions for me, such as:
Are those generational forces to the right of the Boom less dependent on having particular types kinetics for achieving their position as long as their position is achieved?
Are those on the left far more dependent on particular positional strategies for their overall strategies?
I ask these two questions because a fundamental weakness might appear for those on the left of the Boom which will not appear for those on the right: More hierarchical control will be necessary (or perhaps, instead of control, influence in the case of 5GW), simply because, in order to reach the Boom (and all war is kinetics of one form or another), they must be careful to position just-so. Those generational forces to the right of the Boom have the option of making the most of whatever kinetics occur or are available to them and would seem to be more flexible, or to have more options, generally speaking.
Purpleslog,
I suppose the reason for the confusion about 2GW between us is that you are thinking of it in terms of industralization being a necessary aspect of 2GW because it makes massed firepower possible. I look at it from a more fundamental level, as destruction of an opponent’s mass or strength. To me this means that industralization makes 2GW possible (or more possible), but isn’t 2GW itself. As long as your goal is to destroy an opponent’s mass you’re using 2GW.
Curtis,
Yes, it seems that as kinetics disperse the Boom does seem to become more of an abstraction than an actual physical event, but I think for the purposes of the operative action for each generation you can treat them as the same thing.
“Are those generational forces to the right of the Boom less dependent on having particular types kinetics for achieving their position as long as their position is achieved?”
I would say yes. As long as there is a kinetic component (or the threat of kinetics) generations to the right of the Boom, if they are clever enough, may use it. Perhaps even if they aren’t the cause of the kinetics.
“Are those on the left far more dependent on particular positional strategies for their overall strategies?”
Again, yes. And I agree that they must position “just so”. However, being able to choose position is a huge advantage because it allows you to control many of the variables even if the position you choose turns out not to be the best position. So in that sense I would disagree with you about ‘right of boom’ generations having an advantage. Then again, I may have a bias in that direction.