John Robb: “On Open Source Guerrilla Vanguards”

Posted by Curtis Gale Weeks, 2 Nov 2007

Link: On Open Source Guerrilla Vanguards

While I am just as suspicious of ye ol’ foco insurgency —


In Che’s model, when the moral crisis was finally precipitated by the vanguard, an organic uprising would rise to replace it with a morally pure form of governance (without the corruption that the formation of a shadow government and party bureaucracy would entail).


—I think that Robb draws the necessary Manichean extrapolation Manicheans must draw when they draw.

This is a very sharp post, until the final paragraph and particularly the last two sentences:


This open source insurgency will only bring fragmentation and perpetual conflict. The vanguard’s role, is merely as a catalyst for its formation.


Perhaps Robb has never read my post, “What Openness (in ‘Open Source’) Will Really Mean/Do”, or the comment I left for PurpleSlog on Meme-Based Networks and Gene-Based Networks.

In one respect, Robb in this post reminds me of Col. Hammes.  The groups of super-empowered individuals are always nihilists, and all technology ends in violence, destruction, and so forth, into perpetuity.  Every other effect of super-empowerment — and of technology — is entirely ignored.

(HT: Adam Elkus via Facebook.)

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6 Comments

"Manichean".

Heh. I have not seen that word so many times in one week before!

I think Hammes suggested that the multitude of small insurgency groups where some united to defeat the shared opponent - with all of them knowing they will face off in a civil war afterwards.

"The groups of super-empowered individuals are always nihilists, and all technology ends in violence, destruction, and so forth, into perpetuity. Every other effect of super-empowerment — and of technology — is entirely ignored."

I too was a bit put off by this seeming assertion. Especially given that my major understanding of BNW was that the GG element wasn't at all directly tied to nihilistic principles rather entailed a fungible nature that could take on anything from the nihilistic want of al qaeda to the capitalistic sort of any Columbian drug cartel or the conflation of the two along with a tribal/territorial aspect that an American gang might entail.

Robb seems to justify Dan's own criticism's in this post. Though in all fairness, there is a disclaimer that said post is, effectively, "in the works."

PurpleSlog,

My own curiosity is this: knowing they would face off in civil war later, what are they likely to do now. With regard to Iraq and Afghanistan, as examples, I also wonder whether the common enemy might not be perceived as quite as important as the near-peer competitors. If America is the common enemy (for instance) might it be viewed as less of a threat than near-peer competitors, given the shoddy approach America has taken (in presence, scope)? Alternatively, if the established national gov't's are hollowed and weak, wouldn't they become less of a concern than other near-peer competitors?

Understandably, if these groups fell into constant civil war, Robb's vision would come to pass. But as I've maintained before, they are not likely to enter into such a civil war without seeing the effects they themselves cause. I.e., they are not non-thinking beings unable to observe the environment; and, observing it, they would want to change it. Robb seems to suggest that the constant conflict would be too complex for any one group to resolve that environment or build stability, and Mark Safranski brings up the issue of the "fog of war"; but given the possibility that members of more than one group see what they have wrought....

Incidentally, come to think of it: Someone should probably write a post comparing two terms: "fog of war" and "open source warfare." Are they compatible?

Soob,

Although Robb has considered DIY resiliency/stabilization efforts, he always seems to fall back on the "constant conflict" meme -- Although, if we dissect that meme or consider it loosely, we might be able to find other forms of "conflict" than the merely kinetically destructive which is driven by overt or latent nihilism....

"My own curiosity is this: knowing they would face off in civil war later, what are they likely to do now. With regard to Iraq and Afghanistan, as examples, I also wonder whether the common enemy might not be perceived as quite as important as the near-peer competitors. If America is the common enemy (for instance) might it be viewed as less of a threat than near-peer competitors, given the shoddy approach America has taken (in presence, scope)?"

Curtis,

At one point in time I thought that the insurgents would seek to hasten American withdrawal in order to preserve their own strength for the inevitable civil war. To do so they would attempt to inflict a humiliating defeat, such as an overrun, that would have a large symbolic effect. In other words, I was warning of an insurgent tet offensive, or if you want to be more recent, the Marine bombing in Beirut over twenty years ago. In retrospect, I was very wrong--I attributed too much unity of purpose to the insurgents and overestimated their strength. Additionally, it seems doubtful in retrospect that the insurgents would really believe that they would dramatically benefit from an American withdrawal.

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