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THE MAN WHO WASN’T THERE
A recent ThreatsWatch briefing by Steve Schippert and Nick Grace focused on the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) creation of a fictional character, “Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi.” Al-Baghdadi was called into existence to put an Iraqi face on the ISI’s largely foreign leadership. An Iraqi actor portrayed al-Baghdadi, as Al-Qaeda wanted the appearance (but not the reality) of Iraqi control.
Ultimately, Al-Baghdadi had little strategic effect. Al-Qaeda-backed organizations in Iraq alienated the populace with their religious fanaticism, savagery, and ham-handed attempts to alter tribal social codes. The foreign makeup of their leadership no doubt aggravated those problems, but was not a huge issue in itself.
However, the Al-Baghdadi case inspired me to have my own personal 5GW “dream.” I consider this scenario more high-level 4GW than 5GW, but elements of it could be applied to 5GW.
I use a mixed model that combines today’s networked terror groups and some of the future terrorist organizations that I outline in my Athena Intelligence paper. This scenario isn’t meant to illustrate a larger point—it’s intended as a thought exercise about memes, brands, and information warfare.
A recent ThreatsWatch briefing by Steve Schippert and Nick Grace focused on the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) creation of a fictional character, “Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi.” Al-Baghdadi was called into existence to put an Iraqi face on the ISI’s largely foreign leadership. An Iraqi actor portrayed al-Baghdadi, as Al-Qaeda wanted the appearance (but not the reality) of Iraqi control.
Ultimately, Al-Baghdadi had little strategic effect. Al-Qaeda-backed organizations in Iraq alienated the populace with their religious fanaticism, savagery, and ham-handed attempts to alter tribal social codes. The foreign makeup of their leadership no doubt aggravated those problems, but was not a huge issue in itself.
However, the Al-Baghdadi case inspired me to have my own personal 5GW “dream.” I consider this scenario more high-level 4GW than 5GW, but elements of it could be applied to 5GW.
I use a mixed model that combines today’s networked terror groups and some of the future terrorist organizations that I outline in my Athena Intelligence paper. This scenario isn’t meant to illustrate a larger point—it’s intended as a thought exercise about memes, brands, and information warfare.
SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION PART I
It is 2015. An Al-Qaeda splinter group wages violent war against “infidels” and “takfir” Muslims. This terrorist organization is a small, secretive group that relies primarily on attention-grabbing strikes. A small inner core gives ideological and strategic guidance to various operational affiliates. These affiliates carry out the group’s operations, which are selective and extremely destructive in nature.
On the outside is a decentralized mass of lone-wolf cells and copycats. Although they derive ideological inspiration from the group, they have no real connection. The quality of their attacks is scattershot, but they fan fear in the mass media. The lone wolves and copycats also create enough “noise” to mask the activities of the real terrorist organization. Intelligence organizations, lacking reliable human intelligence within the tight-knit inner circle and operational affiliates, frequently conflate the activities of the lone wolves and copycats with the organization’s legitimate operations. Adding to the confusion are the activities of NGOs that sympathize with some of the organization’s broader political aims.
At the top of the pyramid is the organization’s leader, Abu Asad. Little is known about Asad. His name is an obvious pseudonym, he has never been seen in public, and details about his origins are scarce. Rumors, however, are plentiful. Some say he is a grizzled veteran of the Chechen war. Others claim he is a wealthy European convert formerly active in the anti-globalization movement. Most of these rumors are genuine speculation. But a significant portion is misinformation disseminated by the organization through proxies. Asad himself says only that he is a veteran of previous struggles against the “Zionists and Crusaders.” He interacts with the outside world through videos and webcasts released through the organization’s media arm.
One day, the United States announces it has killed Abu Asad in an airstrike on a terrorist safehouse. A careful analysis of the dead man’s background from both open and classified sources seems to support this conclusion. However, a day later the organization releases a video featuring Abu Asad—alive and well! This pattern is repeated until American credibility is completely degraded.
SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION PART II
It is 2010. Mahmoud, Salim, and Jawad have returned from Iraq. They witnessed firsthand the destruction of the ISI, and though disheartened, are in the midst of building their own organization from the contacts they made since they entered Al Qaeda in 2004. However, they realize that none of them have any charisma or motivating qualities. Mahmoud suggests their friend Mokhtar, an unemployed grad student with a gift for oratory.
The problem is that Mokhtar has no military experience or leadership qualities. Fortunately for the organization, Mokhtar is naïve and easily manipulated. Mahmoud, Salim, and Jawad give Mokhtar a role as figurehead, while they make all of the strategic decisions. To enhance Mokhtar’s mystique (and prevent him from being co-opted by other factions within the organization) they isolate him. They are the only ones who see him in person.
At first, Mokhtar is happy with his role. He is misled into believing he is the leader of the group, and that his isolation is for his own protection. Eventually Mokhtar begins to realize who really holds the power. He attempts to leave his safehouse and is killed. Mahmoud, Salim, and Jawad solve the problem with actors and advanced voice manipulation software. Since they are the only ones aware of the deception, they run into little trouble.
SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION PART III
However, the organization’s fortunes soon wane. Syrian military intelligence, wishing to use the organization as a pawn in its own designs, manages to “turn” Jawad. Acting at the behest of his new masters, Jawad embroils the organization in a futile series of actions that lead to internal disputes and strategic failure. The organization disintegrates into a variety of decentralized cells and goes quiet.
The counter-terrorist community breathes a sigh of relief. However, they are extremely disappointed that they never managed to discern Abu Asad’s true identity. High-level defectors from within the organization tell them about the Mokhtar deception. Counter-terrorism analysts, burned by their previous mistakes, do not believe such a wild story.
Five years later, the World Bank building in Washington, D.C. is bombed. Many are killed. Abu Asad takes to the web to claim credit for the attack. This puzzles FBI analysts, as the organization has never carried out an attack on American soil. In the coming year, many IED/sniper attacks are launched on various targets in the Mideast and Southeast Asia, all sanctioned by Abu Asad.
Each operation has a different modus operandi, “Abu Asad’s” messages are contradictory, and the terrorist groups behind the attacks have little relation to each other. Meanwhile, the culprit behind the World Bank bombing is revealed to be a disgruntled insider within the building’s security team.
Eventually, an CIA analyst puts the pieces together. The original organization’s use of Abu Asad was so successful that he has become a popular legend. As his true identity has never been conclusively discerned, virtually anyone can assume his identity. If they are caught, they are written off as a copycat, rather than the “real” Asad. Thus, even after his “real” death, Asad continues to function as an emergent figure that motivates terrorism.
Ironically, the World Bank bomber’s use of the Asad identity to throw investigators off his own trail was the trigger for the renewed round of terrorism. The analyst is ridiculed when he presents this theory to his superiors.
Abu Asad’s identity continues to be employed by various organizations. Eventually, one particularly effective terrorist organization using Abu Asad’s persona is touted by analysts as the “real” Abu Asad. The news media fill with stories about how the fearsome master terrorist Abu Asad has returned from a long absence to terrorize the world. And the cycle repeats again.
It is 2015. An Al-Qaeda splinter group wages violent war against “infidels” and “takfir” Muslims. This terrorist organization is a small, secretive group that relies primarily on attention-grabbing strikes. A small inner core gives ideological and strategic guidance to various operational affiliates. These affiliates carry out the group’s operations, which are selective and extremely destructive in nature.
On the outside is a decentralized mass of lone-wolf cells and copycats. Although they derive ideological inspiration from the group, they have no real connection. The quality of their attacks is scattershot, but they fan fear in the mass media. The lone wolves and copycats also create enough “noise” to mask the activities of the real terrorist organization. Intelligence organizations, lacking reliable human intelligence within the tight-knit inner circle and operational affiliates, frequently conflate the activities of the lone wolves and copycats with the organization’s legitimate operations. Adding to the confusion are the activities of NGOs that sympathize with some of the organization’s broader political aims.
At the top of the pyramid is the organization’s leader, Abu Asad. Little is known about Asad. His name is an obvious pseudonym, he has never been seen in public, and details about his origins are scarce. Rumors, however, are plentiful. Some say he is a grizzled veteran of the Chechen war. Others claim he is a wealthy European convert formerly active in the anti-globalization movement. Most of these rumors are genuine speculation. But a significant portion is misinformation disseminated by the organization through proxies. Asad himself says only that he is a veteran of previous struggles against the “Zionists and Crusaders.” He interacts with the outside world through videos and webcasts released through the organization’s media arm.
One day, the United States announces it has killed Abu Asad in an airstrike on a terrorist safehouse. A careful analysis of the dead man’s background from both open and classified sources seems to support this conclusion. However, a day later the organization releases a video featuring Abu Asad—alive and well! This pattern is repeated until American credibility is completely degraded.
SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION PART II
It is 2010. Mahmoud, Salim, and Jawad have returned from Iraq. They witnessed firsthand the destruction of the ISI, and though disheartened, are in the midst of building their own organization from the contacts they made since they entered Al Qaeda in 2004. However, they realize that none of them have any charisma or motivating qualities. Mahmoud suggests their friend Mokhtar, an unemployed grad student with a gift for oratory.
The problem is that Mokhtar has no military experience or leadership qualities. Fortunately for the organization, Mokhtar is naïve and easily manipulated. Mahmoud, Salim, and Jawad give Mokhtar a role as figurehead, while they make all of the strategic decisions. To enhance Mokhtar’s mystique (and prevent him from being co-opted by other factions within the organization) they isolate him. They are the only ones who see him in person.
At first, Mokhtar is happy with his role. He is misled into believing he is the leader of the group, and that his isolation is for his own protection. Eventually Mokhtar begins to realize who really holds the power. He attempts to leave his safehouse and is killed. Mahmoud, Salim, and Jawad solve the problem with actors and advanced voice manipulation software. Since they are the only ones aware of the deception, they run into little trouble.
SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION PART III
However, the organization’s fortunes soon wane. Syrian military intelligence, wishing to use the organization as a pawn in its own designs, manages to “turn” Jawad. Acting at the behest of his new masters, Jawad embroils the organization in a futile series of actions that lead to internal disputes and strategic failure. The organization disintegrates into a variety of decentralized cells and goes quiet.
The counter-terrorist community breathes a sigh of relief. However, they are extremely disappointed that they never managed to discern Abu Asad’s true identity. High-level defectors from within the organization tell them about the Mokhtar deception. Counter-terrorism analysts, burned by their previous mistakes, do not believe such a wild story.
Five years later, the World Bank building in Washington, D.C. is bombed. Many are killed. Abu Asad takes to the web to claim credit for the attack. This puzzles FBI analysts, as the organization has never carried out an attack on American soil. In the coming year, many IED/sniper attacks are launched on various targets in the Mideast and Southeast Asia, all sanctioned by Abu Asad.
Each operation has a different modus operandi, “Abu Asad’s” messages are contradictory, and the terrorist groups behind the attacks have little relation to each other. Meanwhile, the culprit behind the World Bank bombing is revealed to be a disgruntled insider within the building’s security team.
Eventually, an CIA analyst puts the pieces together. The original organization’s use of Abu Asad was so successful that he has become a popular legend. As his true identity has never been conclusively discerned, virtually anyone can assume his identity. If they are caught, they are written off as a copycat, rather than the “real” Asad. Thus, even after his “real” death, Asad continues to function as an emergent figure that motivates terrorism.
Ironically, the World Bank bomber’s use of the Asad identity to throw investigators off his own trail was the trigger for the renewed round of terrorism. The analyst is ridiculed when he presents this theory to his superiors.
Abu Asad’s identity continues to be employed by various organizations. Eventually, one particularly effective terrorist organization using Abu Asad’s persona is touted by analysts as the “real” Abu Asad. The news media fill with stories about how the fearsome master terrorist Abu Asad has returned from a long absence to terrorize the world. And the cycle repeats again.
Posted by Adam Elkus on Dec 24, 2007 04:48 PM
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7 Comments
Keyser Soze rises again.
Good example of how the 4GW terrorist opponents we see now can and may very easily and quickly adapt themselves to a 5GW or 5GW flavored doctrine. In between the lines I read the potential for an iterative 5GW and a style of 5GW that I think of as stimulus/response 5GW (though lately have been considering calling it automaticity 5GW). In essence, working through Observation by creating the perception of a certain type of situation the 5GW organization triggers a respose from its target that is predictable and serves the purpose of the 5GW organization.
Nice.
Thanks, Arherring!
Speaking of Keyser Soze, maybe someone should write a post about “The Usual Suspects” and 5GW.
Actually, Keyser Soze has already made a couple of appearances:
http://cominganarchy.com/2006/03/10/truly-formless-5gw/
and
http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/welcome_to_the_world_of_5gw.php
He does have a very 5GWish aura about him.
I hadn’t heard of Keyser Soze until this post, but after reading the wikipedia entry about him wonder if the archetype for Soze is Edmond Dantes, aka the Count of Monte Christo.
I like the use of a scenario here - it’s a compelling way of developing some ideas.
Strategist,
Count of Monte Cristo is one of my favorite 19th century novels, so thanks for the reference!
I do see a lot of 5GW parallels in that novel as well.
I was thinking the same thing. Dantes wages an undeclared war against his enemies, who don’t realize that they are being targeted, let alone by a man they thought of as long dead. Rather than taking revenge directly (eg, through a duel or a lawsuit), Dantes engineers the downfall of his enemies through their own actions.
That was always the most remarkable part of the novel for me. Although Dantes manipulates from behind the scenes, his enemies’ misfortune is the product of their own shortsighted decisions, greed, and cruelty.