SEI:4GW::Nukes:3GW?

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Issue: “Technology does not drive doctrine!” (Arherring, Laying the Foundations Part 3)

Summarizing the issue:

In general, some contributors to D5GW have made the point, often enough, to distinguish between particular technological achievements within societies and the style of warfare used by those societies within an xGW framework. I.e., the tools of warfare do not define the style of warfare, since quite obviously (e.g.) an automatic rifle can be used in 2GW, 3GW, and 4GW; etc.

The doctrine that “Technology does not drive doctrine!” has most often been used when arguing against the theories of those who would draw 5GW on the basis of the new technologies that are appearing and gaining prominence in the world. Drone aircraft may be used by a 2GW force, a 3GW force — or an open-source 4GW force should it acquire that technology. Quite regardless of the technology used, the style of 2GW, of 3GW, and of 4GW will be the same, since these types of combat are defined by how they: target the enemy’s OODA in different ways; seek different methods of overcoming that enemy; and indeed, within the xGW framework, are often utilized to combat a foe who depends upon a different generational style of combat for his own victory. (Cross-generational conflict.) Technological distinctions may in fact give a specific generational style of combat a slightly different appearance — one force used arrows, a newer variant uses bullets — but such distinctions do not define the strategic and tactical goals so much as color the style of warfare used by all within that xGW with a different tint; the xGW remains the same.

My take:

I am of a slightly different frame of mind. While I understand the arguments above, I also believe that certain technological advancements may make one style of fighting more or less attractive. E.g., in my exploration of the OODA and xGW already linked above, I speculated at length on the way that technological achievements in our modern era have gradually increased our observational range and thus have led from 1GW to 2GW, from 2GW to 3GW, and ultimately to greater prominence for 4GW and 5GW styles of fighting. Al-Qaeda, for instance, or any number of 4GW foes, can see first-hand and immediately how our populace and government will react to certain events, thanks to our media and the Internet. They are better able to target those CoG’s — at a greater distance than ever before. So while efforts to demoralize the enemy have always been used in warfare, the taunting that now occurs gains a boost from communication technologies that never before existed and need not be conducted within arrow range.

Incidentally, in the linked post I discussed examples of weaponry technology that could act at greater distances and with more precision and/or with a wider area of effect, as a boost to operational observational range. One need not observe in exact detail the bulls-eye when one uses a shotgun — or if the missile is guided by GPS. Similarly, the ability to spread a meme may not require knowing the name, birthplace, astrological sign, gender, religion of an individual living in Seattle!

Issue: “The Lost Generation of Warfare” (John Robb)

Summarizing the issue:

Mark Safranski also linked the John Robb post in a ZenPundit entry titled, Downgrading “The Unthinkable” to “Thinkable”. In a nutshell, nuclear warfare, which was once unthinkable and formed the basis of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, may have been a neat partition between 3GW and 4GW, since the advent of nuclear technology made large scale conflict between states much less attractive.

Admittedly, John Robb implied a missing xGW by calling nuclear warfare “the lost generation” in that post; and, Mark Safranski wondered if smaller, “‘micro-atomic’ and specialized nuclear arms” with proliferation to non-state actors might well play a role in future warfare, requiring expansion of the xGW taxonomy to include the possibilities. The thou shalt not define xGW according to technology arguments arose: even if nukes were used by non-state actors, such use could fit within a 4GW style of fighting — or perhaps within a 3GW style of fighting if individuals acted as blitzkrieg infantry to deliver those smaller, focused nuclear attacks.

My take:

I took a different approach, finding that indeed the advent of nuclear weaponry had a profound effect on the transition from a 2GW/3GW frame of mind to a 4GW frame of mind. (Second half of Toward a Better Understanding of 4GW here on D5GW.) Not only did MAD inspire nation states to conduct proxy warfare when fighting each other, as with the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but also the destructiveness of the attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima had a profound effect on the consciousness of the West:

Given the awesome weight of the nuclear specter in America throughout the 50’s, 60’s, 70’s, and 80’s, a corresponding 4GWish manner of thinking about conflict may have set in. Direct confrontation between great powers became terrifying; but the use of proxies and memes for doing battle — i.e., indirect conflict, plus a dispersal of smaller operative “forces” — could bypass such massive direct confrontation. We know what the Cold War was like, of course; and…we know that an establishment of the meme “The Evil Empire” aided Ronald Reagan’s strategy for winning the Cold War. Evil Empire was more than a concept; it was a moral statement.

Importantly, a continued use of nuclear weapons did not have this effect; rather, the effective force was the idea of nuclear warfare. One might say that nuclear weapons have been “used” as a deterrent, however, although I think that even then we must admit that the operational force was more psychological, or occurred more in the mind, than on the battlefield. In any case, we might wonder, as I have, if the presumed weakness of 4GW forces which leads them to conduct 4GW operations against technologically and economically superior forces is more than analogous with the presumed weakness those superior forces may perceive in themselves when they are confronted by equally powerful nuclear-wielding states. I.e., does the proxy warfare approach utilized by the Cold War enemies (as well as the ideological, meme-driven media efforts) have this in common with the 4GW forces now operating in the world: the acknowledgment that direct and kinetically focused conflict costs more than it is worth?

To return to the question posed in the title of this post: I use “Nukes” rather than “Nuclear Warfare” because, for me, the term connotes the operative psychological consideration of the existence and theoretical use of nuclear weapons.

Issue: Superempowered Individuals, One Way or Another

Summarizing the Issue:

The preeminent conceptualization of “superempowered individuals” involves not only the acquisition of extremely destructive technology by individuals but also the acquisition of what might be called connectivity. An example might be the villain in 12 Monkeys, who had access to lab equipment and biological material suitable for the construction of a killer virus as well as the means to travel quickly, globally, to spread it. Similarly, access to nuclear material might enable individuals to create and deploy nuclear weapons. John Robb, of Global Guerrillas fame, has suggested that such superempowerment of individuals will be a key feature of the 5GW world: “A prevailing theme of global guerrilla theory is that personal superempowerment will change the face of warfare.”

My take:

As linked in the last heading, the concept of “superempowerment” can be understood in various ways. However, I have to admit the prevailing conceptualization exists and that I also think that the dangers of super-empowered destroyers of order (via high-tech weaponry) is a real threat. While I am not altogether certain that the possibility is anything new, since certain individuals within the modern atomic era have had access to destructive technology and the means to utilize it outside the state system if they wished, already, I agree that globalization and the continual modernization of the world increases the odds for destructive superempowerment.

I have previously placed such superempowered actions “in the realm of ‘severe accident’ or psychopathology rather than a model of warfare,” because quite honestly the type of destruction caused by a new virus, for instance, would be extremely difficult to target effectively. How do you limit its scope? Similarly, the complexity of globalization — even “black globalization” — would mean that individual actions of a highly destructive nature, like nuclear attacks, would have down-stream fallout the superempowered individual could not predict, possibly putting his own objectives in jeopardy. (Pun intended.) This is not to say such activity would not happen, nor that no specialized use of nuclear weaponry or biological or chemical warfare could not be used in a 4GW effort, however, or even a 5GW effort.

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With these thoughts in mind, I asked myself, “SEI:4GW::Nukes:3GW?”

I was reminded of an excellent early consideration of 5GW written by Bryce Lane titled “On ‘Fifth Generation’ Warfare?” which I once included on the severely un-finished 5GW Timeline I began months ago. (Original pdf at Defense and the National Interest, and summarized on the 5GW Timeline.) Specifically, I remembered this intriguing line from the article:

The drive for narcissistic individuals, isolated ideologies and pathological groups to see themselves and their identities writ large across the fabric of humanity and history itself is taking up where many cultures have left off.

And:

A classic insurgent, guerrilla or fourth generation enemy has a material-political-social goal in mind. The new problems may be initiated by people who are little more than stalkers, fire starters, narcissists and misfits who wish to see themselves writ larger than life across the psycho-social landscape of the earth and now have been shown that they certainly have the means available of doing so.

The observation is meant to explain how/why some individuals who become superempowered might decide to act upon the world in highly destructive ways even though the down-stream effects of those actions may not be discernible to the actor.

Regardless of how we characterize the destructive tendencies and activities of the super-empowered individual — and I am nearly certain that John Robb would vehemently reject the idea that Lane’s characterization would apply to all destructive SEI’s — still, we must begin to wonder if some psychopathic SEI’s will successfully cause carnage far beyond what America experienced on 9/11. We might consider how so-called “global guerrillas” would purposely cause such carnage. And we must consider what these destructive activities — or even, the mere thought of them — will do to the collective psyche.

One might easily make the argument that the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima was the epitome of 3GW, or even the epitome of 2GW+3GW. The attack was an end-run around the 2GW and 3GW that had occurred and might still occur in WWII. Subsequently, proxy and memetic warfare and MAD would characterize the Cold War, and we were moving into the era of 4GW. (Not that 2GW and 3GW had entirely left the world, however.) With the advent of nuclear weaponry, the ultimate in state power, a new form of fighting had to be developed.

With the threat of what John Robb called “catastrophic superempowerment”, will a new form of fighting need to be developed which will preempt it or circumvent it?

Bryce Lane contemplated some measures that could be taken to preempt catastrophic superempowerment, including: 1) improved civic skills for managing the general chaos, 2) greater networking within a society which would put eyes everywhere — that of individuals — to spot potential problem SEI’s, and 3) streamlined infrastructure and internal systems to “remove opportunities” for SEI’s to cause problems.

John Robb’s new book will reportedly explore “resilient communities” that could withstand the effects of destructive SEI’s.

Thomas P.M. Barnett wants to “shrink the gap” in order to prevent increased dangers to the globalizing world: an effort which has been characterized as a potential 5GW effort. Indeed, equalizing opportunities for success globally, for individuals, might help to preempt the rise of those “misfits” Lane predicts.

In short, the rise of SEI’s might signal the eventual end of the 4GW era in the way that the advent of nuclear weapons would bring about the end of 3GW between powerful (nuke-enabled) states. In order to defend against the threat of SEI’s, something more than 4GW will need to be employed, because we will need to target the whole environment which would give rise to destructive SEI’s.