Triangulating Clausewitz and Boyd

Recent discussions re: “GMW vs xGW” [1] [2] [3] suggest that William Lind’s Generations of Modern Warfare model is insufficient and that the newer model xGW proves more useful for understanding warfare in our present era — as well as in previous eras.

In point of fact, Lind’s model has often caused dispute, particularly on the fourth tier, that is with regard to the prognostication of 4GW. Useful or not, the first three generations are descriptive of what has already occurred in our modern era and so are “pre-verified”. The fourth generation is a guess of what is to come, which has been partly verified by current conflicts but was left open enough to suggest all future conflicts.

The fact that Lind’s GMW leaves “fourth generation warfare” open to becoming whatever happens in the future — the definition is vague and fluid enough — severely limits the usefulness of GMW. What are we to learn from GMW that will benefit us, whether as a state or as individuals engaged in conflict? By leaving no room for the development of a “fifth generation of warfare” that could defeat a “fourth generation warfare”, we are left no recourse in GMW except the ability to describe: Having described 1GW through 3GW, we come to “4GW” which we can use to tag all future events. What we are to do about those events doesn’t matter and is conspicuously absent from the GMW model.

xGW, on the other hand, would seek to suggest a framework which would allow problem-solving. If we eject the word “generation” from the model and instead use something else, such as “grade” [2], and by so doing eject the most common connotations of “generation”, we can perhaps begin to postulate not merely the styles of conflict as they emerge exterior to us, one after another, but also the relationship of these styles to one another in a useful manner: i.e., we may postulate an interior activity, or a reflective and prospective activity which becomes problem-solving. One force sees its opponent’s activity, assesses itself, and seeks to develop a better method of fighting. For me, this is at heart the greatest strength of xGW.

This is why I have some difficulties accepting the most recent trend exemplified in the discussion under Arherring’s latest post on Dreaming 5GW, “XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines.” The post has received a lot of activity since it was added to the blog, quite a few visits. While I recognize the usefulness of having simple descriptions of 0GW-5GW (what I imagine to be its biggest draw), I would avoid encapsulating xGW as a merely descriptive model. A note: while the simple descriptions, though they could be improved, may be a necessary early step toward understanding and using xGW, the discussion there and even now elsewhere —

The advantage to Boyd’s categories is the ahistorical aspect — there is no chain of causality. As mentioned by Dan above, this is one of the biggest criticisms of xGW. I maintain that xGW should abandon the timeline altogether.

(Younghusband, Coming Anarchy)

— which seeks to eliminate issues of causality by eliminating sequencing and temporal relationships would reduce xGW to a merely descriptive taxonomy. Looking back at a battle, whether 50 years back or 2000, we could call it 1st Grade Warfare or 4th Grade Warfare. We might see a 2GW force defeating a 4GW force, a 4GW force defeating a 1GW force, a 3GW force defeating a 5GW force, and feel secure that we were able to categorize these forces within potential categories; but be left in the present believing that quite possibly a 2GW force structure would be just fine for defeating whatever 4GW foes we face. And why not? If xGW is merely to be a system of categorization — of label-making — we would be freed to fight however we want without bothering to think much about xGW. xGW would not be terribly useful for guiding our decisions: a system of labels rather than a system for strategizing.

On the other hand, any system of strategizing must necessarily begin with a workable cognitive framework, which a system of description could provide.

Younghusband in the Coming Anarchy post suggested a return to John Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict:

Categories of Conflict

Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we can imagine three kinds of human conflict:

• Attrition Warfare — as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
• Maneuver Conflict — as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals…and the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur.
• Moral Conflict — as practiced by the Mongols, most Guerrilla Leaders, a very few Counter-Guerrillas…and certain others from Sun Tzu to the present.

These descriptions, I note, are not entirely different from Arherring’s descriptive taxonomy; he even uses some of the same practitioners in his descriptions of 0GW-5GW. But what will distinguish the 3-pronged descriptive strategy of Boyd from the 6-pronged descriptive strategy Arherring used? (Note also that Arherring, by use of the numerals 0 - 5, suggests a progression, whether temporally linear or a linear progression of grades.)

In order for xGW to have any use whatsoever greater than the use of the GMW system, we must come to understand how xGW would move beyond the merely descriptive strategy to a proactive decision-making strategy. Merely enabling description of warfare pre-Peace of Westphalia will not do us any good. Furthermore, I would posit: we are not now needing to fight those medieval and ancient wars which have long been decided. I.e., our modern era concerns us far more; or, present conflicts. While understanding why certain strategies have succeeded or failed in the far past might be of some use, I do not know that we can use uniformitarianism to suppose that our present activities will succeed or fail for the same reasons. Only a belief in warfare entirely separated from other socio-economic political systems would support the theory that identical “types” or “grades” or “generations” of warfare, past and present, will have the same utility regardless of when they occurred or may occur.

I wonder, then, whether we should extend the xGW framework from the merely generic/descriptive taxonomy that would place all warfare within 6 grades, by supposing how the general types of conflict may operate differently in different environments — and we might look to Clausewitz for a guide. Recent discussions have reminded me of an older discussion on Dreaming 5GW initiated by D5GW contributor Deichmans: “5GW in Clausewitz’s Trinity”:

I’d like to add another element to the foundation: the Clausewitzian “Trinity” (developed in Book II of Karl von Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War). Clausewitz, in developing his famous assertion that “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” describes three core elements of any campaign:

• Rationality (of the state)
• Probability (in military command)
• Rage (of the population)

How do rationality, probability, and rage — of the state, in military command, of the population — triangulate with attrition, maneuver, and moral warfare? In very general terms, Clausewitz’s Trinity gives a framework for the environment in which Boyd’s Categories of Conflict must operate. In similarly broad terms, I would suggest that moral warfare, for instance, might have very different outcomes if it is directed to target the rationality of the state, the probability/chance faced by the military command, and the rage of the population. Similarly, attritive strategies may have more or less effect depending on the specific target. Finally, changes within the geopolitical and social structures, not to mention technological changes, might influence the environment sufficiently to make some targets more feasible than others, and thus some strategies of conflict more or less efficient.

For xGW to be useful, we need to understand how these various factors interrelate, and then we need to see the correlation of these factors within our present day.




[1] “5GW as the Event Horizon”, tdaxp

[2] “The Terminology of xGW”, tdaxp

[3] “XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines”, Dreaming 5GW