On Information

Shane,

Could you better explain this:

But as the scale increases (since warfare is not scale invariant), the trade off between “relevance” and “intelligibility” becomes akin to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle: as one becomes more precise, the other becomes dangerously less so.

E.g., do you mean to say it goes both ways or only one way? Precise relevance & imprecise intelligibility / irrelevance & precise intelligibility?

I think I’ll have more to say when I’ve had some rest and my mind isn’t as clouded. At the moment, it strikes me as interesting that your consideration of the “intermediate layer” might lead to two possible fixes ultimately, if I’m understanding you correctly:

1. Eliminate — or at least reduce the role of — the top-level commander

    
   This actually occurs in 4GW, at least on the reduction side. In 5GW, pervasive co-option would take it another step.

2. Eliminate the intermediate step.
    
   We do not currently have this capability and probably won’t for some time; but I’m having visions of Ender commanding his armada…I suppose nanotechnology, robotics and neural implants to command them as well as expand one human’s ability to handle vast amounts of data could make it possible. But this #2 is pretty much sci fi at the moment.

CGW,

Interesting comments - I’m looking forward to your additional remarks, particularly regarding the operational level of war.

Re: Heisenberg, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (a cornerstone of Quantum Mechanics) says that the position and momentum of a particle can not be simultaneously and precisely known. The logic is that these two properties require different detection methods (high-frequency for position, low-frequency for momentum) and that measuring one precisely will perturb the other value. So there is always an inherent uncertainty.

Battlespace visualization on a theater (“operational level”) scale elicits a similar pairing — particularly in ground combat, where the number of individual units is far greater than air or sea combat. If the commander tries to perceive the position of each individual soldier, the result is an incomprehensible mass of data. Similarly, if the commander aggregates his view so that MIL STD 2525 symbols are used to represent larger amalgamations of force (e.g., company or battalion-sized units), the data is tactically irrelevant.

So the corollary to Heisenberg is, rather than position and momentum, the commander’s uncertainty is driven by the opposing concepts of precision (relevance) and comprehensibility (simplicity).

Am I reading a hint of something like “an actor that can successively reduce the need for an operational level of any substance/significance in the now fifth information age should have should have an absolute advantage over it opponents?”

PurpleSlog,

I think the positive action is not “successively reducing the need for” as much as it is “recognize the modern nature of” the operational level.

This would then lead to a broader conclusion of organizational effectiveness: don’t invest too much time in “process” and organize yourself and your assets for responsiveness and adapability to emerging opportunities.

Shane,

Sorry for the delay. This topic could quite obviously provide the material for many long posts, since these are serious questions yet to be resolved in either abstract ways or pragmatic ways.

On the pragmatic side: The inertia in current force structures and methods for doing warfare is considerable. Most of any “solutions” I can conceive would be daunting tasks; and I suppose that much pragmatic and useful improvements will need to occur organically. Which means: we’re talking an extended time frame. This is true especially of the U.S., where much government action is reactive rather than pro-active — or in which any pro-active attempts must always first be reconciled with the past. (Even certain leaps forward eventually get dragged down into intranational political and ideological combat.)

On the pragmatic side: Also, major and quick changes could have the effect of crippling capabilities we already have. There are major learning curves on all levels, not always in synch. So changes need to be well-thought and careful, as well as incremental for the most part. Therefore, even if we decide to move forward in reconciling our force structures with the new informational realities, and have a clear vision of what the future requires, we will need to realize that: until the future is realized, many intermediate configurations will be imperfect yet themselves need to be useful enough and good enough to prevent crippling effects and disastrous results!

On the abstract side: And also from a 5GW perspective, or let’s say my own particular 5GW perspective: This consideration of our military forces seems to miss the point that a multi-faceted cross-domain and expansive 5GW effort will require many more elements than even our brigades and the high-level and lower-level military personnel. That is, from a 5GW perspective, even the top brass commanders in the military may be members of the “intermediate layer” you isolated in your post. So here I’ve now expanded the horizon, by extending the “chain of information” to reconfigure the military commanders as part of the new intermediate layer — which I think will further highlight the importance of your Heisenberg metaphor applied to the domain of warfare. (BTW, I understand the H. principle, I was just wondering about your application of it here.)

On the abstract side: To the degree that co-option is used, and must be used, the operational level will require a kind of modularity-in-synch. Meaning, I suppose, it will need to be “multi-faceted” in the more literal sense, by which I mean there will be many flat surfaces, or fields of battle, which may vary quite a bit yet all appear on the same 5GW gem (system.)

On the abstract side: What keeps the various facets from descending into chaos or simply operating at cross-purposes? Those soft links you mentioned. So we need to consider what those soft links will be, or who they will be, and how they will relate to the rest of the individuals involved in the effort. In very general terms, I think they will be types of liaisons with expertise in more than one field who are able to work in more than one field and, indeed, will serve to aid more than one field (or facet, i.e., will go-between to aid those working localized and particular operations.) In line with the subject of your post: I don’t think these go-betweens will dictate operations but will serve to aid and influence operations, but in so doing their assistance and aid will help to keep the operations forward moving, since for the most part the hands on the ground will be directing daily operations with much freedom to decide what is needed.

Anywho. I am brainstorming a bit to give you an idea of how my mind is working on this, without becoming too specific! I am reminded of previous brainstorming on the whole Sysadmin-U idea, including M. Safranski’s idea, previously glossed, of

“Building new, highly decentralized, ‘Wikinomic’ mass-collaborative platforms from scratch.”

Incidentally, my general idea for 5GW, or the 5GW I prefer, does not circle the idea of “puppet-master” or espionage or conspiracy-theory, or secretive and sinister manipulation — I’m saying this now upfront although it’s been on my mind for a long time — but rather is more on the “kinder, gentler 5GW” side. So I see these soft-link “go-betweens” as being benevolent in operation: non-threatening but highly useful people to have around, whose purpose of offering aid and facilitation will be welcomed, and who never step over bounds by trying to control or dominate what is happening on the ground. But I suppose there you go with another abstraction from me!

LOL, an aside:

Go-Betweens — GOBs

General Operations Battalion

And when a commander, a platoon leader, or a soldier is asked, “What do you need to get the job done?” he answers: “I need GOBs!”

LOL. Sorry, brain fart.

CGW,

Excellent comments — each one could be a ‘blog post of its own.

The more I dig into this, the two parameters that xGW can effectively describe are “ways” (mass, firepower, maneuver, animosity, subterfuge) and “means” (uniformed mil, hardware, transport, culture, perception).

But is simply “describing” a system sufficient? Lind et al. described conflict — OUTSIDE of the uniformed military — that could have dire consequences for established political order. Because of this dramatic departure from the status quo, 4GW stands in stark contrast to its predecessors.

Can we find such a discriminator for 5GW? I don’t think we can.

But is simply “describing” a system sufficient?

That’s an interesting question.

I’m assuming you mean whether we can describe a type of system which describes all 5GW in the way Lind described a world heavily influenced by and influencing 4GW?

I do think we are presently moving into a system, a la globalization in its many guises, which is pressuring the move to 5GW — by some. I also think that many will never transition to a 5GW mindset/operations, so 4GW and for a time at least 3GW and 2GW will still be used.

While writing the above, I remembered an old article in Infantry Magazine written by Benjamin C. Freakley, called “Information warfare: the next dimension.(armed forces’ information management)” (September 1, 2004) in which he contemplated some of the same things:

“We must also recognize and mitigate the unintended second and third-order effects of all our kinetic and non-kinetic actions directed against the enemies of democracy inside and outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Two examples of how we can achieve this are providing commanders with nonlethal technologies and more precision munition options to minimize collateral personnel or material damage. These efforts give commanders on the ground options to shape public opinion derived by some of our necessary kinetic actions. Specifically, we must avoid information fratricide by working with our sister services, allies, and other agencies to provide the commanders both material and nonmaterial solutions to our information management dilemmas. At a minimum, we must identify the informational fratricide risks in our actions and mitigate their adverse impacts. In addition to synchronizing our internal PSYOPS, PAO, and Intelligence efforts in our own formations, we must coordinate and synchronize the efforts of everyone in our AO. This includes our sister services, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, international agencies, and host nation forces. Unity of command and unity of effort within each commander’s battlespace is the objective.”

—The idea of “information fratricide” seems very important and apropos of the post above. Additionally, the call to coordinate with everyone working within an area of operations, including “sister services, governmental and nongovernmental agencies, international agencies, and host nation forces”, points toward the same thing I was tentatively describing in my comments.

It’s an interesting article but no longer seems to be available in free format on the Web — “Highbeam Research” on the net, where I first found it in whole, now appears to be a rolling-fee type of scam btw, and doesn’t even offer a list of fee structures online — but Amazon sells a copy.