Blog Tank: National Strategy for a Few Nuclear Weapons - 5GW

1) The Outpost of Tyranny #7:  Basically, a country with an authoritarian regime that wants to make waves with the big players, yet doesn’t want to be paid a visit by the Leviathan and will use these weapons to prevent that possibility.

2) The Independence movement:  A country or organization that desires to set itself apart and / or establish its own country or government independent from the government that currently rules it. They want to change the map and they want to ensure that the change is permanent.

3) The Prince among the Paupers:  Several countries around the world are making a concerted effort to increase their connectivity and enter the ranks of the Core while their neighbors remain firmly and resolutely in the Gap. and unfortunately those neighbors only seem to export unrest and deter foreign investment. Worse they quite often become the fourth type of player.

4) The Covetous Neighbor:  These are countries, mired in third-world status, that see more prosperous and resource rich neighbors around them. Should they acquire the means, how could they acquire those resources, and how would they prevent the world for stopping them?

Looking at the problem through the problem-solving lens of XGW  a few considerations become rapidly apparent for all of these players. The opposition to the possession of these weapons will likely respond with a 2GW, 3GW or 4GW (especially in the case of player #3) doctrine. Therefore a 4GW or 5GW doctrine is required. Also, as General Sir Rupert Smith would argue, the force needs to be placed in a political context or it will have no Utility. Therefore, I propose a 4GW doctrine for the operational use of these weapons within a political context shaped by a strategy using a 5GW doctrine.

The 4GW Operation:

As noted before, the greatest strength of these weapons is their size and portability. Assuming that the devices could be modified for transportation and detonation they could be possibly smuggled virtually anywhere in the world. This capability means that the weapons could very well be pre-positioned as nuclear blackmail. To add to the confusion of where the weapons are positioned and to maintain the ongoing threat I envision a nuclear shell game, where dummy weapons (maybe enhanced with slightly radioactive medical waste) are emplaced alongside the real weapons in various points around a target with dummy weapons ‘allowed’ to be discovered from time to time, or whenever an object lesson is desired on the part of the player emplacing them. Each of the players that I have described could find targets that would serve their purposes in this way. As 4GW this is a strike against the will of the target, making them choose between their political goal in opposing the ‘player’ or sacrificing something potentially very valuable to them (like the center of their capital city, military base or main shipping port). The more weapons that are available, the greater the potential for deterrence.

The 5GW Strategy:

 Ironically, even though the 4GW Operation benefits from more weapons being available, the 5GW strategy only requires one (and with the proper preparation you might even be able to get away with none, but that’s an advanced class). Essentially, the objective is to prove the potential of multiple weapons by openly displaying the existence of at least one weapon. Should you possess only two, one should be test-detonated and the other should be openly displayed to an authority that can realiably vouch for its authenticity. This very controlled transparency is a 5GW affect on observation that triggers existing assumptions, rule-sets and responses both in countries that are targeted and in countries that are merely in the audience. At this point even if the target believes you are bluffing your target must at least honor the threat. When that happens the shell game your 4GW Operation is playing may as well be Three-Card Monte. The key to making that happen is for the player to act in every way as if the weapons actually exist, and that the player has the ability and the will to use them. This means having a dedicated logistical and security force to service and guard nothing, exercises to employ weapons you don’t have, foreign policy that embodies deterrence by weapons that don’t exist. The reason for this is that your enemies will search relentlessly for evidence of your bluff, yet each exercise, each discovered operation, each policy decision, each and every action taken as if your nuclear capability is a reality is a confirmation that your capability is a reality.