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Dan tdaxp
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July 7, 2008 1:53 PM.

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Recent discussions of Operational Check (such as at tdaxp and WSJ) have talked about many aspects of the hostage rescue, but now from the perspective of xGW theory. Was the rescue an example of tactical 5GW operations?

Consider the Operative Actions of 5GW:

5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape outcomes and effects.

5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance because the response is by the target’s own choice or follows a previously established pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW and the Boom on the timeline.

While Operational: Check was subsumed under the larger Plan Colombia, Check still seems to be a tactical 5GW operation. The rescuers could have easily been killed if the FARC’s observations were better. Indeed, the rescuers impersonated a a nonexistent NGO (h/t tdaxp), hidingg in the static of the rise and fall of pro-FARC NGOs.

Operation: Check did not rely on killing the FARC (so not 0GW).
Operation: Check did not rely on overwhemling FARC with men (so not 1GW).
Operation: Check did not rely on overwhemling FARC with fire (so not 2GW)
Operation: Check did not rely on breaking through fluid lines (so not 3GW)
Operation: Check did not rely on collapsing FARC’s will to resist (4GW).

Rather, Operation: Check relied on manipulating FARC’s observations.

It was a 5GW operation.

As Snowden wrote:

I think the defining characteristic of 5GW operations will be surprise declarations of victory, without any indications hostilities had commenced.

We - and for that matter, the FARC - did not know about Operation: Check until it was over.

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We - and for that matter, the FARC - did not know about Operation: Check until it was over.

—or, until FARC had crossed the Rubicon:

The SecretWarrior will not care if the effects of 5GW activity are apparent if the effects leave her adversaries on the other side of the rubicon. This would be a case of “knowing too late,” in that the sudden revelation that a SecretWar had been underway in no way mitigates whatever position in which the target now finds itself: The target would have a new set of circumstances requiring immediate attention which could not be ignored, and from which the target is unlikely to emerge unscathed. A successful 5GW will leave the target on a downward spiral into insignificance. The target’s knowing it has been a victim won’t save the target from the spiral.

Still, I’ve been hesitant to isolate simple small-scale actions and call them 5GW. I once coined the term “5GA” which, given some other new terminology, would be “fifth gradient action”. Fact is, there is much carry over between the gradients, and we can probably isolate 5GA’s that occurred throughout history, but that doesn’t mean other forces fought in a primarily 5GW mode. I.e., an action isn’t an entire war. So, is FARC irrevocably on the other side of the Rubicon (capital R), from which it can only see itself spiraling downward? Or is the rescue merely one setback?

Arherring Author Profile Page said:

From what I know of Operation Check (gleaned from the news and the Internet) it does seem to be 5GWish on a tactical level and ha the potential to be 5GW at higher levels. However, I think the best we can actually call it is proto-5GW. To my thinking this operation ceased to be 5GW when the Columbian military started publicizing it.

Consider this, Operation Check had the potential to be a ‘perfect crime’. Perhaps the prisoners could have been rescued in-transit to their new destination (after the real FARC members had been subdued onboard the helicopters) and attributed to a signal intercept, a seperate special operation, or even mechanical trouble that landed the helicopter carrying the hostages right in the lap of the sizable back-up force that was waiting in the area should anything have gone wrong with the transfer.
Were this to have happened the Columbian government would still have had their PR coup and would have retained atactical and operational 5GW ability through their now proven flase-flag NGO. Now the FARC will be on their guard against similar operations and may take steps to increase their internal security.

I’ve actually been keeping an eye on this conflict for about the last month or so as a possible study of a successful x-1 or x-2 scenario.

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