Read this article, via ubiwar, about Israeli strategist Shimon Naveh. Naveh is a fascinating individual. Patton-esque (if that wasn't a word it is now) in his free wheeling use of vulgarities and arrogance. That he bases his systems theory on Russian strategy and the writings of two French philosophers is an impressive example of outside the box thinking.
His concepts in practice (if the following quote from the article is any indication) look, in my humblest of opinions, to be (too quote M1 in some commentary here) "Turbo 3GW:"
But the spinning gears inside Naveh's head seem to be entertaining some rather 5GW-ish principles.
His concepts in practice (if the following quote from the article is any indication) look, in my humblest of opinions, to be (too quote M1 in some commentary here) "Turbo 3GW:"
"This space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. Now, you can stretch the boundaries of your interpretation, but not in an unlimited fashion, after all, it must be bound by physics, as it contains buildings and alleys. The question is, how do you interpret the alley? Do you interpret the alley as a place, like every architect and every town planner does, to walk through, or do you interpret the alley as a place forbidden to walk through? This depends only on interpretation. We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through, and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. Not only do I not want to fall into his traps, I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win. I need to emerge from an unexpected place ... This is why we opted for the methodology of moving through walls ... Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing."
But the spinning gears inside Naveh's head seem to be entertaining some rather 5GW-ish principles.
First of all, this war against the Palestinians has to lead to their liberation. Take the date of the end of Operation Defensive Shield, half a year after Defensive Shield, interpret it and go to a different place, switch the disk. It is completely clear to me that it has to lead to the liberation of the Palestinians, after the price is exacted. The second liberation is to create a prison and dismantle it, create a form of thinking and dismantle it: the idea of permanent change is liberation.
No doubt that this is, on it's surface, very kinetic. But the thought process that lies behind it is not to exact attrition upon or outmaneuver the adversary. It's to attack the adversary's very concept of who and what he's fighting and how and where he will fight him.
From a tactical standpoint this seems elementary. From a strategic standpoint, in which the classical concept of victory is reliant upon the state and presence (Machiavelli referred to the victorious prince living amongst the defeated populace as the best measure to seal and maintain victory; state and presence) it's abjectly foreign. That a war can be fought and won beyond the precepts of victory (see Hezbollah in 2006) is strikingly 5GW.
Thoughts?
(Crossposted at Soob)
I have to say that the buzz about Naveh made me go track down his book 'In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory.' I am three chapters in and so far I am very unimpressed. I keep looking for the 5GW payoff and so far he hasn't revealed any thinking that isn't beyond Lind's 1GW or 2GW (from a very Jomini-esq 'destruction and attrition' interpretation of Claueswitz at that). I'm going to keep reading though, he is diving into the Blitzkrieg and that *should* get his thinking into 3GW. Maybe as the book goes on he'll continue to move higher up the gradients, but I don't have high hopes at this point.
There's a critique of Naveh and Systemic Operational Design in the latest JFQ that might of interest.
I specifically avoided reading this critique until after I had read Naveh's book and come to my own conclusion. After reading it I almost completely agree with the conclusion of the article. It also highlights what could be the genesis of the skewed interpretation of history that I observed. I think Naveh started with this SOD/systems theory concept and wrote a version of warfare history that supports it. He used only the elements and interpretations that proved his thesis rather than attempted to find elements that tend to disprove it.
I still don't buy it and I hope that I don't ever fall into that trap with my thinking of 5GW and XGW.