Dreaming 5GW

EBOv2

Previously in writing about EBOv2 (or, “Evolved EBO” as I quickly labeled it then), I noted that effects-based operations should be expanded to include two areas of observation when determining operations:

In general “effects-based” has two components:

1. “It is thus about producing desired futures.”  I.e., operations should be focused on pre-determined ultimate effects.  Our activities are therefore determined by those effects, or based upon those effects we are seeking.
2. “[T]hose engaging in effects-based operations must continuously adapt plans, rules, and assumptions to existing reality.” In other words, whatever effects actually occur within the world — as opposed to the pre-determined effects we have chosen — will shape our activities; our future activities will be based upon those effects.

One might summarize to say that, for successful adaptive operations, we must not only have a willingness to observe all that is occurring within our sphere of activity, but we must also have a clear primary goal.  In fact, we might go so far as to include a consideration of the OODA loop and say that the process of adaptation in EBOv2 is a conscious re-Orientation — as opposed to an unconscious or subconscious re-Orientation.  Unconscious or subconscious re-Orientation occurs when either a) sight of the primary goal has been lost, b) the primary goal is, for whatever reasons, in the process of being altered (or is fluid), and/or c) the primary goal itself is unconscious or subconscious and not understood or apparent to the actor.  Of these, “c” may lead to a positive outcome with respect to the goal for any given action; but for ongoing and extended operations, “c” is more likely to devolve to either “a” or “b” over time than remain a useful guide.

The great stumbling-block for those who would conduct EBOv2 (and for that matter, those who have attempted plain old EBO) results from three different but interrelated conditions:

1. The setting of sights too low, with limited reach, when deciding a primary goal.
2. The inability to define, and thus observe and successfully act upon, an accurate sphere of activity.
3. The existence of others acting within the world who are themselves observing the world at large and setting their own sights on desired futures.

These conditions occur together.  A limited concept of the accurate sphere of activity reduces one’s sights to accomplishing merely immediate objectives, never mind the fact that others operating in that limited sphere may be looking outside that sphere of activity for materiel and/or political/ideological support.

Furthermore, those others affecting the battlefield may not actually be within that limited sphere, at least not in a way that will be greatly affected by the limited application of EBO.  Exterior allies of the interior target may affect anything from the supplying of that target (in the case of materiel) to the global marketplace (economic or ideological) upon which the practitioner of EBO depends.  The application of a limited EBO, in an attempt to accomplish a limited goal, may begin to resemble, for lack of a better description, “pissing into the wind.”

Finally, the practitioner of limited EBO, through a lack of foresight, may ignore others outside that sphere who could help accomplish even those limited objectives in a lasting manner by helping to achieve more significant objectives not within the limited EBO.  Thomas Barnett points at an example of this when he laments that “The Leviathan is screwed.”  In that case, the Leviathan — the military arm — attempted to also be the SysAdmin — or, nation-builder, ignoring the level of support from without, some of it coming within also, that would be required.  (This, incidentally, may be an example of “b” above, or of a shifting, fluid primary objective, since the great effort at SysAdmin was not a part of the major planning for the initial operations.)  Another example, or at least allegory:  short-term gains led our marketplace into the thickets of recession, with the only apparent solution as viewed by those in command being the expansion of the sphere of activity of governments around the world, whether through stimulus packages or bail-outs or broader regulation, often acting in unison.  (Regardless of efficacy or wisdom for any of these responses, these show the sudden realization that an expansion of the sphere of activity would be required.)

To sum:  Without a primary objective that is broad enough, and which takes into account all the domains or battlespaces and actors who may affect that objective, EBO becomes too limited to be of much use and in fact may become counterproductive.

The stumbling-block, in short, is an issue of scope — with the attending issue of complexity.  In my next post, I’ll look at the idea of  Open Space Technology as a guide for how we may approach and overcome that stumbling-block.  

Filed in The Vault and tagged Complexity, EBO, Open Space Technology, Stumblingblock